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Abstract
Ideology is central to political psychology, but despite recent renewed interest in studying
political ideology, its measurement is inconsistent. Ideology scales are numerous and
heterogeneous in content. Further, there is disagreement on whether ideology is
unidimensional or multi-dimensional, and what the nature of these dimensions are. These
inconsistencies limit the generalizability of conclusions made about ideology as it relates to
political views and behaviour. There is a clear need for a conceptual model that is grounded
in theory, and for a well-validated scale that organizes and quantifies ideology. Chapter 1
reviews the state of ideology measurement and identifies plausible dimensions supported by
the literature. Chapter 2 involves the development of the new political ideology scale (NPIS)
and two exploratory factor analyses (EFA) with samples of 426 postsecondary students and
239 Canadian adults, respectively, which explored the latent structure of the items. Chapter 3
involved three studies using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with samples of 484 (Time
1) and 388 (Time 2) Canadian adults, 522 postsecondary students, and 191 Canadian adults,
respectively. These studies tested the fit of the refined item pool and established a threefactor structure of ideology comprising egalitarianism, traditionalism, and authoritarianism
factors. Construct and criterion validity analyses were also conducted. The three factors were
associated to varying degrees with personality traits; social dominance and right-wing
authoritarianism; party affiliation and voting behaviour; support for normative and radical
collective action; views on Canadian political policies; and perceptions of the COVID-19
virus, government response, and vaccination intentions. Chapter 4 involves a latent profile
analysis (LPA) suggesting four patterns of scores, which were associated with different
demographic features and views on collective action: a highly egalitarian, very antiauthoritarian and very progressive profile; an egalitarian, moderately authoritarian, and
moderately progressive profile; a highly authoritarian, slightly anti-egalitarian, and highly
traditional profile; and a very anti-egalitarian, moderately authoritarian, highly traditional
profile. Chapter 5 involves an experimental study on persuasive messaging and ideology as it
relates to COVID-19 vaccination intentions. The studies provide a foundation for a more
cohesive study of ideology, and the scale has potential applications for any research requiring
measurement of core political values.
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Summary for Lay Audience
A person’s political orientation can be understood as a collection of interrelated attitudes
towards how government and civil society should be organized. This network of beliefs,
which can be called an ‘ideology’, is often thought to exist on a dimension of left- to rightwing, or from liberal-to-conservative. While these terms are among the most common
identifiers for ideology, they are far from the only ones. Individuals may use a variety of
other words to describe their political views, and many discrete policy positions cannot be
easily placed on this spectrum. From a psychometric standpoint, there is also a clear need for
a more nuanced model – a substantial number of political psychology researchers have
found a singular dimension of ideology does not line up with their data. I reviewed the state
of ideology measurement in contemporary political psychology as well as interdisciplinary
research and hypothesized a handful of ideological value dimensions that might map on to
individual’s political views. To investigate, I generated an extensive preliminary measure of
70 statements and conducted two exploratory factor analyses (EFAs), a statistical technique
used to identify the structure underlying a set of items and to reduce the model to the bestfitting set of dimensions. After this, three confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were
conducted to test how well the hypothesized model mapped on to the data collected from
three additional samples, which included 484 (at Time 1) and 388 (at Time 2) Canadian
adults, 522 Canadian postsecondary students, and 191 Canadian adults. The new political
ideology scale (NPIS) was found to have three dimensions: egalitarianism, traditionalism,
and authoritarianism. I conducted additional analyses to provide further evidence for the
structure and usefulness of the scale, including exploring its relationships with existing
measures of political views, as well as conducting tests of its utility in predicting outcomes
like party affiliation, voting behaviour, support for collective action, and responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The NPIS is intended to serve as a conceptual model as well as a
testing instrument for any researchers seeking to study core political values, their predictors,
and their consequences.
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Chapter 1
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Introduction
Ideology is at the heart of political psychology. Understanding the core values

that give rise to political behaviour has been of interest to researchers for decades. Nearly
a century ago, scholars such as Thurstone (1931a) and Ferguson (1939) laid the
groundwork for the empirical study of ideology with their research on social attitudes; in
the mid-20th-century, Adorno et al.’s landmark work The Authoritarian Personality
would shape the ideology discourse for years to follow. Despite claims about the ‘end’ of
ideology (the most influential likely being Bell, 1960, and see also Shils, 1986b) or, less
harshly, assertions that ideology exists only among the politically sophisticated (e.g.,
Converse, 1964; Kalmoe, 2020), ideology research has not disappeared. To the contrary:
in recent years, it has undergone a renaissance (Jost, 2006).
Ideology can be defined as a system of core beliefs that is internally consistent
and relatively stable. In the case of political ideology (as opposed to, for example,
religious ideology), it reflects a vision about how society should function, gives meaning
to the political environment, and facilitates political decision-making. While the precise
definition of ideology has varied greatly (Jost, 2006), these attributes are largely
unchallenged. Across interdisciplinary literature, ideology is held to be coherent (beliefs
within the system do not blatantly contradict each other), contrasting (the belief system is
distinct and meaningful), and stable (it does not change drastically over short intervals;
Gerring, 1997, p. 25).
An overwhelming amount of evidence suggests individuals can and do use
political value systems to guide their decisions, including those with lower political
sophistication (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Carney et al., 2008; Erikson & Tedin,
2003; Evans et al., 1996; Feldman, 2003; Jacoby, 1991; Jost et al., 2008; Kerlinger, 1984;
Knight, 1999; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985). Measuring ideology is of such great interest to
researchers because these value systems predict policy views (Graetz & Shapiro, 2005,
Sidanius et al., 1996); party affiliation and voting (Jost et al., 2008); prejudice (Conover
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& Feldman, 1981; Duckitt et al., 2002; Jost et al., 2004) and racism (Sidanius et al.,
1996); climate change attitudes and environmental behaviour (Jylhä & Akrami, 2015;
Jylhä et al., 2016; Sinclair & Saklofske, 2018), and even lifestyles – ideology is so
pervasive, it has been shown to predict music taste and bedroom décor (Carney et al.,
2008). The relevant debate is not whether ideology exists, or whether the term is being
abused (Kalmoe, 2020), but about finding the optimal way to measure it.
This dissertation describes the development and validation of a new measure of
political ideology. To begin, the following section reviews the status of ideology
measurement in political psychology, identifies unresolved issues, and outlines the need
for a new scale.

1.1 The State of Ideology Measurement in Political
Psychology and Need for the Current Study
1.1.1

Left and Right
‘Left’ and ‘right’, spatial metaphors representing political orientation, are likely

the most ubiquitous terms for this purpose and are used in both academic and lay
parlance. Left and right represent two ends of one spectrum and thus a unidimensional
model of ideology. Roughly analogous are the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’. They
are not perfect synonyms, however, particularly outside North America. For example, the
term ‘liberal’ in Europe can conjure connotations of ‘classical liberalism’ and laissezfaire economic policies, such as beliefs about limited government and the “sanctity of
private property”, which are favoured by American conservatives (Kerlinger, 1984, p.
16).
Left and right are widely believed to have originated with the 1789 French
National Assembly based on the sides of the hall where Assembly members were seated.
Those who supported the traditional monarchy gathered on the right, and those who
opposed the monarchy gathered on the left (Bobbio, 1996; Caprara & Vecchione, 2018;
Jost et al., 2009). This origin speaks to a defining attribute of left versus right: the left is
associated with progress (in this historical example, revolution), and the right is
associated with tradition or stability (Bobbio, 1996; Jost, 2006; Lipset et al., 1954).
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The second defining quality of the left-right dimension is generally held to be
their relative attitudes towards inequality (Jost, 2006). The left wing is associated with
egalitarianism, and it opposes hierarchies, while the right accepts inequalities or views
hierarchy as natural and inevitable (Bobbio, 1996). Political psychologists like John Jost,
one of the most prolific researchers on ideology and its consequences, characterizes these
two aspects as “resistance to change” and “acceptance of inequality” (Jost et al., 2007).
Many scales were developed in the 20th century to measure left-right or liberalconservative attitudes, such as Eysenck’s R factor (1951; 1954), McClosky’s Classical
Conservatism Scale (1958), Tomkins’ Polarity Scale (1964), and the Wilson and
Patterson C Scale (1968; 1970). These scales have largely fallen out of favour due to
psychometric validity problems, though the Polarity Scale has been called “lamentably
underresearched” (Jost et al., 2003a, p. 346). Wilson and Patterson’s C scale, at its
inception, was initially received positively, and a review of ideology measures by
Azevedo (2020) suggests it was the most used ideology scale across the last century.
However, researchers who tried to replicate Wilson and Patterson’s work found no fewer
than 15 factors (Altemeyer, 1981; Boshier, 1972; Robertson & Cochrane, 1973), its
average inter-item correlation was only about .13 (Altemeyer, 1981; Wilson & Patterson,
1968), and it was criticized for conflating political and non-political content (Jost et al.,
2003a).
When researchers employ scales to measure left-right or liberal-conservative
ideology, the measures used are collectively idiosyncratic, and individual scales are often
unvalidated or the validation process reported only partially. In a review, Azevedo (2020)
identified no fewer than 152 measures, plus 43 unnamed scales, the vast majority of
which were developed in the previous two decades. Of these, less than half were
psychometrically validated, some provided only partial reports of validation procedures,
and the scales varied substantially in content and format (Azevedo, 2020). Thus, even if
researchers are seeking to measure the same latent construct – an ideological orientation
characterized by attitudes towards equality and resistance to change – the heterogeneity
of these ad hoc instruments calls into question any cumulative conclusions made about
the consequences of ideology (Azevedo, 2020).
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When scales are not used – which is relatively often – psychologists often rely on
a single-item self-report (along the left-right or liberal-conservative continuum; Federico
et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2003a; Knight, 1999) as a symbolic measure of ideology. While
this avoids the issue of measurement heterogeneity and allows for better comparability
and generalizability across studies, there are statistical and theoretical problems with this
approach. There are also issues with the concept of ideology as a unidimensional
construct.

1.1.2

Issues with a Unidimensional Model of Ideology
From a statistical perspective, firstly, single items are subject to large degrees of

measurement error (Ansolabehere et al., 2008), partially because they are prone to
idiosyncrasies in question interpretation (Evans et al., 1996). Second, single items cannot
identify an underlying value domain, which is made possible through examining
consistency across a set of items (Evans et al., 1996) – but ideology is understood to be
an interrelated set of beliefs or ‘core values’. Third, self-placement is frequently
inaccurate – respondents are not always good at applying symbolic ideological terms to
themselves. Asking participants to place themselves along a spectrum based on abstract
terminology (i.e., left and right), assumes homogeneity among respondents’
interpretations. However, individuals differ in their understanding of left and right as they
are defined and as they relate to policy content (Feldman & Johnston, 2013). Because of
this, while it is true that symbolic ideology is a strong predictor of voting behaviour and
party affiliation (Jost, 2006), it is probably not as useful for predicting less
straightforward outcomes, like policy views. Ellis and Stimson (2007; 2009), for
example, found that only a minority of self-identified conservatives possessed overall
conservative policy positions. This is a problem for interpreting results derived from a
single-item measure of symbolic ideology.
From a theoretical perspective, it is not at all clear that the two defining
characteristics of the left-right continuum – attitudes towards equality and change – are
so tightly correlated that they represent one dimension. Many researchers have found it
more useful to assess egalitarianism (or, sometimes, ‘economic values’, both reflecting
attitudes towards the fair distribution of economic resources) separately from resistance
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to change (or ‘social values’, both characterized by one’s attitude towards the evolution
of sociocultural norms). Achterberg and Houtman (2009), Ashton et al. (2005), Duckitt
(2001), Heath et al. (1994), Knight (1999), and Treier and Hillygus (2009) all found a
multidimensional model of political views to have better fit. While these two dimensions
often correlate highly (Jost et al., 2003a), there are exceptions. Cochrane (2010), for
example, found a non-significant correlation between economic and social ideology in
the US. The strength of their correlation tends to vary as a function of political
sophistication as well as the level of polarization in a country’s political institutions, such
that when individuals are more sophisticated and institutions more polarized, the
relationship is stronger (Carmines et al., 2012; Mirisola et al., 2007; Roccato & Ricolfi,
2005). The latter interaction is likely due to the constraint institutions place on the
populace. To the extent that citizens can participate in politics, they are limited by the
parties and politicians available to them, and their values can change to reflect this.
Indeed, those who cannot find an ideological match among available candidates are more
ambivalent about their affiliations (Carmines et al., 2012)
It would be a mistake to strive for model simplicity at the expense of accuracy.
Even if egalitarianism and traditionalism often correlate highly, there are many
circumstances where they do not. There may also be other distinct ideological
dimensions. The most researched is likely authoritarianism.

1.1.2.1

Authoritarianism and Radicalism

Bobbio (1996) proposed ideology also incorporates a spectrum of liberty to
authority and thus the character of both left-wing and right-wing attitudes can be altered
by attitudes towards individual rights; the left loses social cohesion as liberty increases,
while the right loses structured hierarchy (Bobbio, 1996, p. xvi). By this logic, there are
movements of the libertarian right and left as well as the authoritarian right and left.
Authoritarian individuals – citizens, rather than political leaders – tend to submit to
authorities, potentially enabling and perpetuating anti-democratic political institutions
(Altemeyer, 2006), while libertarian (anti-authoritarian) individuals emphasize individual
freedom, and question or oppose entrenched authorities. For an interesting lay measure of
this two-dimensional structure – authoritarianism versus liberty with left versus right –
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see the ‘The Political Compass’, a publicly available non-academic resource
(https://www.politicalcompass.org/).
The psychological literature has usually conceived of authoritarianism as
inherently right-wing – that is, existing in combination with qualities like traditional
values and aversion to change. However, many have also attempted to research the
phenomenon of left-wing authoritarianism (LWA). At face value, LWA seems plausible.
There seems to be little precluding a position of authoritarian obedience from existing in
combination with egalitarian and progressive beliefs, although one caveat is that
obedience to authorities implies hierarchies, which is difficult to square with the strongest
interpretations of egalitarianism and the farthest left movements – such as anarchism,
which opposes all hierarchies (Cohn, 2009). Interestingly, however, egalitarianism
correlates negatively with authoritarianism in North America but positively in Russia
(McFarland et al., 1996), suggesting that the nature of authoritarianism (i.e., whether it is
right- or left-wing) could depend on the type of government historically in power.
Yet attempts to profile left-wing authoritarians, or to develop left-wing or nonpolarized (left-right ‘agnostic’) authoritarianism scales, have been fraught with
difficulties. Altemeyer (2006) has suggested left-wing authoritarians are so limited in
number they are not even worth studying (and that the few he has met over his decades of
research spend little time politically organizing). Rokeach and Eysenck are two
researchers who attempted to create agnostic measures of authoritarianism. However,
Rokeach’s scale (1956) and Eysenck’s T factor (1954/1999) both produced something
arguably closer to cognitive rigidity or dogmatism. The T factor (toughmindednesstendermindedness) was created to explain why extremists on both the left and right have
been given to rigid or even violent methods. This dimension, Eysenck argued, was
independent of left-right (Eysenck 1954/1999). However, evidence for its orthogonality
has been mixed, with right-wingers usually scoring more highly on toughmindedness and
dogmatism in the West (Jost et al. 2003b; Stone & Smith, 1993), and the program of
research was largely abandoned (Jost et al., 2009). The construct might thus represent
something qualitatively distinct from authoritarianism. Van Hiel et al. (2006) also
referred to this rigidity in their ‘extremism theory.’
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There is cutting-edge neuroscience suggesting extremism or dogmatism might
represent its own dimension of ideology. Zamboni et al. (2009) utilized functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multidimensional scaling to identify how
respondents grouped political statements, and found evidence for individualismcollectivism, cultural liberalism-conservatism, and radicalism-moderatism factors. This
final dimension resembles previous conceptions of LWA, dogmatism, extremism, or
radicalism. For example, it contained content pertaining to the use of violence to further a
political goal when necessary (Zamboni et al., 2009, p.25). Kerlinger (1984) defines
radicalism as “…any set of beliefs, but usually beliefs of the extreme right and left, that is
centered in opposition to existing sets of beliefs, institutions, governments, economic,
political, and moral systems, or existing traditions; it espouses drastic thoroughgoing,
revolutionary, even violent change and the ultimate supplanting of existing beliefs,
institutions, and systems with government, institutions, and systems advocated by the
radicals” (p. 19). In short, radicalism represents a desire to overturn the status quo by
extreme actions.

1.1.3

Existing Multidimensional Measures of Ideology
A single left-right dimension has frequently been found to be insufficient

(Feldman, 2013; Feldman & Johnston, 2013; Fleishman, 1988; Heath, 1986a; Luttbeg &
Gant, 1985), even when political elites are polarized (Layman & Carsey, 2002). It is
typically shown that at least two dimensions are necessary (Achterberg & Houtman,
2009; Ashton et al., 2005; Duckitt, 2001; Heath et al., 1994; Knight, 1999; Sarıbay et al.,
2017; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). These are usually egalitarianism-versusantiegalitarianism and progressivism-versus-traditionalism; as discussed above, they are
also sometimes referred to as social and economic attitudes, reflecting attitudes towards
the evolution of sociocultural norms and the fair distribution of wealth, respectively
(Cochrane, 2010; Knight, 1999).
In addition to these two dimensions, authoritarianism is, arguably, an orthogonal
dimension of ideology. Radicalism (or dogmatism, extremism, LWA, etc.) may also be
distinct, though it is comparatively less researched than the preceding three. These are not
novel constructs, and instruments exist to assess each of them. However, the existing
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measures are not ideal for the purpose of measuring political ideology, as the following
sections will discuss.

1.1.3.1

Measures of Authoritarianism

Contemporary understanding of authoritarianism is largely the product of a
decades-long program of research by Robert Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1998, 2006).
Altemeyer felt that authoritarianism comprises conventionalism (essentially
traditionalism) as well as authoritarian submission (obedience) and aggression towards
authority-sanctioned targets (punitiveness), and that these three characteristics form one
factor known as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). However, it is increasingly reported
that RWA is more appropriately measured as a three-factor model (Duckitt & Bizumic,
2013; Duckitt et al., 2009; Funke, 2005; Mavor et al., 2010). Even if a researcher wishes
to measure the entire authoritarian syndrome, RWA is not an ideal scale. RWA’s use of
multi-barreled items forces its factors to spuriously coalesce (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013;
Mavor et al., 2010). Using the existing items – though multi-barreled – Mavor et al.
(2010) investigated an alternative three-factor hypothesis, with factors labeled
conventionalism, aggression, and authoritarian submission, ultimately finding this to be
superior to a one-factor model in both an exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.
Researchers may also be interested in exploring the factors separately. Duckitt
and Bizumic (2013) found the three factors related to different motivational goals. The
pattern of factor intercorrelations also differs between countries (Duckitt et al., 2009). To
attempt to address the shortcomings of the RWA scale, Funke (2005) designed new
items; however, this modified version does not seem to have caught on with researchers.

1.1.3.2

Measures of Egalitarianism and Traditionalism

Duckitt & Sibley (2012) have argued that RWA and Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) – a scale assessing general attitudes towards group dominance – were
the “major impetus” for creating a two-dimensional model in political psychology (p.
1863). The instruments respectively do seem to represent attitudes towards security and
traditionalism and towards anti-egalitarianism and intolerance; additionally, they predict
support for different kinds of political parties (those that campaign on a platform of law,
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order, and traditional values, versus those that support free-market economics and openly
discriminatory policies; Duckitt & Sibley, 2012). But while it is tempting to use SDO and
RWA as a sort of two-dimensional model of ideology, Duckitt and Sibley themselves
expressed reservations about whether they are ideal for this purpose (2012, p. 1886).
Like RWA, SDO itself is multifactorial – Ho et al. (2015) have recently shown
that SDO comprises SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E).
SDO-D represents support for overt, aggressive intergroup dominance, while SDO-E
represents opposition to the general principle of egalitarianism, and the desire to prevent
some groups from obtaining resources (Ho et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015). As such, the
former has been shown to relate to support for wars and the persecution of immigrants,
while the latter relates to more subtle hierarchy-legitimizing views and to self-identified
political conservatism (Ho et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015). Research in social dominance
theory has been highly prolific and incredibly useful for understanding a myriad of
intergroup relations outcomes (Ekehammar et al., 2004; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999), but if one is interested in measuring the general ideological orientation
towards egalitarianism, SDO is likely not the ideal instrument.
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) has been suggested as a measure of ideology,
though it was originally developed as a theory and measure of cultural value domains
(Haidt et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2017). MFT proposes two ‘individualizing’ foundations
(harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) and three ‘binding’ foundations (in-group/loyalty,
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity; Haidt et al., 2009). Research suggests that selfdescribed liberals tend to rely on the individualizing moral foundations for their decisionmaking, while conservatives rely more evenly on all five (Graham et al., 2009). Fairness
and authority foundations, specifically, seem to be the best predictors of political
ideology (Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015). MFT researchers have recently proposed the
existence of a ‘liberty’ foundation. A study of self-identified libertarians found they
greatly value ‘negative liberty’ or independence, while relying comparatively less on the
other five foundations (Iyer et al., 2012). However, MFT as a measure of ideology does
not appear to be superior to existing measures. Kugler et al. (2014), for example, have
argued that MFT’s binding values closely resemble RWA, and that differences in moral
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foundations between liberals and conservatives are mediated by low SDO in liberals and
high RWA in conservatives. The binding values also predict similar outcomes to RWA –
for example, prejudice. In short, MFT does not seem to be an improvement over SDO
and RWA. Recently, Zakharin & Bates (2021) have also found that two MFT domains –
purity/sanctity and authority/respect – fit the data better when each are split into two
factors.

1.1.3.3

Measures of Radicalism, Dogmatism, or LWA

One theoretical problem with the idea of radicalism or dogmatism as a dimension
of ideology is that it may refer to the extremity of, or commitment to, a belief. That is, it
may not characterize the form of the belief, but rather how firmly the belief is held. This
can be measured in other ways, such as the Commitment to Beliefs scale (Maxwell-Smith
& Esses, 2012). However, several scales have been created to attempt to measure
dogmatism and radicalism, as well as left-wing variations of authoritarianism.
As discussed previously, many attempts to uncover LWA or a non-polarized
authoritarianism have revealed something closer to radicalism or dogmatism. One
instrument was Rokeach’s D-scale (1956). In his conception, dogmatic individuals
believed strongly in the veracity of their political views, they emphasized adherence to
the party line, and much like authoritarians, they deferred to their chosen authority. Early
findings suggested self-described communists scored highly on the D scale; however,
attempts to replicate this with a broader sample revealed that D more often correlated
with increases in right-wing attitudes. In later work, it was shown that fascists obtained
the highest D scores and communists the lowest (DiRenzo, 1967; Stone, 1980). Because
of this, it is difficult to make the case for the D scale as an orthogonal measure of
radicalism or dogmatism, nor one of LWA.
Altemeyer (1996), Van Hiel et al. (2006), and Costello et al. (2021) have all
developed measures of LWA. Altemeyer’s LWA scale utilized the same structure as
RWA – aggression, punitiveness, and conventionalism – but with tweaks to measure leftwing beliefs. Altemeyer’s research failed to identify any left-wing authoritarians and led
him to claim they were the ‘Loch Ness monster’ of ideology (1996). It is possible this is
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because LWA exists only in niche samples. Alternatively, his conception of LWA may
simply be a contradiction in terms – if conventionalism or resistance to change is a
quality of the right, then it is hard to conceive of left-wing conventionalism. But given
Altemeyer’s RWA is better modeled as a three-factor scale rather than a unified one (e.g.,
Mavor et al., 2010), conventionalism may not be a necessary component of
authoritarianism per se.
Van Hiel et al. (2006) discussed the issues with Altemeyer’s LWA scale – notably
the lack of clarity in the left-wing conventionalism concept – and devised their own
instrument. Their scale contained items referring to ‘left-wing authoritarian aggression’
(e.g., “A revolutionary movement is justified in using violence because the Establishment
will never give up its power peacefully”), and ‘left-wing authoritarian submission’ (e.g.,
“A revolutionary movement is justified in demanding obedience and conformity of its
members,” Van Hiel et al., 2006). However, their scale demonstrated low internal
consistencies and its hypothesized two-dimensional structure was not found. Nonetheless,
they argued it was successful in distinguishing self-described anarchists and ‘extreme
left-wingers’ from other groups in their Western European sample (Van Hiel et al., 2006).
Costello et al.’s (2021) instrument was published after the studies in this
dissertation were conducted, so it was not consulted in the initial review and development
of the new ideology scale. Of the three LWA scales discussed here, it is the most
thoroughly psychometrically validated. Costello et al. identified a tripartite structure of
‘anti-hierarchical aggression, top-down censorship, and anti-conventionalism’. However,
a review of the item content suggests it may face similar hurdles as Altemeyer’s RWA.
Items in the scale span a variety of topics, referencing the use of political violence (e.g.,
“Political violence can be constructive when it serves the cause of social justice”),
rigidity (e.g., “I cannot imagine myself becoming friends with a political conservative,”),
and attitudes towards censorship (“Getting rid of inequality is more important than
protecting the so-called "right" to free speech”), and many of these items are confounded
with other content, such as egalitarianism (for example, the aforementioned censorship
item).
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In the scale construction process, the authors wrote that they incorporated 12
constructs – aggression, submission, ‘anti or reverse-hierarchical sentiments’,
conventionalism, ‘lethal partisanship’, prejudice towards those with different views,
dogmatism, ‘difference-ism’, moral absolutism, susceptibility to threat, toughmindedness, and rigidity (p. 10) – and it is not necessarily clear that this constellation of
variables is an accurate operationalization of LWA. Adorno et al.’s (1950) F scale was
criticized in part for its many heterogenous attributes – in their view, authoritarianism
comprised nine characteristics of conventionalism, submission to authority, aggression,
‘anti-intraception’ or anti-imagination, superstition and stereotypy, toughness, cynicism,
‘projectivity’ or projecting one’s own violent impulses onto the external world, and
traditional sexual attitudes – because it was unclear why these qualities were assessed as
a single score rather than disentangled (Peabody, 1966). Additionally, many F scale items
were multi-barreled, and inter-item correlations were low (Altemeyer, 1981). Costello et
al’s (2021) LWA scale was significantly predictive of support for and desire to
participate in anti-state violence at protests, suggesting it is a good measure of political
extremism – but not necessarily authoritarianism, which should theoretically predict
support for state-sanctioned violence, not subversive anti-authoritarian actions.
Costello et al.’s paper also includes the following methodology which is of
particular relevance to the development of the ideology scale:
“Given the online nature of our survey administration, we sought to measure
political attitudes with improved ecological validity. To that end, participants
viewed two empty graphs, with the poles of each x-axis labeled with opposing
political beliefs and the poles of each y-axis labeled with a second set of opposing
beliefs. Participants were instructed to place themselves within each graph by
moving their mouse to the position that best represents their political ideology.
We ventured that the resulting coordinate data could be decomposed (i.e., a
continuous variable for placement on the y-axis and another for the x-axis) and
would be useful as a measure of differing elements of political ideology. The first
political compass assessed preferences for traditionalist vs. progressive moral
values (i.e., social ideology; y-axis) and preferences for high vs. low
governmental involvement in the economy (i.e., economic ideology; x-axis). The
second political compass assessed preferences for a political system with
substantial centralized state control vs. one that maximizes personal and political
freedom and autonomy (y-axis) and symbolic identity (x-axis), with the former
variable being a proxy for authoritarianism.” (2021, p. 19).
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In short, the authors sought to compare their LWA scale with, in their view, a
more ecologically valid measure of political ideology – two political ‘compasses’, the
former with a social and economic ideology axis, and the latter with an axis for freedom
versus state control, which they used as a proxy for authoritarianism. It is unclear why the
authors view this as a proxy for authoritarianism when it does not resemble their own
LWA, with its tripartite structure of anti-hierarchical aggression, top-down censorship,
and anti-conventionalism (Costello et al., 2021). There is little in the LWA scale that
pertains to centralized state control or restrictions on freedom and autonomy beyond
freedom of speech (in fact, the anti-conventionalism items, such as “Constitutions and
laws are just another way for the powerful to destroy our dignity and individuality”,
could be taken as pro-individual-autonomy and pro-freedom; Costello et al., 2021, p. 16).
There is no supporting literature provided for the compasses, but it is interesting and
encouraging that the axes they chose closely resembled the factors hypothesized here for
the new ideology scale, and these were considered by the authors to be more ecologically
valid than the standard unidimensional measure of ideology. It is also compelling that
their LWA scale appears to be a valid and useful measure, even if it could be argued that
the scale might be better characterized as radicalism or extremism rather than left-wing
authoritarianism.
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Chapter 2

2

Development of the Political Ideology Scale
The previous review of existing measures of ideology suggests the potential for

several factors: egalitarianism, traditionalism, authoritarianism, and radicalism. In this
chapter, these hypothesized dimensions are outlined (each conceptualized as a single
bipolar continuum), the item development process for the new scale is discussed, and the
results of two exploratory factor analyses are examined.

2.1 Hypothesized Factors
2.1.1

Egalitarianism/Antiegalitarianism
As the previous chapter outlined, attitudes towards equality – ranging from a

preference for inequality to an opposition to inequality – are consistently considered a
characteristic of political ideology, with the right being more tolerant of inequality and
the left opposing it (Bobbio, 1996; Jost, 2006). Egalitarianism refers to the preference for
equality among all members of society; it does not imply a desire for everyone to be the
‘same’ nor for a homogenous culture. This can include equality of opportunities, resource
distribution, and treatment from others. At the opposite pole, antiegalitarianism refers to
the preference for unequal relations between individuals, implying a competitive and
hierarchical society.

2.1.2

Progressivism/Traditionalism
Alongside attitudes towards equality, resistance to change is another characteristic

consistently ascribed to political ideology, with the right resisting change and the left
accepting or seeking it (Jost, 2006). Here, these attitudes are referred to as progressivism
versus traditionalism. Progressivism is the preference for social change. This entails
pushing the boundaries of social norms and policies in new, non-traditional directions,
with the aim of improving the perceived standard of life in society. At the opposite pole,
traditionalism is the preference for conventional social standards. It implies a belief that
traditional ways of knowing or doing things are better, and a general resistance to novel,
perhaps untested ideas.
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2.1.3

Libertarianism/Authoritarianism
Some theorists have proposed a dimension of liberty versus authoritarianism (e.g.,

Bobbio, 1996), while others have conceived of authoritarianism as a ‘syndrome’ or
constellation of attributes (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 2006). Here, it is
hypothesized that libertarianism versus authoritarianism can be represented along either a
single dimension or by two dimensions of authoritarian obedience and authoritarian
punitiveness, as Altemeyer’s (2006) model has suggested. It is hypothesized that
authoritarianism is distinct from (though may still correlate with) other dimensions of
ideology, such as resistance to change and attitudes towards equality.
Along a libertarianism versus authoritarianism dimension, libertarianism is the
preference for personal freedom. It implies a dislike of perceived coercion or control that
impinges on individual autonomy, and thus a certain level of skepticism towards
authorities. It is important to note that in common parlance, libertarianism is often taken
to mean something closer to conservatism (particularly in the United States). Amongst
the American libertarian movement, the term tends to imply laissez-faire economic
policies and conservative social norms. Historically, libertarianism has been associated
with the left wing; indeed, until the 20th century, the term was functionally synonymous
with anarchism, a left-wing movement characterized by opposition to all hierarchy and a
focus on collective interests (Cohn, 2009).
At the opposite pole, authoritarianism is the preference for authoritarian oversight
over society. It implies submission, obedience, and deference to established authorities,
such as the government and law enforcement. At its core, authoritarianism is about
attitudes towards the role of authorities in enforcing societal standards (Feldman, 1989;
Knight, 1999). This likely entails hostility towards ‘deviants’, as assessed in Altemeyer’s
RWA scale (1981, 2006), but perhaps not necessarily. It is possible that this factor could
be further divided into a pacifism-versus-aggression factor (containing content about
punitiveness towards criminals and other perceived nonconformists, as well as hostility
towards perceived threatening outsiders) in addition to libertarianism-versusauthoritarianism (containing content about the value of personal freedom, autonomy, and
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privacy). The initial item pool contained both types of content to allow for the possibility
of disentangling these factors.

2.1.4

Radicalism/Moderatism
Many researchers have endeavored to develop scales assessing left-wing

authoritarianism, dogmatism, or extremism. Zamboni et al.’s (2009) analysis indicated
this could represent a unique dimension of ideology. Here, this construct is referred to as
radicalism and is hypothesized to be the preference for revolutionary or even violent
action towards enacting political change. It is also hypothesized that, like
authoritarianism, it should be distinct from (though may correlate with) other dimensions
of ideology, rather than being specific to the left or right.
Radicalism entails dogmatic and morally righteous thinking about the perceived
correct social order. At the opposite pole, moderatism is hypothesized to be the
preference for pragmatic, incremental approaches to politics. It entails greater flexibility
with regards to competing viewpoints and a belief that there is not necessarily one correct
way to do things.

2.2 Scale Development
Often, rather than assessing core values, ideology measures have relied on policy
items (Evans et al., 1996). One problem with this approach is that policy items will need
to be updated over time as discourses change, and they are also less likely to generalize to
other nations with different political contexts. Another hurdle is that possessing a
coherent set of policy views relies on a certain degree of political knowledge. As Kalmoe
(2020) points out, while most people might have ideological leanings, for these to be
expressed in the political domain depends on access to information. Measuring ideology
as a collection of policy views is likely to create an illusion of ‘ideological innocence’ (as
Kalmoe, 2020 describes it) in large swathes of the population. In short, a measurement of
ideology should assess core political values (for example, how equitably to distribute
resources) without referring to highly specific issues (such as the intricacies of one
country’s tax brackets). The items here were developed with this concern in mind. To
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ensure the feasibility of the project, the scope of the scale development research was
delimited to the Canadian context; participants in all studies were residents of Canada.
The initial scale was developed by generating a preliminary pool of 70 items
thought to represent one of the four (or five, if authoritarianism were split) hypothesized
factors, depicted in Table 1. A literature review of political attitude scales was conducted
to aid in creating items. Some scales consulted included Social Dominance Orientation
(Pratto et al., 1994; Ho, et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015) and the Identification with All
Humanity Scale (McFarland et al., 2012) for the Egalitarianism factor; Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2006) and Evans et al.’s Libertarian-Authoritarian
Dimension (1996) for the Progressivism and Libertarianism factors; the Polarity Scale
(1964) for Egalitarianism, Progressivism, and Libertarianism; and lastly, the Dogmatism
Scale (Rokeach, 1956) and the New Left Scale (Gold et al., 1976) for the Radicalism
factor. All items were newly devised for this measure.
A 7-point Likert scale was selected, as previous research has found reliability and
validity to be highest at seven choices (Matell & Jacoby, 1971; Krosnick, 1999). As
discussed, the items were intended to be general and abstract rather than policy-specific.
A review panel of eight Masters- and Doctoral-level personality and social psychology
students reviewed the initial item pool and provided constructive feedback. Based on
their suggestions, revisions were made to ensure clarity and content validity. To attempt
to address acquiescence bias, all factors contained approximately equal numbers of proand con-trait worded items. No explicit option was provided for ‘no opinion’ or ‘don’t
know’ (though in all studies, participants could opt not to answer any item if they
wished), as evidence suggests data quality is equivalent when participants are not given
this option, and a greater amount of useful data is collected (Krosnick, 1999; McClendon
& Alwin, 1993; Schuman & Presser, 1981).
Table 1: Initial item pool
Progressivism versus Traditionalism
+

-
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sometimes to solve big social problems,
we have to try brand new approaches.
I admire people who are trying to make a
difference by being active in political
movements.
In order to build a good society, we need
to let go of past customs that are holding
us back.
I am quick to adopt new ideas and ways
of thinking.
Society can survive just fine without oldfashioned customs to guide it.
Too many people accept the world as it is
instead of trying to make it better.
Sometimes what society needs are people
who are brave enough to push new ideas,
even if they seem troublesome to certain
groups.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to
avoid too many changes in how it works.
I try my best to follow the traditions
passed down by my culture or society.
Changes in the social order are often
shown later to be for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being oldfashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should
grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are
usually just immature acts of rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the right
ideas about how to live.
These days, people are too willing to try
out wild new ideas without any proof they
will work.
I don’t trust activists and agitators trying
to stir things up.

Egalitarianism versus Antiegalitarianism
+
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

In a fair world, the wealth gap should be
as small as possible.
Society is at its best when people
cooperate with those around them.
Resources should be distributed
according to people’s needs.
A responsible society takes good care of
its weakest members.
Different cultural groups have more in
common than they have differences.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes
more highly so that money is distributed
more equitably.
The role of the government is to ensure
the wellbeing of its citizens.
Our society would have a lot less conflict
if we treated everyone more equally.
No jobs should be looked down upon,
because they all provide useful
contributions to society.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

In a fair world, it is natural that some
people will end up with more resources
and some with less.
People should get used to competition,
because it’s an inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard
for success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay
high taxes just because they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for
privileges others can’t afford.
Social inequality is inevitable, because
some groups of people have good
qualities that others do not.
It would cause fewer problems if different
groups of people lived separately and
didn’t have to interact.
Life would be boring if we ensured
everyone had the same standard of living.

Libertarianism versus Authoritarianism
+
•
•

All authority should be questioned rather
than blindly followed.
One of the worst things I could imagine
would be living under a dictatorship.

•
•

Freedom must sometimes be sacrificed in
the name of security.
Without strong leaders, society as we
know it would collapse.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

It is not the place of the government to
restrict freedom of speech.
What two consenting adults do in their
own bedroom is not anyone else’s
business.
In school, kids should be taught to think
critically about all of the information they
receive.
Without personal freedom, society as we
know it would collapse.
Children should be able to play and
express themselves without too many
strict rules.
I believe in letting others do as they
please, and they should do the same for
me.*
Rarely, if ever, has declaring war on
another country been justified.*
Prisons should be places of rehabilitation,
not of harsh punishment.*

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Government surveillance is only
concerning if you have something to hide.
The role of the government is to maintain
law and order.
Parents should be strict in disciplining
their children, to teach them obedience.
Our country’s leaders need to be tougher
on citizens who hold dangerous views.*
Criminals should be harshly punished for
the wellbeing of society.*
Good national leaders keep us safe by
standing up to enemies who would do us
harm.*
Our government must be prepared to use
its full military might to protect us.*
There are some crimes that are so terrible,
the criminal deserves the death penalty.*
It is often necessary for the police to use
force to catch potential criminals.*

Radicalism versus Moderatism
+
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Violence can be justified when pursuing a
noble goal.
I have no faith in our current social
system.
When I compromise with the other side in
a political debate, I feel like I’ve
sacrificed some integrity.
When people are trying to further a great
cause, the ends justify the means.
I know that my political views are
morally right.
Sometimes words aren’t enough to create
social change – there needs to be
disruption.
Sometimes, creating great changes in
society requires ruthlessness or brutality.
I wouldn’t want to associate at all with
someone whom I politically disagreed.

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

It’s best if political changes happen in
small increments.
If people from opposing sides of the
political spectrum took the time to listen,
they’d see that they agree on a lot of
things.
If you are hostile in a debate, you have
already lost.
People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs
on others, regardless of how strongly they
hold them.
There are no moral or immoral political
views, only differences of opinion.
Extremists of any political beliefs are
threats to democratic society.
No single group in particular can be
trusted to say what information should be
censored.
Educators should be allowed to express
their political views to students, even if
some of those attitudes are
unconventional or disagreeable.
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Note: (*) identifies items pertaining to freedom versus obedience, as opposed to pacifism
versus punitiveness.

2.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (Study 1)
The first Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) investigated the factor structure of
the preliminary items.

2.3.1

Methods

2.3.1.1

Participants and Data Cleaning

Participants were undergraduate students at Western University recruited through
the SONA subject pool. To conduct a factor analysis, the general recommendation is to
obtain a sample size of either N = 200 or a 5:1 participant-item ratio (Howard, 2016;
Kahane et al., 2018; Yong & Pearce, 2013). For the 70-item scale, this would require a
minimum of 350 participants. For the first EFA, 480 participants were recruited, ensuring
minimum sample guidelines of 5:1 participant-to-item would be met after data cleaning.
A range of techniques recommended by Curran (2016) were employed to deal
with careless responding and invalid data, including screening data for short response
times, as well as calculating Mahalanobis D to identify multivariate outliers. First, 14
participants were excluded for not completing any part of the political ideology scale.
Second, data were screened for short response times, an indicator of inattentive
responding. A cut-off of two seconds per item, recommended by Huang et al. (2012), was
used. The total survey (including other scales) contained 159 items; at two seconds per
item, this suggests a minimum completion time of 318 seconds. Sixteen participants were
excluded based on this criterion. Finally, Mahalanobis D was calculated in SPSS
software. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend a conservative threshold value of
.001 when using Mahalanobis D to flag data outliers. Using this criterion, 24 participants
were excluded. This left a sample size of N = 426. Missing data in the EFA were handled
with maximum likelihood estimation.
Of these participants, 265 (62.2%) were women, 159 (37.3%) were men, two
(0.5%) identified as a gender not specified, and the age range was 17-33 years (M =
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18.45, SD = 1.38). The sample was predominantly White: 231 participants identified
their ethnicity as White, 52 as South Asian, 66 as Chinese, 16 as Southeast Asian, 13 as
Black, 12 as Korean, 35 as Middle Eastern/West Asian, 5 as Japanese, 4 as Filipino, 3 as
First Nations/Aboriginal, and 20 selected ‘Other or not specified’.

2.3.1.2

Procedure

Participants were recruited via the SONA platform via Western University and
completed the survey online via Qualtrics survey software. Items were presented in a
randomized order to control for order effects. Participants were compensated with course
credit.

2.3.1.3

Measures

The preliminary 70-item scale was administered, as well as a series of
demographic questions. No other questionnaires were administered. It is worth noting
here that a social desirability measure was not included in the battery of questionnaires in
this study, nor in the following studies. There were two reasons for not including a
measure of social desirability in the questionnaires. First, though relatively short
measures of social desirability do exist (e.g., the 13-item version of the Marlow-Crowne;
Reynolds, 1982), time and, in some studies, financial constraints meant that survey space
was limited. Second, and more importantly, it has been demonstrated that social
desirability scales do not improve the validity of personality measures (Connelly &
Chang, 2015) and that they may not be assessing what researchers assume they are – a
response bias resulting from the need for social approval. It is argued that instead, social
desirability scales are more likely measuring a substantive trait (de Vries et al., 2014;
McCrae & Costa, 1983), or that they measure neither response bias nor a substantive trait
(Lanz et al., 2021).

2.3.1.4

Data Analytic Decisions

Howard (2016) suggests determining a priori the selection of factor analytic
method, retention method, rotation method, and loading cut-offs to avoid committing
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Type I errors. Except where specified, analyses were conducted in RStudio with the
psych analysis package (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/psych/psych.pdf).

2.3.1.4.1

Factor Analytic Method

Principal Components Analysis (PCA), Principal Axis Factoring (PAF), and
Maximum Likelihood (ML) are the most common factor analytic methods for EFA.
Howard (2016) recommends the use of PAF or ML over PCA. I opted here to use ML, as
the model fit indices produced enable comparisons between model solutions; this is
necessary to test the structure of the new scale, e.g., whether a four- or five-factor
solution better represents the data.

2.3.1.4.2

Factor Retention Method

Techniques to determine the ideal number of factors include the Kaiser criterion,
scree plot, parallel analysis, and Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test. In
general, using one of the latter three techniques (or a combination) is advised instead of
the Kaiser criterion, which arbitrarily suggests retaining factors with eigenvalues over 1
(Howard, 2016). A combination of parallel analysis and the scree plot were used to
interpret the EFA due to concerns that MAP can underestimate the number of factors
(Howard, 2016). Consideration was also given to comparisons of model fit.
An ideal model is one that would not be improved by an additional factor nor by
removing a factor (Howard, 2016). The scree plot aids in interpreting this ideal by
visualizing a break in the graph after which eigenvalues plateau. Parallel analysis aids in
interpreting the scree plot by generating randomized datasets with the same number of
items and possible range of observed values, then extracting eigenvalues from these
random data sets. Here, the 95th percentile of each randomized data eigenvalue was
plotted alongside the observed eigenvalues (see Figure 1). It is recommended that the
number of factors retained is, at most, the number of factors with observed eigenvalues
larger than those from the random data (Howard, 2016). In general, it is also
recommended that factors have a minimum of three items (Yong & Pearce, 2013) and,
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importantly, that the factor can be meaningfully interpreted (Worthington & Whittaker,
2006).

2.3.1.4.3

Factor Rotation Method

An oblique factor rotation was selected over an orthogonal rotation, as orthogonal
rotations do not permit correlations between rotated factors. It was considered unlikely
that different aspects of political ideology would be entirely uncorrelated, given the high
correlations often found between attitudes towards equality and resistance to change
discussed earlier.
There are various oblique rotational methods, with the most common being direct
oblimin and promax (Howard, 2016). Direct oblimin comprises multiple rotation
techniques, which differ from each other in the extent factors are permitted to correlate
(delta value). Direct quartimin rotation (which assigns a delta value of 0) is recommended
in most circumstances and was employed here (Howard, 2016).

2.3.1.4.4

Factor Loading Cut-off

There are various heuristics for determining appropriate factor loading cut-offs.
Howard (2016) advises that a good item should have a factor loading ≥0.40; others, such
as Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), suggest graded cut-offs of 0.32 (‘poor’), 0.45 (‘fair’),
0.55 (‘good’), 0.63 (‘very good’), and 0.71 (‘excellent’), allowing for more flexibility in
interpretation. Here, it was decided that items with loadings < 0.40 were suboptimal and
would be altered or removed.
Regarding items with primary and alternative factor loadings, based on Howard
(2016)’s .40-.30-.20 rule, it was determined that items should a) load onto their secondary
factor ≤ .3, and b) demonstrate a discrepancy between primary and alternative factor
loadings of +/- .2. For example, an item should be retained if its primary factor loading
was .40 and its alternative factor loading was .20, as this satisfies all three criteria.
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2.3.2

Results and Discussion
Interpretation of the scree plot (Figure 1) and parallel analysis supported

investigating a seven-, six-, five-, and four-factor model.

Figure 1: Scree plot and parallel analysis for EFA 1.
Model fit indices for each solution can be found in Table 2. RMSEA and SRMR
fit indices for all model solutions were good, with RMSEA < .05 (Kenny, 2015;
MacCallum et al., 1996) and SRMR < .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1998). However, TLI did not
reach an acceptable threshold (≥ .900) for any of the solutions (Hu & Bentler, 1998;
Kenny, 2015). Chi square was significant for all model solutions; however, this value is
skewed greatly by sample size, and thus is almost always significant whenever sample
size is ≥ N = 400 (Kenny, 2015; McDonald & Ho, 2002).
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Table 2: EFA 1 model fit indices.
χ2

(df)

BIC

RMSEA [95% CI]

TLI

SRMR

Seven-factor

2565.57*

1946

-9216.37

.027 [.024, .030]

.885

.040

Six-factor

2788.35*

2010

-9381.08

.030 [.027, .033]

.861

.040

Five-factor

3039.08*

2075

-9523.88

.033 [.031, .036]

.833

.040

Four-factor

3336.81*

2141

-9625.75

.036 [.034, .039]

.800

.040

Note: *p < .001
The seven-, six-, and four-factor models were problematic, as they contained
factors that had only one or two items with loadings ≥ .40. In the seven-factor model,
Factor 4 had only one adequate item, and factors 6 and 7 had only two. In the six-factor
model, Factors 4, 5, and 6 had only two items. In the four-factor model, Factor 4 had one
item. EFA factor loadings for the five-factor solution can be found below in Table 3.
Factor loadings for the seven-, six-, and four-factor solutions can be found in the
Appendices.
Factors were interpreted and items were selected for editing or removal based on
the factor loadings obtained in the five-factor solution. The five-factor solution was
selected for several reasons: a) it was one of two models hypothesized based on
background theory (along with a four-factor model); b) it demonstrated superior model fit
indices to the four-factor solution; and c) it was the only solution that did not produce a
factor with less than three items.
Table 3: Five-factor solution factor loadings in EFA 1.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Item text
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many
changes in how it works.
I try my best to follow the traditions passed down by my
culture or society.
Changes in the social order are often shown later to be
for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just
immature acts of rebellion.

1
-.19

2
.47

3
-.10

4
-.01

5
.07

.17

.42

.11

-.18

.27

-.05

.53

-.17

.06

.02

-.10
-.04

.50
.44

.28
-.19

-.09
-.09

-.04
-.04

.04

.43

-.18

-.14

.01
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7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Item text
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about
how to live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new
ideas without any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists and agitators trying to stir things
up.
Sometimes to solve big social problems, we have to try
brand new approaches.
I admire people who are trying to make a difference by
being active in political movements.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go of past
customs that are holding us back.
I am quick to adopt new ideas and ways of thinking.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned
customs to guide it.
Too many people accept the world as it is instead of
trying to make it better.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are brave
enough to push new ideas, even if they seem
troublesome to some.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will end up
with more resources and some with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s an
inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just
because they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges others
can’t afford.
Social inequality is inevitable, because some groups of
people have good qualities that others do not.
It would cause fewer problems if different groups of
people lived separately and didn’t have to interact.
Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the
same standard of living.
In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as
possible.
Society is at its best when people cooperate with those
around them.
Resources should be distributed according to people’s
needs.
A responsible society takes good care of its weakest
members.
Different cultural groups have more in common than
they have differences.

1
.08

2
.52

3
-.06

4
-.21

5
.14

-.02

.46

.04

-.07

.09

-.23

.51

.08

-.15

.05

.09

-.12

-.17

.50

.05

.01

-.15

-.18

.47

-.14

.01

-.07

.16

.47

.12

-.58

.15

.16

.15

.13

-.50

-.04

.28

.08

.25

-.42
-.54

.30
.21

-.03
.03

.22
.01

.14
.00

-.62

.10

.02

.14

.10

-.39

.40

-.09

.03

.00

-.57

.20

-.04

.09

.03

.72

.07

.01

.12

.00

.61

.19

.04

.30

.03

.44

.02

.31

.22

.09
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30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Item text
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so
that money is distributed more equitably.
The role of the government is to ensure the wellbeing of
all of its citizens.
Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated
everyone more equally.
No jobs should be looked down upon, because they all
provide useful contributions to society.
Freedom must sometimes be sacrificed in the name of
security.
Without strong leaders, society as we know it would
collapse.
Government surveillance is only concerning if you have
something to hide.
The role of the government is to maintain law and order.
Parents should be strict in disciplining their children, to
teach them obedience.
Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who
hold dangerous views.
Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing
of society.
Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to
enemies who would do us harm.
Our government must be prepared to use its full military
might to protect us.
There are some crimes that are so terrible, the criminal
deserves the death penalty.
It is often necessary for the police to use force to catch
potential criminals.
All authority should be questioned rather than blindly
followed.
One of the worst things I could imagine would be to live
under a dictatorship.
It is not the place of the government to restrict freedom
of speech.
What two consenting adults do in their own bedroom is
not anyone else’s business.
In school, kids should be taught to think critically about
all of the information they receive.
Without personal freedom, society as we know it would
collapse.
Children should be able to play and express themselves
without too many strict rules.
I believe in letting others do as they please, and they
should do the same for me.

1
.56

2
-.07

3
.01

4
.10

5
.02

.43

-.05

.11

.15

.16

.09

.11

.13

.02

.44

.05

.12

-.03

-.04

.40

-.15

.07

-.20

-.21

.44

-.03

.06

.08

.11

.47

-.21

.14

.02

-.11

.51

-.01

-.14

.45

.17

.19

.02

-.13

.05

.49

-.13
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Item text
1
2
3
4
53 Rarely, if ever, has declaring war on another country
been justified.
54 Prisons should be places of rehabilitation, not of harsh
.17 .04 .16 .40
punishment.
55 Violence can be justified when pursuing a noble goal.
56 I have no faith in our current social system.
57 When I compromise with the other side in a political
-.02 -.03 -.45 .17
debate, I feel like I’ve sacrificed some of my integrity.
58 When people are trying to further a great cause, the ends
justify the means.
59 I know that my political views are morally right.
.13 -.23 -.04 .03
60 Sometimes words aren’t enough to create social change
– there needs to be disruption.
61 Sometimes, creating great changes in society requires
ruthlessness or brutality.
62 I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I .19 .02 -.53 .12
politically disagreed with.
63 It’s best if political changes happen in small increments.
64 If people from opposing sides of the political spectrum
took the time to listen, they’d see that they agree on a lot
of things.
65 If you are hostile in a debate, you have already lost.
66 People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others,
.06 .10 .42 .18
regardless of how strongly they hold them.
67 There are no moral or immoral political views, only
differences of opinion.
68 Extremists of any political beliefs are threats to
democratic society.
69 No single group in particular can be trusted to say what
information should be censored.
70 Educators should be allowed to express their political
views to students, even if some of those attitudes are
unconventional or disagreeable.
Note: Factor loadings are only shown for items that demonstrated at least one loading
≥0.40. Primary factor loadings and alternative factor loadings (≥.30 and/or discrepancy
≤ +/- .2) are bolded.
Table 4: Inter-factor correlations for EFA 1 five-factor solution
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5

1.
-.36
.14
.26
-.13

2.

3.
-.14
-.17
.27

.30
.16

4

.13

5

-

5

-.26

.17

.40

.11

.07
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Table 5: Content of five-factor model in EFA 1.
Factor Item text
1
17 -In a fair world, it is natural that some people will end up with more
resources and some with less.
18 -People should get used to competition, because it’s an inevitable part of
life.
20 -Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re
successful.
21 -It is fine that some people can pay for privileges others can’t afford.
24 -Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the same standard of
living.
25 -In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
27 -Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
30 -It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money is
distributed more equitably.
32 -Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone more
equally.
2
1 -Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes in how it
works.
3 -Changes in the social order are often shown later to be for the worse.
4 -There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
5 -Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is something kids
should grow out of.
6 -Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts of
rebellion.
7 -My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about how to live.
8 -These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas without any
proof they will work.
9 -I don’t trust activists and agitators trying to stir things up.
3
49 -In school, kids should be taught to think critically about all of the
information they receive.
57 -When I compromise with the other side in a political debate, I feel like I’ve
sacrificed some of my integrity.
62 -I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I politically
disagreed with.
66 -People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless of how
strongly they hold them.
4
12 -In order to build a good society, we need to let go of past customs that are
holding us back.
14 -Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned customs to guide it.
16 -Sometimes what society needs are people who are brave enough to push
new ideas, even if they seem troublesome to some.
51 -Children should be able to play and express themselves without too many
strict rules.
5
35-Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
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Factor Item text
39 -Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold dangerous
views.
40 -Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of society.
41 -Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies who would
do us harm.
42 -Our government must be prepared to use its full military might to protect
us.
Note: Only items satisfying the .40-.30-.20 rule are shown.
Note: Items with negative factor loadings are italicized.
Factor 1 of the five-factor solution was interpreted as the hypothesized
egalitarianism-antiegalitarianism factor, with five pro- and six con-trait intended items
loading highly; three of these had cross-listings on alternative factors. Interestingly, the
items pertaining to equality between different groups did not load onto this factor, nor
any other factor.
Factor 2 was interpreted as a traditionalism factor, with nine items loading highly,
all of which were con-trait. None of the pro-trait items (intended to convey
progressivism) loaded onto this factor. Several items intended to convey progressivism
did not load highly onto any factors. These items were revised in the hopes of capturing
the hypothesized construct more successfully in the next study.
Factor 3 somewhat resembled the hypothesized moderatism-radicalism factor.
Three items intended as radicalism loaded highly onto this factor. Unexpectedly, an item
intended as a libertarianism item – item 49 – loaded highly onto this factor in the opposite
direction. Based on this content, this factor could be interpreted as dogmatism or rigidity.
It was hoped that the next round of data collection, after revisions to the item list, would
help to elucidate the nature of this factor.
The content of Factor 4 was unexpected: it contained two pro-trait items written
for the hypothesized libertarianism-authoritarianism factor, and three pro-trait items
written for the hypothesized progressivism-traditionalism factor. The emergent meaning
of these items was difficult to interpret. Items 12, 14, and 16 address attitudes towards
embracing new ideas and the rejection of outdated customs, while item 51 pertains to
attitudes towards child-rearing (permissive, rather than strict and authoritative), and item
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54 was meant to assess compassionate attitudes towards criminal justice. Combined,
these could be said to represent an attitude of tender-mindedness, similar to Eysenck’s Tfactor (1954), or of universalism. The second EFA was conducted, in part, to help to
determine whether this factor was replicable and thus a potential distinct dimension of
ideology.
Factor 5 contained five con-trait items from the hypothesized libertarianismauthoritarianism dimensions, one pertaining to authoritarian obedience and four
pertaining to authoritarian punitiveness, as well as one item (59) intended to convey
radicalism. While this factor was clearly interpretable as authoritarianism, the lack of protrait (libertarianism) items was unexpected. It was also unclear whether this meant that
the two hypothesized authoritarianism constructs are better assessed as a unified factor,
or whether they might be disentangled with further revisions.

2.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis (Study 2)
Based on the results from the first EFA, the item list was edited. In the first EFA,
30 items satisfied the 40-30-20 rule, and as per the criteria described in conducting EFA
1, any that did not satisfy the 40-30-20 rule were not retained. Some of these items were
removed entirely, while others were revised while retaining similar meanings. Items that
were close to satisfying the 40-30-20 rule but fell short of this criterion were candidates
for revision. Nineteen new items (either brand new, or revised versions of problematic
items) were introduced in EFA 2. The second iteration of the scale thus contained a total
of 49 items. See Table 6 for the full item list included in EFA 2.
Table 6: EFA 2 item list.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money is distributed more
equitably.
Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone more equally.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will end up with more resources and some
with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s an inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for success.
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8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges others can’t afford.
Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the same standard of living.
I would dislike being called old-fashioned.
A healthy society is always progressing and evolving.
Society needs activists and rebels to shake things up.
Every new generation brings exciting new ideas.
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes in how it works.
Changes in the social order are often shown later to be for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is something kids should grow
out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts of rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about how to live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas without any proof they will
work.
I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
In school, kids should be taught to think critically about all of the information they receive.
People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless of how strongly they hold
them.
Extremists of any kind are threats to society.
No single group or person should be able to censor information.
When I compromise with the other side in a political debate, I feel like I’ve sacrificed some
of my integrity.
I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I politically disagreed with.
Sometimes, creating progress in society requires ignoring those who disagree.
Violence can be justified when trying to improve society.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go of customs that are holding us back.
The government should not restrict anyone's freedom of speech.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned customs to guide it.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are brave enough to push new ideas, even if
they seem troublesome to some.
Children should be able to play and express themselves without too many strict rules.
Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they are not hurting anyone.
Children should be given firm rules and boundaries.
Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
Societal rules and customs exist for good reasons.
Leaders of society should be questioned about their decisions, not blindly obeyed.
Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
National leaders should settle disputes between countries peacefully, not through war.
Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold dangerous views.
Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of society.
Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies who would do us harm.
Our government must be prepared to use its full military might to protect us.
The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger to society.
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49 Police officers are justified in using force to carry out their duties.
Note: Italics indicate a new item written for Study 2 (either an altered item, or an entirely
new addition).

2.4.1

Methods

2.4.1.1

Participants and Data Cleaning

The revised scale was administered as part of a broader study conducted by a
colleague. The sample required for the colleague’s broader study was comprised of white
Canadian adults.
A total of 284 participants completed the revised scale, and N = 239 remained
after data cleaning. This satisfied the N ≥ 200 criteria for sample size for EFA, and a 5:1
participant-item ratio would be satisfied at N = 245 (Howard, 2016). In addition to the
techniques employed in EFA 1 – screening for short response times and multivariate
outliers – this study also utilized written attention checks which, if failed, were taken to
indicate careless responding, and resulted in participant exclusion. The attention check
item read as follows: “It is important that you pay attention when completing the survey.
Please check the middle option: ‘neither agree nor disagree.’” Missing data were handled
with maximum likelihood estimation.
First, 19 participants were excluded for not selecting ‘Neither agree nor disagree’
on the attention check. Second, applying the same 2-second cut-off as Study 1, 13
participants were excluded for abnormally short response times. Finally, Mahalanobis D
was calculated in SPSS software. Applying Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) threshold of
<.001 when using Mahalanobis D, 13 participants were flagged as multivariate outliers.
The remaining sample for analyses was N = 239, and of these, 153 (64.0%) were women,
83 (34.7%) were men, and 3 (1.3%) identified as neither male nor female, and the age
range was 16-82 years (M = 47.71, SD = 15.52).

2.4.1.2

Measures

The revised 49-item scale was administered alongside the questionnaires of
interest to the collaborator, which were not utilized in this study.

34

2.4.1.3

Procedure

Participants were recruited via a Qualtrics Panel survey as part of a broader study.
Participants completed the study online via Qualtrics survey software and were
compensated by Qualtrics Panel upon completion1. Items were presented in a randomized
order to control for order effects.

2.4.1.4
2.4.1.4.1

Data Analytic Decisions
Factor Analytic Method

Maximum Likelihood was the factor analytic method used for the EFA.

2.4.1.4.2

Factor Retention Method

A combination of the scree plot and parallel analysis were used in interpreting the
EFA to determine the ideal number of factors to extract, as well as comparisons of the
model fit.

2.4.1.4.3

Factor Rotation Method

Direct quartimin rotation (an oblique method) was used.

2.4.1.4.4

Factor Loading Cut-off

The .40-.30-.20 rule was employed such that a) items should load onto a primary
factor ≥0.40, b) items should load onto any alternative factors ≤.3, and c) items should
demonstrate a discrepancy between primary and alternative loadings of +/- .2. Items that
failed to meet these criteria were deleted or reworded.

1

Qualtrics Panel does not disclose the exact amount of money participants are compensated. The
price-per-participant was $5.00; a portion of this figure goes towards Qualtrics’ processing fees.
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2.4.2

Results and Discussion
Interpretation of the scree plot and parallel analysis supported investigating a six-,

five-, and four-factor model and is depicted in Figure 2. There was a visible break in the
scree plot between factors five and six. Six factors were greater than the suggested cut-off
determined by the parallel analysis (95th percentile of the combined simulated data),
indicating six was the maximum number of factors that should be extracted.

Figure 2: Scree plot and parallel analysis for EFA 2.
Table 7 depicts model fit indices for these solutions. For all models, RMSEA and
SRMR indices indicated good model fit, but TLI was suboptimal (< .900).
Table 7: EFA 2 model fit indices.
χ2
Six-factor
Five-factor
Four-factor
Note: *p < .001

(df)

1206.02* 897
1347.66* 941
1535.09* 986

BIC
-3706.37
-3805.70
-3864.71

RMSEA [95%
CI]
.038 [.032, .043]
.042 [.037, .048]
.048 [.044, .053]

TLI

SRMR

.885
.856
.815

.040
.040
.050

36

The sections below consider the six-, five-, and four-factor solutions one by one.
Reliability coefficients were calculated for each factor (after reverse-coding items with
negative factor loadings). Cronbach’s alpha values are included in the tables depicting
factor content.

2.4.2.1

Six-factor solution

Table 8: EFA 2 six-factor solution factor loadings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

Item text
In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as
possible.
Resources should be distributed according to
people’s needs.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more
highly, so that money is distributed more equitably.
Our society would have a lot less conflict if we
treated everyone more equally.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will
end up with more resources and some with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s
an inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for
success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes
just because they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges
others can’t afford.
Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the
same standard of living.
I would dislike being called old-fashioned.
A healthy society is always progressing and
evolving.
Society needs activists and rebels to shake things up.
Every new generation brings exciting new ideas.
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too
many changes in how it works.
Changes in the social order are often shown later to
be for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should grow out
of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just
immature acts of rebellion.

1
2
-.15 .74

3
.07

4
.12

5
6
-.11 .07

.08

.58

-.01 .10

.01

.13

.10

.69

-.07 -.02 .07

.04

.12

.49

-.02 -.12 -.02 .19

.47

-.45 .11

-.01 .15

.12

.51

-.18 .20

-.10 .07

.03

.00

-.71 .12

-.02 -.06 .04

.46

-.37 .01

-.12 .16

.09

-.43 -.16 .13

.33

.08
.27

-.01 .05
.51 .24

-.60 .07 -.15 .09
-.13 -.24 -.15 .20

.07

.04

-.08 .09

.03
.02

-.01 .71
-.08 .10

-.04 .17
.25 .42

-.08
.07

.05

-.03 .09

.45

-.15

-.72 .19

.13
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Item text
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas
about how to live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild
new ideas without any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
In school, kids should be taught to think critically
about all of the information they receive.
People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others,
regardless of how strongly they hold them.
Extremists of any kind are threats to society.
No single group or person should be able to censor
information.
When I compromise with the other side in a political
debate, I feel like I’ve sacrificed some of my
integrity.
I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone
whom I politically disagreed with.
Sometimes, creating progress in society requires
ignoring those who disagree.
Violence can be justified when trying to improve
society.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go of
customs that are holding us back.
The government should not restrict anyone's
freedom of speech.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned
customs to guide it.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are
brave enough to push new ideas, even if they seem
troublesome to some.
Children should be able to play and express
themselves without too many strict rules.
Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they
are not hurting anyone.
Children should be given firm rules and boundaries.
Government surveillance makes me feel safe and
secure.
Societal rules and customs exist for good reasons.
Leaders of society should be questioned about their
decisions, not blindly obeyed.
Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
National leaders should settle disputes between
countries peacefully, not through war.
Without strong leaders, society as we know it would
collapse.

1
.10

2
3
-.04 .56

4
.30

5
.00

6
-.12

-.02 .02

.17

.18

.66

.06

.03

.15

.42

-.04 .07

.16

-.05 .03

.40

.10

-.25 .26

.01

.05

-.28 .43

-.02 .10

-.19 .01

-.29 .53

-.12 .05

.02

-.17 -.09 -.11 .53

.13

-.10 .13

-.30 .09

.09

-.18 .04

.08

-.15 .58

.01

.47

.42
.51

.11 .02 .14
-.01 -.08 .12

.06
.11

-.35
-.03

.41

.03

.04

-.11

.16

.03

-.21 -.01 -.10 -.48 -.04 .23
.17 .51 .18 -.22 .03 .20
.64

.00

.05

.18

-.12 -.13
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Item text
1
2
3
4
5
44 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens .35 .14 -.06 .40 .27
who hold dangerous views.
45 Criminals should be harshly punished for the
.22 .02 .21 .58 .18
wellbeing of society.
46 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to .67 .08 .06 .07 -.06
enemies who would do us harm.
47 Our government must be prepared to use its full
.45 -.04 .26 .18 .02
military might to protect us.
48 The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a
.14 -.02 .14 .50 .18
danger to society.
49 Police officers are justified in using force to carry
.50 -.18 .05 .14 .01
out their duties.
Note: Factor loadings are only shown for items that demonstrated at least one loading
≥0.40. Primary factor loadings and alternative factor loadings (≥.30 and/or discrepancy
≤ +/- .2) are bolded.
Table 9: Inter-factor correlations for EFA 2 six-factor solution
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5
Factor 6

1.
-.07
.25
.08
.19
.11

2.

3.
-.15
-.16
-.37
.18

.20
.28
-.16

4

.35
-.17

5

-.25

6

-

Table 10: Content and internal reliabilities of six-factor model in EFA 2.
Factor Item text
1
6 -People should get used to competition, because it’s an inevitable part
of life.
12 -A healthy society is always progressing and evolving.
38 -Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
39 -Societal rules and customs exist for good reasons.
43 -Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
46 -Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies who
would do us harm.
49 -Police officers are justified in using force to carry out their duties.
2
1 -In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
2 -Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
3 -It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money
is distributed more equitably.
4 -Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone
more equally.

α

.730

.520

6
.00
.00
-.08
.07
-.04
-.06
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Factor Item text
8 -Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re
successful.
42 -National leaders should settle disputes between countries
peacefully, not through war.
3
11 -I would dislike being called old-fashioned.
17 -There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
20 -My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about how to live.
24 -People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless of
how strongly they hold them.
4
19 -Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts
of rebellion.
28 -I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I politically
disagreed with.
41 -Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
45 -Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of society.
48 -The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger to society.
5
13 -Society needs activists and rebels to shake things up.
18 -Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
22 -I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
6
31 -In order to build a good society, we need to let go of customs that
are holding us back.
36 -Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they are not hurting
anyone.
Note: Items with negative factor loadings are italicized.

α

.715

.714

.753

.532

Overall, while the six-factor model had the most optimal model fit indices, two
factors (3 and 5) were not interpretable as ideological dimensions, and Factor 6 was also
problematic. The nature of the factors was interpreted as follows.
For the factors that were interpretable and meaningful, Factor 1 contained some
content that was intended to convey antiegalitarianism, traditionalism, and authoritarian
obedience; as such, it was interpretable as a general conservatism factor. Factor 2
represented the hypothesized egalitarianism-antiegalitarianism factor, though
unexpectedly, the item “National leaders should settle disputes between countries
peacefully, not through war” also loaded highly. However, this factor had a low
Cronbach’s alpha value, indicating poor internal consistency. Factor 4 mixed content that
was intended to convey traditionalism and authoritarian aggression; the overall meaning
resembled Factor 1 (general conservatism), though with a more hostile valence.
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For the factors that were difficult to interpret or otherwise problematic, Factor 3
did not appear to represent any meaningful dimension of ideology, but combined items
that were semantically related (e.g., containing the word “old-fashioned”), or possibly
that pertained to politeness or conventionalism. Factor 5 contained three items pertaining
to activism and did not appear to represent a theoretically meaningful dimension of
political ideology. Factor 6 contained only two items and had a poor Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient. These two items appear to be capturing generally ‘liberal’ or progressive
attitudes.

2.4.2.2

Five-factor solution

Table 11: EFA 2 five-factor solution factor loadings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Item text
In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as
possible.
Resources should be distributed according to people’s
needs.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so
that money is distributed more equitably.
Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated
everyone more equally.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will end up
with more resources and some with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s an
inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just
because they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges others
can’t afford.
Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the
same standard of living.
I would dislike being called old-fashioned.
A healthy society is always progressing and evolving.
Society needs activists and rebels to shake things up.
Every new generation brings exciting new ideas.
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many
changes in how it works.
Changes in the social order are often shown later to be
for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.

1
.09

2
.78

3
-.09

4
.04

5
.15

.15

.55

.13

-.04

.15

.04

.65

.18

-.07

.01

-.07

.44

.21

-.02

.20

.14

-.53

.43

.12

.03

.03

-.25

.49

.22

-.01

.27
-.05

-.46
-.69

.34
-.07

.06
.12

.12
.06

.02

-.47

.44

.03

-.02

.31

-.54

.06

-.18

.14

-.06
-.22

.06
.18

.01
.58

-.62
-.11

.07
.18

-.19
.48

.04
-.13

.46
-.08

-.08
.24

.33
.00

.12

-.02

.01

.72

-.06
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Item text
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just
immature acts of rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about
how to live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new
ideas without any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
In school, kids should be taught to think critically about
all of the information they receive.
People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others,
regardless of how strongly they hold them.
Extremists of any kind are threats to society.
No single group or person should be able to censor
information.
When I compromise with the other side in a political
debate, I feel like I’ve sacrificed some of my integrity.
I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I
politically disagreed with.
Sometimes, creating progress in society requires
ignoring those who disagree.
Violence can be justified when trying to improve society.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go of
customs that are holding us back.
The government should not restrict anyone's freedom of
speech.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned
customs to guide it.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are brave
enough to push new ideas, even if they seem
troublesome to some.
Children should be able to play and express themselves
without too many strict rules.
Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they are
not hurting anyone.
Children should be given firm rules and boundaries.
Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
Societal rules and customs exist for good reasons.
Leaders of society should be questioned about their
decisions, not blindly obeyed.
Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
National leaders should settle disputes between countries
peacefully, not through war.

1
.49

2
-.16

3
-.02

4
.08

5
-.04

.52

.00

-.06

.05

-.17

.36

.01

.00

.52

-.06

.41

-.13

.06

.16

.01

.52

-.12

-.03

.16

-.10

.08

.12

.05

.42

.19

.41

.07

-.06

-.34

.10

.41

.09

-.28

-.36

.10

-.09

.06

.11

-.21

.54

.15

.05

-.03

-.35

.42

-.32

.12

.40

.05

.32

-.11

.07

.00

-.03

.48

.00

.00

-.11

.01

.65

.23

-.06

.46

-.08

-.09

-.52
-.12

-.06
.44

-.07
.27

-.07
.18

.21
.19
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Item text
1
2
3
4
43 Without strong leaders, society as we know it would
.21 .02 .54 .05
collapse.
44 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who .59 .09 .27 -.09
hold dangerous views.
45 Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing
.73 .03 .09 .15
of society.
46 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to
.14 .06 .62 .07
enemies who would do us harm.
47 Our government must be prepared to use its full military
might to protect us.
48 The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger
.62 -.01 .02 .09
to society.
49 Police officers are justified in using force to carry out
.21 -.20 .42 .05
their duties.
Note: Factor loadings are only shown for items that demonstrated at least one loading
≥0.40. Primary factor loadings and alternative factor loadings (≥.30 and/or discrepancy ≤
+/- .2) are bolded.
Table 12: Inter-factor correlations for EFA 2 five-factor solution
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5

1.
-.28
.12
.30
-.30

2.

3.
-.03
-.20
.28

.17
.12

4

-.23

5

-

Table 13: Content and internal reliabilities of five-factor model in EFA 2.
Factor Item text
1
15 -Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes
in how it works.
18 -Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
19 -Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts
of rebellion.
21 -These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas
without any proof they will work.
22 -I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
23 -In school, kids should be taught to think critically about all of the
information they receive.
41 -Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
44 -Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold
dangerous views.
45 -Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of society.

α

.809

5
-.11
-.08
-.01
-.08

-.06
-.09
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Factor Item text
48 -The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger to society.
2
1 -In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
2 -Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
3 -It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money
is distributed more equitably.
4 -Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone
more equally.
6 -People should get used to competition, because it’s an inevitable
part of life.
8 -Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re
successful.
3
12 -A healthy society is always progressing and evolving.
38 -Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
43 -Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
46 -Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies who
would do us harm.
49 - Police officers are justified in using force to carry out their duties.
4
11 -I would dislike being called old-fashioned.
17 -There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
24 -People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless of
how strongly they hold them.
5
31 -In order to build a good society, we need to let go of customs that
are holding us back.
35 -Children should be able to play and express themselves without too
many strict rules.
36 -Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they are not hurting
anyone.
Note: Items with negative factor loadings are italicized.

α

.763

.676

.619

.620

The five-factor solution produced four factors that appeared to be theoretically
meaningful and interpretable. Factor 1 combined content pertaining to traditionalism and
authoritarianism, and the overall meaning was interpretable as a general conservatism
factor. Factor 2 was again clearly interpretable as the proposed egalitarianism factor.
Factor 3 contained authoritarianism content, particularly the authoritarian obedience
items, with one notable exception: the item ‘A healthy society is always progressing and
evolving’. Factor 5 was interpreted as the same unexpected ‘liberalism’ factor that
manifested in Study 1. While this dimension was not hypothesized, this factor’s
reoccurrence in a new sample with different demographic characteristics supported the
inclusion of this factor in the scale going forward. All the above factors demonstrated
good or fair internal consistency.
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Factor 4 resembled the six-factor model’s Factor 3 and did not have a clear
interpretation. It contained two items with the words ‘old-fashioned’, and the item
‘People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless of how strongly they hold
them’.

2.4.2.3

Four-factor solution

Table 14: EFA 2 four-factor solution factor loadings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Item text
In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that
money is distributed more equitably.
Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated
everyone more equally.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will end up with
more resources and some with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s an
inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because
they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges others can’t
afford.
Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the same
standard of living.
I would dislike being called old-fashioned.
A healthy society is always progressing and evolving.
Society needs activists and rebels to shake things up.
Every new generation brings exciting new ideas.
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many
changes in how it works.
Changes in the social order are often shown later to be for the
worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature
acts of rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about how to
live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas
without any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.

1
.07
.18
.10

2
.82
.57
.62

3
.02
.21
.21

4
.00
-.07
-.05

-.05

.45

.32

-.05

.21

-.56

.37

.12

.13

-.29

.44

.25

.31
-.10

-.46
-.66

.32
-.07

.01
.08

.10

-.52

.37

.06

.27

-.52

.05

-.25

-.07
-.13

.03
.13

.04
.66

-.63
-.11

-.16
.46

.04
-.09

.61
-.13

-.13
.20

.14
.49

.02
-.15

-.01
-.10

.72
.05

.55

.00

-.20

.05

.38

.04

-.06

.50

.43

-.11

.01

13

.54

-.11

-.14

.15
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23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Item text
In school, kids should be taught to think critically about all of
the information they receive.
People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless
of how strongly they hold them.
Extremists of any kind are threats to society.
No single group or person should be able to censor
information.
When I compromise with the other side in a political debate, I
feel like I’ve sacrificed some of my integrity.
I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I
politically disagreed with.
Sometimes, creating progress in society requires ignoring
those who disagree.
Violence can be justified when trying to improve society.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go of customs
that are holding us back.
The government should not restrict anyone's freedom of
speech.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned customs to
guide it.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are brave
enough to push new ideas, even if they seem troublesome to
some.
Children should be able to play and express themselves
without too many strict rules.
Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they are not
hurting anyone.
Children should be given firm rules and boundaries.
Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
Societal rules and customs exist for good reasons.
Leaders of society should be questioned about their decisions,
not blindly obeyed.
Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
National leaders should settle disputes between countries
peacefully, not through war.
Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold
dangerous views.
Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of
society.
Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies
who would do us harm.
Our government must be prepared to use its full military
might to protect us.

1

2

3

4

.39

.08

-.05

-.41

.35

.13

-.26

-.44

.05

.11

.15

-.47

-.30

.13

.57

.01

-.59
-.08

-.03
.46

.09
.39

-.09
.16

.35
.68

-.06
.05

.42
.14

.10
-.09

.77

.04

.00

.10

.29

-.02

.51

.13

46

Item text
1
2
3
48 The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger to
.65
-.01 -.08
society.
49 Police officers are justified in using force to carry out their
duties.
Note: Factor loadings are only shown for items that demonstrated at least one loading
≥0.40. Primary factor loadings and alternative factor loadings (≥.30 and/or discrepancy
≤ +/- .2) are bolded.
Table 15: Inter-factor correlations for EFA 1 four-factor solution
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4

1.
-.33
.00
.37

2.

3.
.08
-.27

.03

4

-

Table 16: Content and internal reliabilities of four-factor model in EFA 2.
Factor Item text
1
15 -Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes in
how it works.
18 -Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
19 -Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts
of rebellion.
21 -These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas without
any proof they will work.
22 -I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
44 -Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold
dangerous views.
45 -Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of society.
48 -The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger to society.
2
1 -In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
2 -Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
3 -It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money
is distributed more equitably.
8 -Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re
successful.
10 -Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the same standard
of living.
3
12 -A healthy society is always progressing and evolving.
14 -Every new generation brings exciting new ideas.
46 -Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies who
would do us harm.
4
11 -I would dislike being called old-fashioned.

α
.837

.777

.578

.671

4
.06
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Factor Item text
17 -There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
33 -Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned customs to guide
it.
Note: Items with negative factor loadings are italicized.

α

The four-factor solution produced only two factors that were easily interpretable
as ideological dimensions. Factor 1 resembled the factors in the six- and five-factor
model that combined content pertaining to traditionalism and authoritarianism; the
overall meaning was interpretable as a general conservatism factor. Factor 2 was again
clearly interpretable as the proposed egalitarianism factor.
Factor 3 had poor reliability and the conceptual meaning was unclear. Two of the
items were intended to convey progressive values, while the third was “Good national
leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies who would do us harm”. The overall
impression was thus one of interventionism or even hostility, but the factor’s meaning
was difficult to understand. Factor 4 seemingly combined items that were semantically
related (e.g., those that included the word “old-fashioned”), or, possibly, that pertained to
politeness or conventionalism.

2.4.2.4

Revised scale

A factor pertaining to egalitarianism was found consistently across models, as was
a factor resembling authoritarianism (though its exact content differed slightly between
models). It was unclear from this analysis whether authoritarianism is best represented as
single factor, or whether its content should be split between ‘punitiveness’ and
‘obedience’ factors.
Interestingly, most of the items written to convey extremism or radicalism did not
load highly in any of the explored model solutions, or they demonstrated substantial
cross-loadings. In other words, the initial EFAs did not provide sufficient evidence for its
existence as a dimension of ideology.
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The tentatively named ‘liberalism’ factor – while not one of the hypothesized
dimensions – was consistent and was thus deemed worth exploring further as a
potentially distinct factor of ideology.
Ultimately, a tentative four-factor structure of egalitarianism, traditionalism,
authoritarianism, and liberalism was selected for further testing in Chapter 3. After
completing EFA 2, 18 items were removed from the ideology scale, and the following
four items were revised: “Societal rules and customs exist for good reasons” was changed
to “Laws and rules are the best way to keep society functioning properly.” “Our
government must be prepared to use its full military might to protect us” was revised to
“Having a strong military is how our government keeps us safe.” “No single group or
person should be able to censor information” was changed to “Governments and
powerful individuals should not be able to censor information.” And lastly, “The
government should not restrict anyone's freedom of speech” was changed to “Censoring
individuals’ speech or expression is bad for society.”
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Chapter 3

3

Scale Validation
This chapter outlines the scale validation process across Studies 3-5. In each

study, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used to assess the scale structure
identified in the previous chapter, and tests of construct validity and criterion validity
were conducted. After conducting EFA 2 and revising the scale, it was expected that the
scale would contain egalitarianism, authoritarianism, and traditionalism factors; the
existence of a radicalism factor was not supported by the initial validation studies. The
unexpected ‘liberalism’ factor identified in the previous studies was also considered,
though no specific hypotheses were made about the correlates of this factor due to a lack
of clarity on its emergent meaning and no theoretical background supporting it.
Study 3 took place across two time points. Test-retest reliability was computed
between Time 1 and Time 2, and I investigated the construct validity of the scale with
measures of personality (HEXACO; Ashton & Lee, 2009), Right-Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA; Altemeyer, 2006), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994), selfreported political orientation (left to right), nationalism, and patriotism (Kosterman &
Feshbach, 1989), and criterion validity with measures of political behaviour (party
affiliation and voting behaviour), political efficacy (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Morrell,
2005), and attitudes towards the COVID-19 virus and government pandemic response.
If the ideology scale is a valid measure of political beliefs, its factors should
correlate highly with related constructs. That is, egalitarianism should correlate
negatively with SDO, while traditionalism and authoritarianism should correlate
positively with RWA. It should also relate to political affiliation in the expected
directions (egalitarianism predicting more left-wing affiliation, and traditionalism more
right-wing affiliation).
The ‘ideology gap’ in nationalism and patriotism is well-established and suggests
both constructs are positively correlated with right-wing attitudes (Schatz et al., 1999;
van der Toorn et al., 2014). Nationalism can be defined as an allegiance to, identification
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with, and loyalty to one’s nation-state. Given authoritarianism is characterized by a
devotion to extant authorities and leaders, typically one’s government, it was anticipated
that nationalism and authoritarianism would be positively related. Further, nationalism
implies a commitment to maintaining a national cultural identity and should thus
correlate with traditionalism, given the traditionalism factor is characterized by the desire
to conserve the status quo. Patriotism is closely related to nationalism (though they are
not interchangeable) and is defined by feelings of attachment and devotion to one’s
country (Primoratz, 2020). Given its similarities to nationalism and the body of work
demonstrating its relationship with right-wing views, it was anticipated the ideology scale
would relate to patriotism similarly. However, it should be noted some research has
alternatively suggested that in the Canadian context, patriotism has different connotations
and may not correlate with nationalism (Esses et al., 2021).
Finally, the new scale should relate to personality traits in directions consistent
with previous literature. There is a documented link between openness to experience and
more left-wing beliefs (here, higher egalitarianism and lower traditionalism), and
between conscientiousness and more right-wing beliefs (or lower egalitarianism and
higher traditionalism; Carney et al., 2008).
Additionally, the ideology scale should be able to predict other political variables
(criterion validity). Egalitarianism should positively predict identification with, and
voting for, a more left-wing political party (e.g., the NDP) and negatively predict support
for more right-wing parties (e.g., the Conservative party), and the opposite should be true
of traditionalism. I also expected the authoritarianism factor would relate negatively to
collective action, as those with authoritarian values should theoretically be less likely to
challenge entrenched systems. Lastly, ideological polarization is present in attitudes
towards COVID-19 and the measures taken to manage the pandemic, including maskwearing, lockdowns, and vaccinations (Cakanlar et al., 2020; Chock and Kim, 2020), as
well as to vaccination for other diseases (Baumgaertner et al., 2018). As such, it was
hypothesized that more ‘left-wing’ views – higher egalitarianism and lower traditionalism
– would relate to greater feelings of threat from the coronavirus, greater psychological
burden, and a desire for more government restrictions to curb the pandemic. It was also

51

hypothesized that authoritarianism would correlate positively with the desire for greater
restriction, as authoritarianism entails an expectation that governments will protect their
citizens, and that they may employ strict measures to do so.
In Study 4, in addition to the second CFA, criterion validity was investigated with
measures of political outcomes including attitudes towards collective action and a range
of Canadian policy issues. Tests of incremental validity were also conducted to determine
whether the new scale had predictive ability beyond the most common ways of
measuring political attitudes – left-right political orientation, and the SDO and RWA
scales. The sample collected in this study was used in Chapter 4 to conduct a latent
profile analysis.
While left-wing or liberal attitudes are associated with greater support for
collective action in general, Teixeira et al. (2020), who researched acceptance of
normative and non-normative (radical) actions, did not find a relationship between leftright political orientation and the relative degree of support for different types of action. I
hypothesized that authoritarianism, specifically, would relate to negative attitudes
towards non-normative action, given that it directly challenges established social norms
and, in some cases, laws. I also expected that egalitarianism would be positively related
to both normative and non-normative collective action, while traditionalism would be
negatively associated with both, as collective action is typically aimed at improving the
standard of living for a group with fewer resources or privileges (though not always).
Regarding Canadian policy issues, broadly, I expected egalitarianism would
correlate positively with support for policies in line with left-wing or liberal beliefs,
including: support for First Nations/Indigenous rights, support for decriminalization (for
example, of drug use) and reforming the police, support for expanding and increasing
access to healthcare, support for protections for gender and sexual identity, support for
policies that serve to redistribute wealth (such as increasing taxes on the wealthiest
Canadians), support for pro-environmental policies, and opposition to military spending
and violent intervention. Likewise, I expected traditionalism would correlate with these
positions in the opposite direction (in line with right-wing or conservative beliefs).
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Theoretically, authoritarianism would correlate positively with support for policies that
are characterized by submission to the government or other centralized power and
enforcement of the rule of law, such as increased military spending and military
intervention, criminalization and policing, and support for government surveillance.
In Study 5, in addition to the third CFA, the scale’s relationship to behavioural
intentions regarding COVID-19 vaccination was tested, and tests of incremental validity
conducted in relation to left-right affiliation. It was hypothesized that more ‘left-wing’
views – higher egalitarianism and lower traditionalism – would predict a greater intention
to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. The sample collected for this study was also used in
Chapter 5 to conduct the experimental analyses on COVID-19 vaccination attitudes
involving a persuasive messaging intervention.

3.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Scale Validation
(Study 3)
Seven new items were created to bolster and distinguish the four factors identified
in Chapter 2, which were tentatively named egalitarianism, traditionalism,
authoritarianism, and liberalism. The scale was also tentatively named the New Political
Ideology Scale (NPIS). Factor 1 (egalitarianism) was given three new items conveying
non-economic egalitarian beliefs, Factor 2 (traditionalism) was given an item conveying
resistance to progressive change, Factor 3 (authoritarianism) received two items
conveying authoritarian nationalism, and Factor 4 (liberalism) received an item
conveying a more proactive attitude towards protecting individual freedoms. This
iteration of the NPIS had a total of 34 items. Table 17 below depicts the items and factor
structure explored in the following study.
Table 17: Factor list for CFA and scale validation study 3.
Factor
Egalitarianism

Item text
1 In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
2 Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
3 It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that
money is distributed more equitably.
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Factor

Traditionalism

Authoritarianism

Liberalism

Item text
4 Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone
more equally.
5 Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because
they’re successful.
6 Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the same
standard of living.
28 Everyone should have the right to access high quality
healthcare.**
29 People should be treated equally regardless of their appearance
or identity.**
30 We must have laws in place to prevent discrimination based on
things like ethnicity and gender identity.**
7 Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many
changes in how it works.
8 Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
9 Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature
acts of rebellion.
10 These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas
without any proof they will work.
11 I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
12 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold
dangerous views.*
13 Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of
society.*
14 The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger to
society.*
15 Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.*
31 These days, we are going too far in trying to protect the
interests of minority groups.**
16 Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
17 Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
18 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies
who would do us harm.
19 Police officers are justified in using force to carry out their
duties.
20 Laws and rules are the best way to keep society functioning
properly.
21 Having a strong military is how our government keeps us safe.
32 The needs of our own country’s citizens must come first, not
those of other countries.**
33 I have sometimes felt ashamed of my country.**
22 In order to build a good society, we need to let go of customs
that are holding us back.
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Factor

Item text
23 Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned customs to
guide it.
24 Children should be able to play and express themselves without
too many strict rules.
25 Everyone should be able to do as they please, if they are not
hurting anyone.
26 Governments and powerful individuals should not be able to
censor information.
27 Censoring individuals’ speech or expression is bad for society.
34 We must continue to create and improve laws that protect
individual rights and freedoms.**
Notes: Con-trait items are italicized.
Items with an asterisk(*) were originally composed for the Authoritarianism factor, but
are listed under Factor 2 based on the results from Study 2.
Items with a double asterisk (**) are new to this study.

3.1.1

Methods

3.1.1.1

Participants and Data Cleaning

The scale was administered as part of a larger battery of measures in a study
conducted by a colleague, which required a sample comprised of Canadian adults. At
Time 1, there were 519 participants. At Time 2, 446 participants completed the study (a
retention rate of 85.93%).
This study employed attention check items as well as screening for short response
times and multivariate outliers. The attention check item read as follows: “It is important
that you pay attention when completing the survey. Please check the middle option:
‘neither agree nor disagree.’” Participants were excluded for not selecting ‘Neither agree
nor disagree’ on the attention check, for short response times (less than two seconds per
item), and for multivariate outliers (at a threshold of <.001). At time 1, the total sample
after data cleaning for the CFA was N = 484; at time 2, the sample size after data
cleaning was N = 388.
At Time 1, 216 (44.60%) participants were women, 257 (53.10%) were men,
seven (1.40%) identified as a gender not specified, and four (0.08%) declined to answer.
The age range was 18-69 years (M = 30.85, SD = 10.09). The sample predominantly
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identified as White (N = 284; 58.67%). Of those who were non-White, 31 (6.40%)
identified as South Asian, 84 (17.35%) as Chinese, 32 (6.61%) as Black, seven (1.45%)
as Middle Eastern or West Asian, 11 (2.27%) as Filipino, 25 (5.17%) as Southeast Asian,
seven (1.45%) as Korean, three (0.62%) as Japanese, 14 (2.89%) as Aboriginal or First
Nations, and 15 (3.10%) as an ethnic group not specified. Participants could select
multiple ethnicities; 25 (5.17%) identified as multiracial (i.e., selected at least two
options).
At Time 2, 162 (41.80%) were women, 217 (55.90%) were men, 7 (1.80%)
identified as neither male nor female, and two declined to respond (0.05%). The age
range was 18-67 years (M = 30.59, SD = 10.04). The sample again predominantly
identified as White (N = 234; 60.31%). Of those who were non-White, 26 (6.70%)
identified as South Asian, 69 (17.78%) as Chinese, 18 (4.64%) as Black, five (1.29%) as
Middle Eastern or West Asian, 11 (2.84%) as Filipino, 18 (4.64%) as Southeast Asian,
eight (2.06%) as Korean, three (0.78%) as Japanese, nine (2.32%) as Aboriginal or First
Nations, 12 (3.09%) as an ethnic group not specified, and 21 (5.41%) as multiracial.

3.1.1.2

Procedure

Participants were recruited at Time 1 via the Prolific survey platform. A followup notification was sent via Prolific participants after 2 weeks prompting them to
complete part 2. Participants completed both part 1 and part 2 of the study online via
Qualtrics survey software. Both questionnaires took approximately 20 minutes to
complete. Participants were compensated via Prolific upon completion of both part 1 and
part 2 with 2.35 British pounds (for a total of 4.70 British pounds), equivalent to a rate
slightly higher than the Canadian federal minimum wage at the time of writing. Items and
measures were presented in a randomized order to control for order effects.

56

3.1.1.3
3.1.1.3.1

Measures
SDO

SDO7 (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994) is a 16-item scale assessing the
preference for hierarchical group relations. Recent research suggests the scale is best
measured as a two-factor model with SDO-Egalitarianism and SDO-Dominance,
indicating the preference for anti-egalitarian policies and for intergroup dominance,
respectively (Ho et al., 2015). Items are assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale with
higher scores indicating a belief in hierarchical group relations. Example items on the
SDO-D factor include “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups,” and
on the SDO-E, “We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of
life.” Internal reliability for the SDO-D was α = .84, and for the SDO-E was α = .89.

3.1.1.3.2

RWA

RWA assesses authoritarian attitudes, conceived as a combination of
conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission (Altemeyer,
2006). The RWA is a 20-item scale assessed on a 9-point Likert-type scale, with higher
scores indicating more authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2006). Example items on the RWA
scale include “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in
government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are
trying to create doubt in people’s minds,” and “There are many radical, immoral people
in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the
authorities should put out of action.” Internal reliability for the RWA was α = .95.

3.1.1.3.3

HEXACO-60

Openness to experience and conscientiousness were assessed with 10-item
subscales from the HEXACO-60. Higher scores on these HEXACO subscales indicate
higher openness and conscientiousness, respectively. Internal reliabilities for
conscientiousness (α = .80) and openness (α = .80) were very good.
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3.1.1.3.4

Patriotism and Nationalism

Patriotism and nationalism were assessed with Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989)
patriotism and nationalism scales, modified to refer to Canada rather than the United
States. Example items on the patriotism scale include “Although at times I may not agree
with the government, my commitment to Canada always remains strong.” and on the
nationalism scale, “Generally, the more influence Canada has on other nations, the better
off they are.” Higher scores on these scales indicate greater patriotism and nationalism,
respectively. Internal reliability for the patriotism scale was α = .92, and for nationalism
was α = .84.

3.1.1.3.5

Left-right political orientation

Left-right political orientation was assessed with a single item measured on a 7point Likert-type scale, with 1 representing “Very liberal/left-wing” and a 7 representing
“Very conservative/right-wing”.

3.1.1.3.6

Political Efficacy

Political efficacy was assessed with a combination of two 4-item efficacy scales
from Morrell (2005) and Kelly and Breinlinger (1996). Example items on the political
efficacy scale include “Every individual can have an impact on the political process”
(Morrell, 2005) and “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important
political issues facing our country” (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996). Higher scores indicate
greater perceptions of political efficacy. The total eight-item scale had an internal
reliability of α = .78.

3.1.1.3.7

Political Participation

Political participation was assessed using a series of items written for this study.
Three items asking if respondents had voted in the last federal, provincial, and municipal
elections were summed to create the voting behaviour scale. The internal reliability of the
voting behaviour items was α = .67. The three items intended to convey collective action
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did not demonstrate adequate reliability (α = .37). As such, I investigated one item – “In
the past year, have you participated in a protest, rally, march, or demonstration (other
than a workplace strike) regarding an issue you were concerned about?” – to assess the
question about participation in collective action. This variable was dummy coded such
that 1 = “Yes” and 0 = “No”.

3.1.1.3.8

Coronavirus Threat and Impact Questionnaire

Perceived threat, psychological burden, and attitudes towards government
restrictions were assessed using subscales from Conway et al.’s (2020) Coronavirus
Threat and Impact Questionnaire. The perceived threat subscale contained three items,
such as “I am stressed around other people because I worry I’ll catch the coronavirus.”
The psychological scale contained two items, including “I have become depressed
because of the coronavirus.” The punishment scale and restriction scale also contained
two items each, including “I want my Federal government to severely punish those who
violate orders to stay home,” and “I support Federal government measures to restrict the
movement of citizens to curb the spread of Coronavirus (COVID-19),” respectively. All
items were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1 - Strongly disagree”
to “7 - Strongly agree”. Internal reliabilities were α = .89 for the perceived threat
subscale, α = .83 for the restriction scale, α = .93 for the punishment scale, and α = .89
for the psychological scale.

3.1.1.4
3.1.1.4.1

Data Analytic Decisions
Factor Analytic Method

CFA was conducted in R with the lavaan package with Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimation. Lavaan defaults to listwise deletion for missing data, except where
missing values are missing completely at random or missing at random, in which case
full information maximum likelihood estimation are provided. Latent factors were
standardized to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, so as not to sacrifice the test of the factor
loading for each factor’s first indicator item.
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Some researchers have recommended treating Likert scale responses as ordinal
data for the purposes of CFA, while others have suggested that when there are at least
five response options, maximum likelihood models with continuous data perform equally
well (Rhemtulla et al., 2012). As an exploratory measure, the models in this study were
also tested using an ordinal approach. However, this method did not produce substantial
improvements in model fit; specifically, compared to the standard model, while it led to
improvements on some indices (CFI and TLI) it worsened fit on others (chi square,
RMSEA, and SRMR). As such, the continuous models with ML estimation are presented
here and in all CFAs going forward.

3.1.1.4.2

Factor Loading Cut-off

Based on Byrne (2010) and Hair et al. (2006), it was determined that items with
loadings ≤ 0.55 would be candidates for revision or deletion. While higher cut-offs (e.g.,
0.60 or 0.70) are sometimes recommended for well-established scales, 0.55 was selected
given the scale was novel.

3.1.2

Results and Discussion

3.1.2.1

CFA Time 1

The first model tested the four-factor structure with all 34 items. Except for
SRMR, model 1 demonstrated inadequate fit indices. The first modification (model 2)
was to move 4 items (12, 13, 14, and 15) from the traditionalism factor to the
authoritarianism factor, where they were originally hypothesized; however, model fit
indices were not improved by this modification. Model 3 tested a five-factor model
splitting the authoritarianism items into obedience and punitiveness factors, as originally
hypothesized. This did not improve model fit substantially. Unexpectedly, Factor 2
(traditionalism) demonstrated a very high correlation with authoritarian punitiveness
(.899), but less highly with Obedience (.686).
Model 4 tested a revised four-factor model with the authoritarianism factor
reduced only to the authoritarian obedience items, while the punitiveness items that were
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not removed were included with Factor 2. Model fit was slightly improved but still
inadequate. The decision was also made to eliminate the unexpected ‘liberalism’ factor,
as only two items demonstrated sufficient factor loadings. Several items were also
removed due to poor factor loadings, and items 13 and 15 were eliminated, as they had
similar loadings on the authoritarianism and traditionalism factors – suggesting they were
not useful for distinguishing between the two concepts.
Model 5 tested a three-factor model. Factor 2 contained both the traditionalism
and authoritarian punitiveness items, while Factor 3 contained authoritarian obedience
items. Overall, model fit was greatly improved with a three-factor model compared to the
four- and five-factor models; however, there was little theoretical justification to include
the punitiveness items on the traditionalism factor. Model 6 thus tested a three-factor
model with the original hypothesized structure (i.e., the traditionalism items on Factor 2,
and the authoritarianism items on Factor 3). Given that model fit was still unsatisfactory,
the modification indices were explored. The most impactful modification was identified
to be allowing correlation of residual variance between items 3 and 5, both of which refer
to taxes; given the semantic similarity of these items, allowing their residuals made
theoretical sense. This improved the fit of model 7 substantially. Tables 18 and 19 below
depict the model fit indices and the factor loadings from the CFAs conducted with Time
1 data.
Table 18: Model fit indices for CFA 1, Time 1.
1. Four-factor
2. Four-factor
3. Five-factor
4. Four-factor
5. Three-factor
6. Three-factor
7. Three-factor

χ2
1940.892*
1994.211*
1837.142*
1443.753*
792.338*
840.605*
660.613

(df)
521
561
517
428
186
186
185

BIC
55200.28
55253.60
55108.57
50015.23
22499.18
33690.27
33516.46

RMSEA [95% CI]
.075 [.071, .079]
.076 [.073, .080]
.073 [.069, .076]
.070 [.066, .074]
.082 [.076, .088]
.085 [.079, .091]
.073 [.067, .079]

CFI
.747
.737
.765
.788
.839
.826
.874

TLI
.727
.717
.745
.770
.818
.804
.857

Factor Loadings
Model
3
4
5

6

7

Note: *p < .001
Table 19: Factor loadings for CFA 1, Time 1.
Factor

Item
1

2

SRMR
.080
.081
.076
.074
.068
.076
.079
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Factor
Item
1
1 In a fair world, the
wealth gap should be as
small as possible.
2 Resources should be
distributed according to
people’s needs.
3 It is fair to tax people
with large incomes more
highly, so that money is
distributed more
equitably.
4 Our society would
have a lot less conflict if
we treated everyone
more equally.
5 Wealthy people
shouldn’t have to pay
high taxes just because
they’re successful.
6 Life would be boring if
we ensured everyone had
the same standard of
living.
28 Everyone should have
the right to access high
quality healthcare.
29 People should be
treated equally
regardless of their
appearance or identity.**
30 We must have laws in
place to prevent
discrimination based on
things like ethnicity and
gender identity.**
2
7 Even if society isn’t
perfect, I’d prefer to
avoid too many changes
in how it works.
8 Rebelling against the
political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is
something kids should
grow out of.

Factor Loadings
.66
.67
.63

.67

.66

.63

.63

.53

.52

.53

.53

-

-

-

.72

.73

.72

.71

.73

.75

.61

.62

.60

.62

.62

.60

.59

.67

-.64

-.66

-.64

-.63

-.66

-.67

-.51

-.55

-.56

-.55

-.54

-

-

-

.57

.56

.57

.57

.57

.56

.60

.56

.54

.56

.56

.55

.54

.60

.52

.51

.54

.55

.55

.53

.59

.64

.66

.66

.64

.64

.65

.64

.63

.66

.66

.63

.65

.66

.66
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Factor

3

Item
9 Strange new trends in
style or slang are usually
just immature acts of
rebellion.
10 These days, people
are too willing to try out
wild new ideas without
any proof they will
work.
11 I don’t trust activists
trying to stir things up.
12 Our country’s leaders
need to be tougher on
citizens who hold
dangerous views.*
13 Criminals should be
harshly punished for the
wellbeing of society.*
14 The death penalty is
justified if the criminal is
a danger to society.*
15 Prisons should not be
places of harsh
punishment.*
31 These days, we are
going too far in trying to
protect the interests of
minority groups.
19 Police officers are
justified in using force to
carry out their duties
21 Having a strong
military is how our
government keeps us
safe.
32 The needs of our own
country’s citizens must
come first, not those of
other countries.
12 Our country’s leaders
need to be tougher on
citizens who hold
dangerous views.

Factor Loadings
.65
.63
.64

.64

.65

.65

.65

.56

.56

.56

.55

.56

.55

.54

.73

.75

.75

.73

.75

.76

.76

.35

*

*

.35

-

-

-

.72

*

*

.71

-

-

-

.67

*

*

.67

.62

*

*

-.58

*

*

-.58

-

-

-

.66

.59

*

.66

.70

.71

.72

*

*

*

.59

.60

*

*

*

*

*

.64

.63

*

*

*

*

*

.57

.56

*

*

*

.40

.38
(P)

*

-

-

-
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Factor

4

Item
13 Criminals should be
harshly punished for the
wellbeing of society.*
14 The death penalty is
justified if the criminal is
a danger to society.
15 Prisons should not be
places of harsh
punishment.
16 Government
surveillance makes me
feel safe and secure.
17 Without strong
leaders, society as we
know it would collapse.
18 Good national leaders
keep us safe by standing
up to enemies who
would do us harm.
19 Police officers are
justified in using force to
carry out their duties.
20 Laws and rules are
the best way to keep
society functioning
properly.
21 Having a strong
military is how our
government keeps us
safe.
31 These days, we are
going too far in trying to
protect the interests of
minority groups.
32 The needs of our own
country’s citizens must
come first, not those of
other countries.
33 I have sometimes felt
ashamed of my country.
22 In order to build a
good society, we need to
let go of customs that are
holding us back.

Factor Loadings
.76
*
(P)

*

.75

-

-

*

.69

.70
(P)

*

*

.64

.63

*

-.59

-.62
(P)

*

-

-

-

.52

.47

.56
(O)

.56

.56

.51

.52

.59

.53

.67
(O)

.68

.67

.56

.56

.59

.51

.64
(O)

.64

.65

.57

.58

.56

.57

.58
(P)

*

*

.58

.57

.68

.61

.71
(O)

.71

.69

.65

.65

.72

.68

.66
(P)

*

*

.72

.72

*

*

.63
(P)

*

*

*

*

.54

.56

.57
(P)

*

*

.55

.55

-.40

-.36

-.43

-

-

-

.61

.60

-.43
(O)
.61

.61

-

-

-
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Factor

Item
Factor Loadings
23 Society can survive
.50
.51
.51
.51
just fine without oldfashioned customs to
guide it.
24 Children should be
.44
.45
.45
.45
able to play and express
themselves without too
many strict rules.
25 Everyone should be
.42
..43
.43
.43
able to do as they please,
if they are not hurting
anyone.
26 Governments and
.31
.31
.31
.31
powerful individuals
should not be able to
censor information.
27 Censoring
.17
.17
.16
.16
individuals’ speech or
expression is bad for
society.
34 We must continue to
.28
.27
.27
.27
create and improve laws
that protect individual
rights and freedoms.**
Notes: Con-trait items are italicized.
An asterisk (*) indicates items that were relocated from Factor 2 to Factor 3 during
model testing.
(-) indicates an item was removed.
(P) and (O) indicate the Authoritarianism Obedience and Punitiveness factors in the tests
of the five-factor model.

3.1.2.2

CFA Time 2

The three-factor models were tested with the data from Time 2. Modification
indices for the second three-factor model suggested the same modification as in Time 1 –
that is, to allow correlated residuals for items 3 and 5. This again made a substantial
improvement in model fit.
Table 20: Model fit indices for CFA 1, Time 2.
1. Three-factor
2. Three-factor
3. Three-factor

χ2
671.358*
642.996*
522.001

(df)
186
186
185

BIC
25492.717
25464.355
25492.103

RMSEA [95% CI]
.082 [.075, .089]
.080 [.073, .086]
.069 [.062, .075]

CFI
.863
.871
.905

TLI
.845
.854
.892

SRMR
.064
.069
.072
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Note: *p < .001
Table 21: Factor loadings for CFA 1, Time 2.
Factor

1 (E)

2 (T)

3 (A)

Item

1 In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as
possible.
2 Resources should be distributed according to people’s
needs.
3 It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly,
so that money is distributed more equitably.
4 Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated
everyone more equally.
5 Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just
because they’re successful.
6 Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the
same standard of living.
28 Everyone should have the right to access high quality
healthcare.
29 People should be treated equally regardless of their
appearance or identity.**
30 We must have laws in place to prevent discrimination
based on things like ethnicity and gender identity.**
7 Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too
many changes in how it works.
8 Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should grow out of.
9 Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just
immature acts of rebellion.
10 These days, people are too willing to try out wild new
ideas without any proof they will work.
11 I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
12 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens
who hold dangerous views.*
13 Criminals should be harshly punished for the
wellbeing of society.*
14 The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a
danger to society.*
15 Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.*
31 These days, we are going too far in trying to protect
the interests of minority groups.
19 Police officers are justified in using force to carry out
their duties.
21 Having a strong military is how our government
keeps us safe.
32 The needs of our own country’s citizens must come
first, not those of other countries.
12 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens
who hold dangerous views.

Factor Loadings
Model
1
2
.72
.72

3
.71

-

-

-

.72

.73

.62

.60

.59

.64

-.70

-.71

-.59

-

-

-

.62

.61

.66

.52

.51

.58

.61

.60

.66

.73

.75

.75

.71

.73

.73

.64

.66

.66

.63

.63

.63

.82
-

.84
-

.84
-

-

-

-

.64

*

*

.73

.74

.74

.62

*

*

.64

*

*

.58

*

*

-

-

-
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Factor

Item
13 Criminals should be harshly punished for the
wellbeing of society.*
14 The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a
danger to society.
15 Prisons should not be places of harsh punishment.
16 Government surveillance makes me feel safe and
secure.
17 Without strong leaders, society as we know it would
collapse.
18 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to
enemies who would do us harm.
19 Police officers are justified in using force to carry out
their duties.
20 Laws and rules are the best way to keep society
functioning properly.
21 Having a strong military is how our government
keeps us safe.
32 The needs of our own country’s citizens must come
first, not those of other countries.
33 I have sometimes felt ashamed of my country.

Factor Loadings
-

-

*

.67

.67

.51

.48

.48

.69

.62

.62

.69

.66

.66

*

.58

.58

.72

.68

.68

*

.74

.74

*

.61

.61

-

-

-

Notes: Con-trait items are italicized.
An asterisk (*) indicates items that were relocated from Factor 2 to Factor 3 during
model testing.
Ultimately, the final three-factor model, which had the hypothesized structure
(egalitarianism, traditionalism, and authoritarianism factors) and which allowed
correlated residuals between items 3 and 5 was selected.
Table 22 below depicts the factor correlations of the final model at Time 1 (above
diagonal) and Time 2 (below diagonal). Table 23 shows the descriptive statistics of the
individual items of the final scale at Times 1 and 2.
Table 22: Inter-factor correlations for CFA 1, Time 1 and 2.
1.
1. Egalitarianism
2. Traditionalism
3. Authoritarianism

2.
-.72

-.71
-.49

.80

3.
-.37
.82
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics for scale items in CFA 1, Time 1 and Time 2.

1 In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as
possible.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly,
so that money is distributed more equitably.

Mean (SD)
Time 1
Time 2
5.56 (1.41) 5.61 (1.42)
5.75 (1.30)

5.77 (1.37)

Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated
everyone more equally.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just
because they’re successful.
Everyone should have the right to access high quality
healthcare.
People should be treated equally, regardless of their
appearance or identity.
We must have laws in place to prevent discrimination
based on things like ethnicity and gender identity.
2 Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too
many changes in how it works.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should grow out of.

5.82 (1.26)

5.98 (1.10)

2.60 (1.70)

2.44 (1.60)

6.65 (.72)

6.67 (.56)

6.50 (.87)

6.55 (.71)

6.13 (1.18)

6.23 (.96)

3.54 (1.57)

3.51 (1.64)

3.16 (1.72)

3.04 (1.57)

Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just
immature acts of rebellion.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new
ideas without any proof they will work.

2.95 (1.52)

2.84 (1.43)

4.28 (1.67)

4.04 (1.61)

I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.

3.67 (1.73)

3.57 (1.76)

3.19 (1.89)

2.94 (1.75)

3.37 (1.68)
4.87 (1.55)

3.32 (1.58)
4.66 (1.60)

5.33 (1.29)

5.18 (1.35)

5.40 (1.32)

5.29 (1.34)

3.69 (1.78)

3.64 (1.68)

4.16 (2.03)

4.03 (2.04)

These days, we are going too far in trying to protect the
interests of minority groups.
3 Government surveillance makes me feel safe and secure.
Without strong leaders, society as we know it would
collapse.
Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to
enemies who would do us harm.
Laws and rules are the best way to keep society
functioning properly.
Having a strong military is how our government keeps
us safe.
The death penalty is justified if the criminal is a danger
to society.
Note: Con-trait items are italicized.
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3.1.2.2.1

Scale Modifications

As before, items were excluded for poor factor loadings, high cross-loadings, or
because of the elimination of Factor 4 (‘liberalism’), and two were excluded due to being
highly skewed; specifically, “everyone should have the right to access high quality
healthcare” and “people should be treated equally, regardless of their appearance or
identity” demonstrated very high means and low standard deviations. After completing
the tests of reliability and validity below, the NPIS was later revised with the addition of
four additional con-trait items to bolster the traditionalism and authoritarianism factors,
with the revised version of the scale tested in CFA 2. One item with an unsatisfactory
factor loading was reworded, as were the two highly skewed items. The revised NPIS can
be seen at the beginning of section 3.2 in Table 43.

3.1.2.3

Reliability and Validity Analyses

3.1.2.3.1

Internal Consistency

At Time 1, Cronbach’s alpha was α = .793 for egalitarianism, α = .823 for
traditionalism, and α = .783 for authoritarianism, indicating very good internal reliability
across all three subscales. Reliabilities were also good at Time 2, with Cronbach’s alphas
of α = .812 for egalitarianism, α = .868 for traditionalism, and α = .806 for
authoritarianism.

3.1.2.3.2

Test-Retest Reliability

Total scores were calculated for each factor by calculating the mean of the
subscale items (after reverse-coding con-trait items) at Time 1 and 2. Test-retest
reliabilities were very good or excellent for Egalitarianism (.87), Traditionalism (.89),
and Authoritarianism (.90). However, it is important to note that this study involved a
relatively short time interval of two weeks.
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3.1.2.3.3

Construct Validity

The data were examined for multivariate outliers on variables of interest
(HEXACO, SDO, RWA, patriotism, and nationalism). A total of 39 participants were
excluded from the Time 1 data (which included SDO and RWA) for a sample of N = 421,
and 10 from the Time 2 data (which included HEXACO, political affiliation variables,
patriotism, and nationalism) for a sample of N = 378.
Tables 24 and 25 show descriptive and summary statistics. Not included in the
table is the dichotomous variable for participation in a protest or demonstration. In total,
301 (79.60%) respondents indicated they had not participated in a demonstration, and 77
(20.4%) indicated they had. Bivariate correlations between all study variables can be
found in the Appendix. For the purposes of analysis, gender was coded as 0 = male and 1
= female, and ethnic identity was coded as 0 = White and 1 = Ethnic minority (including
multiracial identity).
Table 24: Descriptive statistics for all study variables in scale validation study 3.
SDO-D (n =421)
SDO-E (n =421)
RWA (n =421)
C-19 Threat (n = 482)
C-19 Burden (n = 482)
C-19 Restrict (n = 482)
C-19 Punish (n = 482)
Conscientiousness (n =378)
Openness (n =378)
Patriotism (n =378)
Nationalism (n =378)
Left-right political orientation (n =378)
Political efficacy (n =378)
Voting behaviour (n =378)
Egalitarianism (n =421); (n = 378)
Traditionalism (n =421); (n = 378)
Authoritarianism (n =421); (n = 378)

Mean (SD)
2.43 (1.07)
2.29 (1.04)
3.05 (1.49)
4.63 (1.55)
3.83 (1.79)
6.01 (1.12)
5.03 (1.56)
4.86 (0.57)
4.57 (0.64)
4.98 (1.06)
3.63 (1.01)
2.94 (1.48)
4.59 (0.93)
1.53 (1.11)
Time 1
Time 2
6.07 (0.73) 6.04 (0.80)
3.33 (1.20) 3.31 (1.27)
4.38 (1.11) 4.33 (1.15)

Range
1.00-5.88
1.00-5.50
1.00-7.60
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
2.80-6.20
2.80-6.00
1.09-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.25-7.00
0.00-3.00
Time 1
Time 2
2.71-7.00
2.86-7.00
1.00-6.67
1.00-6.67
1.17-7.00
1.17-6.83

70

Table 25: Summary of party affiliation and voting behaviour.

Liberal Party
Conservative Party
New Democratic Party
Green Party
People’s Party

3.1.2.3.3.1

Identify with (%)
(n = 359)
138 (38.40%)
54 (15.00%)
133 (37.00%)
29 (8.10%)
5 (1.40%)

Voted for (%)
(n = 263)
134 (51.00%)
31 (11.80%)
76 (28.90%)
18 (6.80%)
4 (1.50%)

Convergent validity

I expected that the egalitarianism factor would be negatively related to SDO-D
and SDO-E, that both traditionalism and authoritarianism would be positively related to
RWA, and that authoritarianism would be positively related to patriotism and
nationalism. Left-right affiliation (such that high scores indicate more right-wing beliefs)
should be related negatively with egalitarianism, and positively with traditionalism and
authoritarianism. conscientiousness and openness to experience are personality domains
known to be related to higher and lower conservatism (right-wing) beliefs, respectively.
Conscientiousness could thus be related positively to traditionalism and authoritarianism
and negatively to egalitarianism, while openness could be positively related to
egalitarianism and negatively to traditionalism and authoritarianism.
To determine the relationship between the subscales of the New Political Ideology
Scale with these constructs, I calculated multiple regressions in SPSS software,
controlling for gender, age, and ethnic identity. Tables 26 through 33 depict the results of
the multiple regression analyses. Significant predictors are bolded.
The tests of convergent validity overall showed results in the expected directions,
and there were also some unanticipated relationships. Egalitarianism was strongly,
negatively related to both SDO-D and SDO-E, but unexpectedly, traditionalism was also
(positively) related to SDO-E, and both traditionalism and authoritarianism with SDO-D.
As expected, both traditionalism and authoritarianism were strongly related to RWA, as
was egalitarianism (negatively and weakly).
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Left-right affiliation was related to all three dimensions of ideology in the
expected directions; that is, more right-wing or conservative identification was associated
with lower egalitarianism scores, and higher traditionalism and authoritarianism scores.
Authoritarianism had the weakest association with left-right affiliation; this makes
theoretical sense given the variables typically associated with the left-right dimension are
acceptance of inequality and resistance to change (Bobbio, 1996; Jost et al., 2003a).
As expected, authoritarianism was strongly, positively related to both patriotism
and nationalism. Traditionalism was positively related to nationalism, though less
strongly than authoritarianism. Unexpectedly, egalitarianism also showed a small positive
correlation with both patriotism and nationalism.
Interestingly, only authoritarianism was related to conscientiousness (positively),
and only traditionalism was related to openness (negatively). It is possible that the welldocumented relationship between openness and left- or liberal-leaning attitudes is driven
by the non-traditional, creative, or adventurous qualities associated with being high in
openness to experience. The relationship between conscientiousness and authoritarianism
also makes sense, given that individuals high in conscientiousness tend to be dutiful and
orderly, but it is less clear why conscientiousness was unrelated to traditionalism. It is
possible that assessing personality with the Five Factor Model of personality could have
produced a different pattern of results, given that it is more widely used than HEXACO.
Table 26: Validation study 3 regression analysis for SDO-Dominance
β

t

p

R
.693

Adjusted
R2
.473

-.137
-3.596
<.001
Age
Gender
.022
.600
.549
Ethnicity
-.067
-1.738
.083
Egalitarianism
-.339
-7.500
<.001
Traditionalism
.331
5.615
<.001
Authoritarianism
.171
3.426
.001
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
SDO-D = greater social dominance
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Table 27: Validation study 3 regression analysis for SDO-Egalitarianism
β

t

p

R
.754

Adjusted
R2
.562

.021
.607
.544
Age
Gender
-.068
-1.995
.047
Ethnicity
-.022
-.629
.530
Egalitarianism
-.467
-11.314
<.001
Traditionalism
.537
6.825
<.001
Authoritarianism
-.025
-.541
.589
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
SDO-E = greater social dominance
Table 28: Validation study 3 regression analysis for RWA
β

t

p

R
.799

Adjusted
R2
.633

-.067
-2.110
.036
Age
Gender
-.008
-.266
.790
Ethnicity
.021
.652
.515
Egalitarianism
-.095
-2.510
.012
Traditionalism
.498
10.146
<.001
Authoritarianism
.307
7.392
<.001
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
RWA = greater authoritarianism
Table 29: Validation study 3 regression analysis for left-right affiliation
β

t

p

R
.719

Adjusted
R2
.509

-.039
-.976
.330
Age
Gender
-.026
-.661
.509
Ethnicity
.074
1.854
.065
Egalitarianism
-.370
-7.658
<.001
Traditionalism
.317
5.294
<.001
Authoritarianism
.117
2.399
.017
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs
Table 30: Validation study 3 regression analysis for patriotism

Age

β

t

p

.141

3.124

.002

R
.605

Adjusted
R2
.356
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β
t
p
R
Gender
.019
.432
.666
Ethnicity
-.005
-.107
.915
Egalitarianism
.168
3.029
.003
Traditionalism
.061
.891
.374
Authoritarianism
.594
10.599
<.001
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

Adjusted
R2

Table 31: Validation study 3 regression analysis for nationalism
β

t

p

R
.697

Adjusted
R2
.477

-.104
-2.546
.011
Age
Gender
-.042
-1.042
.298
Ethnicity
.010
.237
.813
Egalitarianism
.192
3.858
<.001
Traditionalism
.371
5.997
<.001
Authoritarianism
.485
9.622
<.001
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White
Table 32: Validation study 3 regression analysis for conscientiousness
β

t

p

R
.283

Adjusted
R2
.065

.069
1.260
.208
Age
Gender
.154
2.865
.004
Ethnicity
-.164
-2.991
.003
Egalitarianism
-.103
-1.550
.122
Traditionalism
-.118
-1.423
.156
Authoritarianism
.163
2.420
.016
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Table 33: Validation study 3 regression analysis for openness
β

t

p

R
.471

.128
2.549
.011
Age
Gender
.003
.067
.946
Ethnicity
-.147
-2.911
.004
Egalitarianism
.082
1.338
.182
Traditionalism
-.286
-3.768
<.001
Authoritarianism
-.090
-1.450
.148
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

Adjusted
R2
.209
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3.1.2.3.3.2 Divergent validity
The relationship between the egalitarianism factor with RWA, and that between
SDO and the traditionalism and authoritarianism factors, should be lower than their
relationships with their theoretically similar concepts. However, traditionalism’s
relationship to SDO-E and SDO-D was roughly as strong as egalitarianism’s, indicating
there was room for improvement in distinguishing the egalitarianism factor. RWA
showed the expected pattern of effects – that is, egalitarianism’s relation to RWA was
much weaker than RWA’s relation to traditionalism and authoritarianism.

3.1.2.3.4

Criterion Validity

3.1.2.3.4.1 Political Participation
The new scale should be able to predict political behaviours such as party
affiliation, voting behaviour, political efficacy, and participation in collective action. I
had originally hypothesized that a radicalism or dogmatism factor would relate to both
efficacy and participation; however, this factor did not manifest. Theoretically,
traditionalism and authoritarianism could also have a negative correlation with
participation in collective action. Authoritarianism could also relate positively to political
efficacy, as the efficacy scale conveys trust in political authorities and their institutions,
and both authoritarianism and traditionalism should relate negatively to participation, as
collective action can involve challenging authority (anti-authoritarianism), and the
traditionalism factor includes content about distrust in activism and a general resistance
to change. Political efficacy and political participation are shown below in Tables 34 and
35. Seven participants were excluded from the voting behaviour analyses for selfreporting as ineligible to vote in Canada.
Party affiliation should reflect the same pattern as left-right affiliation; that is,
supporting a right-wing party (Conservative Party of Canada or People’s Party of
Canada) should be negatively related to egalitarianism and positively with traditionalism
and authoritarianism. The NDP is generally seen as Canada’s most left-wing party, in
comparison with the Liberal party (left-of-center) and the Conservative party (right-of-
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center). Perceptions of the Green Party are less consistent, but the party’s focus on
environmental issues means it is likely perceived by most as left or left-of-center.
Table 34: Validation study 3 regression analysis for political efficacy
β

t

p

R
.268

Adjusted
R2
.056

.064
1.177
.240
Age
Gender
-.044
-.823
.411
Ethnicity
-.175
-3.165
.002
Egalitarianism
.074
1.102
.271
Traditionalism
-.178
-2.140
.033
Authoritarianism
.097
1.433
.153
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Table 35: Validation study 3 regression analysis for likelihood of voting in federal
election
β

t

p

R
.294

Adjusted
R2
.073

.226
4.136
<.001
Age
Gender
.009
.169
.866
Ethnicity
-.098
-1.768
.078
Egalitarianism
.029
.434
.665
Traditionalism
-.104
-1.254
.211
Authoritarianism
-.011
-.156
.876
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
I investigated the probability of participating in collective action with a binary
logistic regression, and self-reported party affiliation and of past voting behaviour in the
federal election with a multinomial logistic regression in SPSS software – again
controlling for gender, age, and ethnic identity. The results are shown below in Tables 36
through 38. The number of participants who identified with or voted for the People’s
Party of Canada were too small to include in the multinomial logistic regression (N =5
and N = 4, respectively), so respondents who identified this choice were excluded.
Table 36: Validation study 3 parameter estimates for collective action participation
Predictor
Age
Gender

B
-.286
-.049

Wald
.966
7.827

Exp(B)
.751
.952

p
.326
.005
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Predictor
B
Wald
Exp(B)
Ethnicity
.424
1.896
1.529
Egalitarianism
.225
.678
1.252
Traditionalism
-.306
2.767
.736
Authoritarianism
-.069
.184
.933
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

p
.169
.410
.096
.668

Table 37: Validation study 3 parameter estimates for party affiliation (with Liberal
as reference group)
Predictor
Age

Liberal Party vs.
B
Wald
Exp(B)
p
NDP
.004
.065
1.004
.798
Green
-.020
.585
.981
.444
Conservative
.004
.030
1.004
.862
Gender
NDP
-.115
.154
.891
.694
Green
-.203
.190
.816
.663
Conservative
.887
3.969
2.428
.046
Ethnicity
NDP
-.075
.060
1.197
.655
Green
.968
3.119
2.632
.077
Conservative
.180
.200
.928
.806
Egalitarianism
NDP
.822
7.186
2.275
.007
Green
-.453
.946
.636
.331
Conservative
-1.409
21.048
.244
<.001
Traditionalism
NDP
-.303
2.779
.738
.095
Green
-.220
.508
.802
.476
Conservative
.164
.459
1.179
.498
Authoritarianism NDP
-.543
9.997
.581
.002
Green
-1.023
13.288
.360
<.001
Conservative
.270
1.045
1.310
.307
Notes: By default in SPSS, Female and Non-White were set to reference groups
Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Table 38: Validation study 3 parameter estimates for voting behaviour (with Liberal
as reference group)
Predictor
Age

Gender

Ethnicity

Egalitarianism

Liberal Party vs.
NDP
Green
Conservative
NDP
Green
Conservative
NDP
Green
Conservative
NDP

B
-.001
.007
.005
-.167
-.571
.428
.450
-.737
-.381
.421

Wald
.002
.057
.043
.269
.915
.636
1.651
1.209
.559
1.727

Exp(B)
.999
1.007
1.005
.846
.565
1.534
1.569
.478
.683
1.523

p
.966
.812
.836
.604
.339
.425
.199
.272
.455
.813
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Predictor

Liberal Party vs.
B
Wald
Exp(B)
p
Green
-.862
2.132
.422
.144
Conservative
-1.292
12.556
.275
<.001
Traditionalism
NDP
.019
.009
1.019
.925
Green
-.161
.148
.851
.701
Conservative
.534
2.833
1.705
.092
Authoritarianism NDP
-.247
1.939
.781
.164
Green
-1.289
11.888
.275
.001
Conservative
.132
.155
1.141
.694
Notes: By default in SPSS, Female and Non-White were set to reference groups
Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Lower traditionalism was correlated with higher political efficacy, and none of the
factors predicted a significantly increased likelihood of participating in collective action
or an increased likelihood of voting. However, the ideology factors showed interesting
relationships with party affiliation and voting behaviour. Higher egalitarianism was
linked to an increased likelihood of identifying with and voting for the Liberal Party
versus the Conservative party. It also predicted an increased likelihood of identifying
with the New Democratic Party rather than the Liberal Party – over twice as likely. High
authoritarianism predicted a decreased likelihood of identifying with the NDP or Green
Party, and a decreased likelihood of voting for the Green Party. Given that these parties
receive less mainstream attention, win fewer seats, and may be seen to have fringe
positions, it makes theoretical sense that anti-authoritarianism would relate to support for
them – or said another way, that higher authoritarianism predicts support for mainstream
parties, who hold more political power.
While higher egalitarianism greatly increased the likelihood of NDP affiliation
versus Liberal affiliation, and slightly for Liberal affiliation versus Conservative
affiliation, only the latter was true for voting behaviour in the last federal election.
However, party affiliation and actual votes cast are not always the same – for example, in
cases of strategic voting (i.e., trying to prevent a less-preferred party from winning by
voting for a second-choice party). It is possible that many who identified with the NDP
voted for the Liberal party in the last election as a strategic vote.
There was no relationship between ideology and collective action. However,
collective action was assessed here with a single item asking about involvement in protest
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or demonstrations. A better measure was considered necessary to capture a potential
relationship between the ideology scale and collective action participation and was
investigated in the next validation study.

3.1.2.3.4.2 Coronavirus Attitudes
I hypothesized that higher egalitarianism and lower traditionalism would be
associated with greater perceived threat and burden from the coronavirus, and greater
approval of measures to implement pandemic restrictions and punish those who disobey
them. Authoritarianism was expected to relate positively to approval of pandemic
restrictions and punishments for those who disobey them, but no predictions were made
regarding authoritarianism and perceived threat or psychological burden from the virus.
Tables 39 through 42 below depict the results of the regression analyses investigating
these questions.
Table 39: Validation study 3 regression analysis for perceived threat of COVID-19
β

t

p

R
.351

Adjusted
R2
.112

.049
1.067
.286
Age
Gender
.128
2.826
.005
Ethnicity
.102
2.213
.027
Egalitarianism
.320
5.820
.000
Traditionalism
.034
.495
.621
Authoritarianism
.108
1.876
.061
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Table 40: Validation study 3 regression analysis for psychological burden of
COVID-19
β

t

p

R
.305

-.047
-1.000
.318
Age
Gender
.204
4.408
.000
Ethnicity
-.073
-1.558
.120
Egalitarianism
.157
2.807
.005
Traditionalism
-.026
-.362
.717
Authoritarianism
.017
.292
.770
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

Adjusted
R2
.081
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Table 41: Validation study 3 regression analysis for approval of COVID-19
restrictions
β

t

p

R
.424

Adjusted
R2
.169

.003
.066
.947
Age
Gender
-.013
-.289
.773
Ethnicity
.117
2.608
.009
Egalitarianism
.370
6.959
.000
Traditionalism
-.064
-.956
.340
Authoritarianism
.230
4.124
.000
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Table 42: Validation study 3 regression analysis for approval of punishments for
violators of COVID-19 restrictions
β

t

p

R
.427

Adjusted
R2
.172

-.024
-.546
.585
Age
Gender
-.042
-.968
.333
Ethnicity
.144
3.221
.001
Egalitarianism
.244
4.594
.000
Traditionalism
.044
.652
.515
Authoritarianism
.333
5.974
.000
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Higher egalitarianism was associated with greater perceived threat from COVID19, as were female gender and ethnic minority status. Contrary to hypotheses,
traditionalism was unrelated. Egalitarianism and authoritarianism were both strongly
related to approval of government restrictions, and punishments for those who disobey
restrictions. Egalitarianism appears to the main ideological driver of COVID-19 attitude
polarization, at least regarding attitudes towards the severity of the crisis. Regarding the
government response to the crisis, both egalitarianism and authoritarianism contributed.
Regardless of whether authoritarian individuals felt personally threatened by COVID-19,
they were nonetheless in favour of government restrictions to curb the pandemic, and
they were highly in favour of punishing those who flouted pandemic restrictions.
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3.2

Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Scale Validation

(Study 4)
Table 43 below depicts the scale tested in validation study 4, following the
modifications made based on validation study 4.
Table 43: Scale factors and items for CFA and scale validation study 4
Factor
Egalitarianism

Traditionalism

Authoritarianism

Item text
-In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
-It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that
money is distributed more equitably.
-Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone
more equally.
-Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because
they’re successful.
-Having equal access to healthcare is a human right.**
-We must make sure people are given equal opportunities,
regardless of their appearance or identity.**
-We must have laws in place to prevent discrimination based on
things like ethnicity and gender identity.
-Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes
in how it works.
-Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
-Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts
of rebellion.
-These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas
without any proof they will work.
-I don’t trust activists trying to stir things up.
-These days, we are going too far in trying to protect the interests
of minority groups.
-Protests and other collective actions are necessary to achieve a
better society.*
-Younger generations should work to change our outdated
political system.*
-I appreciate government surveillance because it protects our
country from threats.**
-Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
-Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies
who would do us harm.
-Laws and rules are the best way to keep society functioning
properly.
-Having a strong military is how our government keeps us safe.
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Factor

Item text
-I dislike it when the government restricts our freedoms to
supposedly ‘keep us safe’.*
-I’m fine with disobeying authorities when they are acting
unfairly.*
Note: Con-trait items are italicized.
*Proposed new items
**Modified wording

3.2.1

Methods

3.2.1.1

Participants and Data Cleaning

Participants were recruited via a combination of Western University’s SONA
undergraduate sample pool and the university’s email Mass Recruitment system.
Participants were students at Western University. Those recruited from the SONA sample
pool were psychology undergraduate students, and those recruited using the email Mass
Recruitment system were Western students from any department. The combined sample
had 670 participants.
The data were screened for incomplete responses, short response times, and
multivariate outliers. Participants were excluded if they failed to complete the political
ideology scale, if their response time averaged less than two seconds per item, and for
being multivariate outliers on the political ideology scale (at a threshold of < .001).
Sample size after data cleaning was N = 522. Of these, 331 (63.40%) were women, 159
(30.50%) were men, 11 (2.10%) identified as neither male nor female, and 21 (4.02%)
declined to answer. The age range was 17-74 years (M = 22.30, SD = 6.29). The sample
predominantly identified as White (N = 294, 56.30%). Of those who were not White, 53
(10.20%) identified as South Asian, 94 (18.00%) as Chinese, 13 (2.50%) as Black, 26
(5.00%) as Middle Eastern or West Asian, four (0.80%) as Filipino, 16 (3.10%) as
Southeast Asian, 9 (1.70%) as Korean, five (1.00%) as Japanese, eight (1.50%) as
Aboriginal or First Nations, and 25 (4.80%) as an ethnic group not specified. Participants
could select multiple ethnicities, and 36 (6.90%) identified as multiracial (i.e., selected at
least two options).

82

3.2.1.2

Procedure

All participants completed the questionnaires online via Qualtrics. Items and
measures were presented in a randomized order to control for order effects. The
questionnaires took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. Participants recruited via
SONA were compensated with course credit, and those recruited via email were
compensated with the option to enter a draw for one of four University food services gift
cards (one $20.00 gift card, or one of three $10.00 gift cards).

3.2.1.3
3.2.1.3.1

Measures
SDO

The SDO7 (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994), a 16-item scale assessing the
preference for hierarchical group relations, was administered again in Study 4. Higher
scores on SDO-D and SDO-E indicate greater social dominance. Internal reliabilities for
the two SDO factors were α = .82 for SDO-D, and α = .89 for SDO-E.

3.2.1.3.2

RWA

The RWA scale, a 20-item measure of authoritarianism combining
conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission, was
administered again in Study 4. Higher scores on RWA indicate greater authoritarianism.
Internal reliability for the RWA was α = .93.

3.2.1.3.3

Left-right Political Orientation

Left-right political orientation was assessed with a single item measured on a 7point Likert-type scale, with 1 representing “Very liberal/left-wing” and a 7 representing
“Very conservative/right-wing”.
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3.2.1.3.4

Canadian Political Issues

Forty-three items pertaining to issues relevant to Canadians were written. I
reviewed sources including the political platforms of the major Canadian federal parties
as well as the issues discussed on the Institute for Research on Public Policy and major
news networks to generate these items. The items were categorized as follows:
Indigenous rights, crime and policing, healthcare, gender and sexual identity, economics,
immigration, education, military and foreign aid, voting and political campaigning,
environment and sustainability, COVID-19 responses, telecommunications and
surveillance, and one item about Canada’s ties to the British monarchy. Agreement with
the statements was assessed with a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 representing “No,
strongly oppose”, and 7 representing “Yes, strongly support”.

3.2.1.3.5

Collective action

A questionnaire assessing attitudes towards various types of collective action was
adapted from an inventory created by Teixeira et al. (2020). The scale contains 12 items,
six of which pertain to normative collective action and six of which pertain to nonnormative collective action. Normative collective actions are those which are ‘systemsanctioned’, legal, and relatively non-disruptive; examples include organizing and
participating in a strike, distributing flyers, and holding information-sharing sessions.
Non-normative actions are radical, disruptive, and, in some cases, illegal; examples
include vandalizing buildings with protest messages, blocking access to buildings, and
spreading negative rumours about a high-status group or other target. Teixeira et al.
(2020) suggests the necessity of distinguishing normative from non-normative actions, as
they are perceived differently and may also have different effects on the political process.
Items were scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale with a 7 indicating an action was
perceived as “completely acceptable” and a 1 indicating an action was perceived as
“completely unacceptable”. Internal reliability for the normative items was α = .88, and
for the non-normative items was α = .79.
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3.2.1.4

Data Analytic Decisions

3.2.1.4.1

Factor analytic method

CFA was conducted in R with the lavaan package with Maximum Likelihood
estimation. Lavaan defaults to listwise deletion for missing data, except where missing
values are missing completely at random or missing at random, in which case full
information maximum likelihood estimations are provided. Latent factors were
standardized to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, so as not to sacrifice the test of the factor
loading for each factor’s first indicator item.

3.2.1.4.2

Factor loading cut-off

As before, based on Byrne (2010) and Hair et al. (2006), items with loadings <
0.55 were candidates for revision or deletion.

3.2.2

Results and Discussion

3.2.2.1

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

CFA 2 demonstrated strong support for a three-factor structure of the new
ideology scale. The first model tested the three-factor model (with egalitarianism,
traditionalism, and authoritarianism factors) with all 22 items. While this model was
tested first without allowing for correlated residuals between the items suggested in CFA
1, investigating the modification indices revealed this again to be the most impactful
modification on model fit; as such, all models reported here include this correlation.
The model was revised thereafter by removing problematic items one at a time.
As outlined in the data analytic plan, items with weak factor loadings were removed. As
well, items 12 and 13 – which had low variance and extremely high means (> 6.50) –
were removed. Table 44 shows descriptive statistics for all scale items, Table 45 depicts
model fit indices for all models tested, and Table 46 shows factor loadings for all items in
all models tested. Prior to testing revised three-factor models, a two-factor model (not
shown in Table below) was also tested combining the traditionalism and authoritarianism
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items (excluding items 18, 21, and 22) into one factor. The two-factor model
demonstrated poorer model fit than the corresponding three-factor version (model 4)
across all indices; χ2 = 876.001 (151), p < .001; RMSEA = .096, CI [.090, .102]; CFI =
.841; TLI = .820; SRMR = .078.
Table 44: Descriptive statistics for scale items in validation study 4
Mean (SD)
E 6 Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re

5.37 (1.77)

successful.
7 In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.

5.22 (1.70)

8 It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money is
distributed more equitably.

5.48 (1.64)

9 Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone more equally.

5.84 (1.30)

12 Having equal access to health care is a human right.

6.52 (0.94)

13 We must make sure people are given equal opportunities, regardless of their
appearance or identity.

6.50 (0.88)

14 We must have laws in place in order to prevent discrimination based on
things like ethnicity and gender identity.

6.19 (1.21)

T 1 Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes in how it

2.97 (1.58)

works.
2 Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is something kids
should grow out of.

2.78 (1.53)

3 Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts of rebellion.

2.58 (1.38)

4 These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas without any proof
they will work.

3.88 (1.63)

5 I don’t trust activists and agitators trying to stir things up.

3.34 (1.62)

15 These days, we are going too far in trying to protect the interests of minority
groups.

2.57 (1.73)

16 Protests and other collective actions are necessary to achieve a better
society.

2.46 (1.27)

17 Younger generations should work to change our outdated political system.

2.41 (1.32)
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A 10 Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.

4.66 (1.55)

11 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to those who would do us
harm.

4.93 (1.35)

18 I appreciate government surveillance because it protects our country from
threats.

3.77 (1.55)

19 Laws and rules are the best way to keep society functioning properly.

5.09 (1.40)

20 Having a strong military is how our government keeps us safe.

3.33 (1.66)

21 I dislike it when the government restricts our freedoms to supposedly keep us
safe.

3.97 (1.70)

22 I’m fine with disobeying authorities if they are acting unfairly.

5.17 (1.45)

Note: Con-trait items are italicized. Means presented here are after reverse coding.

Table 45: Model fit indices for CFA 2
χ2
1.
903.418*
2.
727.993*
3.
633.991*
4.
586.380*
5.
540.719*
6.
461.633*
Note: *p < .001

(df)
205
185
166
148
131
115

BIC
36938.270
34897.089
33070.151
31205.361
30055.802
28757.532

RMSEA [95% CI]
.081 [.075, .086]
.075 [.069, .081]
.073 [.067, .080]
.075 [.069, .082]
.077 [.071, .084]
.076 [.069, .083]

CFI
.860
.887
.900
.904
.904
.914

TLI
.842
.872
.886
.889
.888
.898

SRMR
.085
.078
.076
.073
.070
.063

Table 46: Factor loadings for CFA 2
Factor

1 (E)

Item
1
.65

Wealthy people shouldn’t have
to pay high taxes just because
they’re successful.
In a fair world, the wealth gap
-.66
should be as small as possible.
It is fair to tax people with large -.70
incomes more highly, so that
money is distributed more
equitably.
Our society would have a lot less -.64
conflict if we treated everyone
more equally.

2
.65

Factor Loadings
Model
3
4
5
.65
.65
.67

6
.70

-.66

-.66

-.66

-.67

-.71

-.70

-.70

-.70

-.73

-.76

-.64

-.64

-.64

-.62

-.57
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Factor

2 (T)

3 (A)

Item
Having equal access to health
care is a human right.
We must make sure people are
given equal opportunities,
regardless of their appearance or
identity.
We must have laws in place in
order to prevent discrimination
based on things like ethnicity
and gender identity.
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d
prefer to avoid too many changes
in how it works.
Rebelling against the political
‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out
of.
Strange new trends in style or
slang are usually just immature
acts of rebellion.
These days, people are too
willing to try out wild new ideas
without any proof they will
work.
I don’t trust activists and
agitators trying to stir things up.
These days, we are going too far
in trying to protect the interests
of minority groups.
Protests and other collective
actions are necessary to achieve
a better society.
Younger generations should
work to change our outdated
political system.
Without strong leaders, society
as we know it would collapse.
Good national leaders keep us
safe by standing up to those who
would do us harm.
I appreciate government
surveillance because it protects
our country from threats.

-.70

Factor Loadings
-.70 -.70 -.70 -

-

-.63

-.63

-.63

-.63

-.60

-

-.74

-.74

-.74

-.74

-.72

-.68

.71

.72

.72

.71

.72

.72

.79

.80

.79

.79

.79

.80

.64

.64

.64

.64

.64

.63

.56

.55

.56

.56

.56

.56

.79

.79

.80

.80

.80

.80

.75

.75

.75

.76

.75

.75

-.68

-.68

-.68

-.68

-.68

-.68

-.64

-.64

-.65

-.65

-.64

-.64

.53

.55

.56

.52

.52

.51

.51

.52

.54

.52

.51

.51

.43

.45

.45

-

-

-
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Factor

Item
Laws and rules are the best way
to keep society functioning
properly.
Having a strong military is how
our government keeps us safe.
I dislike it when the government
restricts our freedoms to
supposedly keep us safe.
I’m fine with disobeying
authorities if they are acting
unfairly.
Notes: Con-trait items are italicized.

Factor Loadings
.56
.53
.52

.54

.55

.51

.74

.72

.72

.76

.77

.78

.14

-

-

-

-

-

-.35

-.36

-

-

-

-

Factor correlations are depicted below in Table 47. Correlations between
egalitarianism and traditionalism, as well as between traditionalism and authoritarianism,
were high. Egalitarianism and authoritarianism were moderately correlated.
Table 47: Inter-factor correlations for CFA 2
1. Egalitarianism
2. Traditionalism
3. Authoritarianism

1.
.85
.52

2.

3.
.76

-

Based on the results of the CFA, five items were removed, and the three-factor
NPIS with 17 items – four authoritarianism items, five egalitarianism items, and eight
traditionalism items – was used in subsequent tests of scale reliability and validity.

3.2.2.2

Reliability and Validity Analyses

3.2.2.2.1

Internal Consistency

Internal reliability coefficients for egalitarianism (α = .83) and traditionalism (α =
.88) were excellent. Internal reliability for authoritarianism (α = .69) approached
acceptability.

3.2.2.2.2

Construct Validity

Table 48 depicts descriptive statistics for variables of interest other than the 43
Canadian political issue items. Bivariate correlations can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 48: Descriptive statistics for all study variables in scale validation study 4.
SDO-D (n = 514)
SDO-E (n = 514)
RWA (n = 513)
Left-right political orientation (n = 506)
Normative collective action (n = 514)
Non-normative collective action (n = 514)
Egalitarianism (n = 522)
Traditionalism (n = 522)
Authoritarianism (n = 522)

3.2.2.2.2.1

Mean (SD)
2.30 (1.06)
2.18 (1.11)
2.92 (1.27)
2.82 (1.50)
6.12 (0.93)
2.50 (1.13)
5.62 (1.18)
2.87 (1.20)
4.50 (1.08)

Range
1.00-5.75
1.00-5.63
1.00-9.00
1.00-7.00
2.67-7.00
1.00-6.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00

Convergent and divergent validity

Relationships between the NPIS factors with SDO, RWA, and left-right political
orientation were once again examined with multiple regressions, controlling for
demographic factors. Results are shown below in Tables 49 through 52.
First, age and ethnicity predicted SDO, RWA, and left-right political affiliation in
an unanticipated direction. That is, in this sample, older age was associated with lower
SDO and RWA, and more left-wing affiliation, though older age is generally associated
with conservatism because with increasing age, individuals are more likely to shift from
liberal to conservative viewpoints than the reverse (Peterson et al., 2020). However, it is
important to note that the sample was, on average, in their early twenties, as they were
university students. Findings on age differences in SDO, RWA, and political affiliation
might typically reflect differences between younger adults and middle-aged or older
adults, rather than differences in samples comprised almost entirely of young adults.
Here, SDO and RWA were also lower in participants who identified as white than those
who identified as an ethnic minority, and the reasons for this are unclear.
The findings from the convergent validity analyses were mixed. Egalitarianism
was highly predictive of SDO-E and SDO-D, and the relationship with the former was
stronger. However, like in Study 3, traditionalism was also highly predictive of SDO-D.
The traditionalism factor appears to be tapping into an attitude towards group-based
dominance rather than simply conventionalism. This confound may also drive the high
factor correlation between egalitarianism and traditionalism.
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Traditionalism was strongly predictive of RWA, as anticipated. Authoritarianism
was also predictive of RWA, but only weakly; unexpectedly, its relationship with RWA
was weaker than the relationship between Egalitarianism and RWA.
The NPIS was strongly related to left-right political affiliation after controlling for
age, gender, and ethnicity. Relationships between egalitarianism and traditionalism with
political affiliation were in the expected directions; that is, egalitarianism predicted more
left-wing affiliation, while traditionalism predicted more right-wing affiliation.
Authoritarianism was related to more right-wing affiliation, but less strongly so than
traditionalism. This suggests that the authoritarianism factor is not left-right ‘agnostic’,
but rather, that elements of authoritarianism are tied to right-wing or conservative
attitudes. Still, since the relationship between left-right affiliation and authoritarianism
was weaker than with egalitarianism and traditionalism, there are presumably some
individuals who identify as left-wing that nonetheless score moderately or even highly on
authoritarianism.
Table 49: Validation study 4 regression analysis for SDO-Dominance
β

t

p

R
.718

Adjusted
R2
.510

-.094
-2.849
.005
Age
Gender
.032
.946
.345
Ethnicity
.075
2.305
.022
Egalitarianism
-.291
-6.269
<.001
Traditionalism
.444
8.488
<.001
Authoritarianism
.034
.897
.370
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
SDO-D = greater social dominance
Table 50: Validation study 4 regression analysis for SDO-Egalitarianism

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Egalitarianism
Traditionalism

β

t

p

.040
-.151
.044
-.443
.313

1.255
-4.608
1.403
-9.937
6.238

.210
<.001
.161
<.001
<.001

R
.744

Adjusted
R2
.548
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Adjusted
R2

β
t
p
R
Authoritarianism
-.074
-2.025
.043
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
SDO-E = greater social dominance
Table 51: Validation study 4 regression analysis for RWA
β

t

p

R
.799

Adjusted
R2
.634

-.117
-4.101
<.001
Age
Gender
.015
.499
.618
Ethnicity
.123
4.369
<.001
Egalitarianism
-.179
-4.474
<.001
Traditionalism
.579
12.818
<.001
Authoritarianism
.074
2.248
.025
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
RWA = greater authoritarianism
Table 52: Validation study 4 regression analysis for left-right affiliation
β

t

p

R
.743

Adjusted
R2
.547

-.059
-1.839
.067
Age
Gender
-.048
-1.454
.147
Ethnicity
-.044
-1.411
.159
Egalitarianism
-.352
-7.872
<.001
Traditionalism
.359
7.111
<.001
Authoritarianism
.127
3.464
.001
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs

3.2.2.2.3

Criterion Validity and Incremental Validity

To test whether the NPIS predicted outcomes like attitudes towards collective
action and support for various Canadian political policies (criterion validity), as well as
whether it explains more variance in these outcomes than commonly used measures like
left-right affiliation, SDO, and RWA (incremental validity), a series of regression
analyses were conducted with these outcomes and the ideology scale alone (controlling
for demographic variables), and a series of regression analyses were run including either
left-right affiliation at step one or SDO and RWA at step one, as well as with all three,
followed by the inclusion of the ideology scale. An improvement in the model is
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indicated by a significant F change score, which indicates a large difference in the
variance explained in the model including the scale versus the model without.

3.2.2.2.3.1

Collective action

Results from the criterion validity analyses for normative and non-normative
collective action are depicted in Tables 53 and 54. Traditionalism had the strongest
relationship with attitudes towards normative collective action. Specifically, highly
traditional individuals found normative collective actions, like strikes or petitions, less
acceptable. This could be because they recognize – or at least fear – that normative
collective action will be a pathway to the social changes they find undesirable (while
non-normative action may be comparatively less successful, but still perceived as
threatening). Supporting this idea is the finding that normative collective action seems to
produce better results than non-normative action (Teixeira et al., 2020).
Authoritarianism showed the only significant relationship with attitudes towards
non-normative collective action. Authoritarians’ strong dislike of radical action is likely
due to its system-challenging, rebellious quality, regardless of whether the actions are
effective for the desired goal. Interestingly, Teixeira et al. (2020) found no relationship in
their study between liberal-conservative or left-right identification on support for
normative versus non-normative protest; for overarching, unidimensional political
ideology, the topic of the protest likely matters much more than whether the strategy is
normative or radical.
Table 53: Validation study 4 regression analysis for normative collective action
β

t

p

R
.544

.030
.762
.446
Age
Gender
-.101
-2.448
.015
Ethnicity
-.150
-3.814
.000
Egalitarianism
.115
2.045
.041
Traditionalism
-.485
-7.692
.000
Authoritarianism
.101
2.211
.028
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

Adjusted
R2
.287
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Table 54: Validation study 4 regression analysis for non-normative collective action
β

t

p

R
.446

Adjusted
R2
.189

.029
.687
.492
Age
Gender
-.085
-1.942
.053
Ethnicity
-.012
-.275
.784
Egalitarianism
.006
.099
.921
Traditionalism
-.131
-1.940
.053
Authoritarianism
-.366
-7.488
.000
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

3.2.2.2.3.2 Incremental validity in predicting attitudes towards
collective action
Results from the incremental validity analyses for normative and non-normative
collective action are depicted in Tables 55-60. Demographic variables and left-right
political orientation alone explained about 14%. The ideology scale, demographic
variables, and left-right political orientation together explained about 29% of the variance
in attitudes towards normative collective action (R2 change = .153).
F change was significant in all regression models. The NPIS thus provided a large
improvement in explaining attitudes towards collective action, both normative and nonnormative, compared to a single-item measure of political ideology or to SDO and RWA
combined. For normative action, the NPIS explained 15.3% more variance in attitudes
compared to left-right affiliation alone (R2 change =.153), but compared to SDO and
RWA, only 1.4% more variance (R2 change = .014), and to all three conventional
ideology measures combined, only 2.9% more (R2 change = .029). For non-normative
action, compared to left-right affiliation, the NPIS explained 9% more variance (R2
change = .090), compared to SDO and RWA, explained 15.3% more variance (R2 change
= .153), and compared to all three conventional measures together, explained 9.1% more
variance (R2 change = .091). The scale thus appears to be particularly useful when
studying niche or fringe political attitudes is of interest (like radical collective action). Its
usefulness in predicting attitudes towards non-normative action could be because, unlike
RWA, the authoritarianism construct in the NPIS is distinct from traditionalism; in RWA,
its double- and triple-barreled items prevents these constructs from being disentangled.
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Table 55: Validation study 4 regression analysis for left-right affiliation, political
ideology scale, and normative collective action

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right

β

t

p

.002
-.010
-.196
-.311

.041
-.214
-4.532
-6.952

.967
.830
.000
.000

R
.377

Adjust.
R2
.135

F
change

p

.546

.288

35.262

<.001

.033
.819
.413
Age
Gender
-.097
-2.356
.019
Ethnicity
-.149
-3.759
.000
Left-right
.063
1.094
.274
Egalitarianism
.139
2.330
.020
Traditionalism
-.505
-7.599
.000
Authoritarianism
.093
1.995
.047
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs
Table 56: Validation study 4 regression analysis for SDO, RWA, political ideology
scale, and normative collective action

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
SDOD
SDOE
RWA

β

t

p

-.050
-.079
-.086
-.224
-.051
-.382

-1.317
-1.973
-2.252
-3.978
-.907
-7.217

.188
.049
.025
.000
.365
.000

R
.595

Adjust.
R2
.346

F
change

p

.610

.360

4.380

.005

-.028
-.715
.475
Age
Gender
-.091
-2.247
.025
Ethnicity
-.093
-2.441
.015
SDOD
-.206
-3.542
.000
SDOE
-.009
-.143
.886
RWA
-.335
-5.331
.000
Egalitarianism
-.009
-.157
.875
Traditionalism
-.197
-2.776
.006
Authoritarianism
.133
3.006
.003
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
SDO-D and SDO-E = greater social dominance; higher RWA = greater authoritarianism
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Table 57: Validation study 4 regression analysis for left-right affiliation, SDO,
RWA, political ideology scale, and normative collective action

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right
SDOD
SDOE
RWA

β

t

p

-.049
-.067
-.076
.116
-.243
-.069
-.434

-1.284
-1.676
-1.978
2.273
-4.290
-1.226
-7.555

.200
.094
.048
.023
.000
.221
.000

R
.602

Adjust.
R2
.354

F
change

.619
.383
5.147
-.025
-.651
.515
Age
Gender
-.082
-2.052
.041
Ethnicity
-.083
-2.179
.030
Left-right
.154
2.793
.005
SDOD
-.213
-3.690
.000
SDOE
-.013
-.225
.822
RWA
-.369
-5.815
.000
Egalitarianism
.038
.635
.526
Traditionalism
-.224
-3.128
.002
Authoritarianism
.114
2.584
.010
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs; higher SDO-D and SDO-E = greater social
dominance; higher RWA = greater authoritarianism

p

.002

Table 58: Validation study 4 regression analysis for left-right affiliation, political
ideology scale, and non-normative collective action
β

t

p

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right

.017
-.100
-.052
-.391

.391
-2.251
-1.208
-8.786

.696
.025
.228
.000

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right
Egalitarianism
Traditionalism
Authoritarianism

.008
-.098
-.028
-.303
-.094
-.016
-.331

.196
-2.292
-.685
-5.072
-1.517
-.228
-6.839

.845
.022
.494
.000
.130
.820
.000

R
.383

Adjust.
R2
.140

F
change

p

.491

.230

19.620

<.001
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Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs
Table 59: Validation study 4 regression analysis for SDO, RWA, political ideology
scale, and non-normative collective action

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
SDOD
SDOE
RWA

β

t

p

.010
.007
-.007
-.106
.225
-.289

.224
.150
-.153
-1.572
3.346
-4.558

.823
.881
.879
.117
.001
.000

R
.275

Adjust.
R2
.064

F
change

p

.481
.217
32.117
<.001
.025
.578
.564
Age
Gender
-.050
-1.110
.268
Ethnicity
-.027
-.648
.518
SDOD
.037
.581
.562
SDOE
.247
3.705
.000
RWA
.017
.245
.806
Egalitarianism
.129
1.987
.048
Traditionalism
-.234
-2.981
.003
Authoritarianism
-.351
-7.190
.000
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher SDO-D
and SDO-E = greater social dominance; higher RWA = greater authoritarianism
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Table 60: Validation study 4 regression analysis for left-right affiliation, SDO,
RWA, political ideology scale, and non-normative collective action

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right
SDOD
SDOE
RWA

β

t

p

-.005
-.037
-.058
-.470
-.033
.294
-.078

-.113
-.811
-1.324
-8.144
-.509
4.610
-1.208

.910
.418
.186
<.001
.611
<.001
.228

R
.435

Adjust.
R2
.177

F
change

p

.532
.268
20.666
<.001
.011
.257
.797
Age
Gender
-.065
-1.500
.134
Ethnicity
-.056
-1.353
.177
Left-right
-.346
-5.815
.000
SDOD
.050
.799
.425
SDOE
.256
3.973
.000
RWA
.088
1.282
.200
Egalitarianism
.033
.511
.610
Traditionalism
-.154
-1.992
.047
Authoritarianism
-.314
-6.587
.000
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs; higher SDO-D and SDO-E = greater social dominance;
higher RWA = greater authoritarianism

3.2.2.2.4

Canadian policy issues

Table 61 below shows means and standard deviations of policy items as well as
regression coefficients (betas) between all policy items and the three ideology factors
after controlling for demographic variables (age, gender, and ethnicity). Zero-order
bivariate correlations between policy items and the NPIS can be found in the appendix.
Zero-order correlations demonstrated significant relationships between all policy items
and at least one NPIS factor, except for attitudes towards Bitcoin, which was not
significantly correlated with any. The correlations between egalitarianism and
traditionalism with policy items tended to be larger than those with authoritarianism, and
in the case of attitudes towards mandatory vaccination, authoritarianism showed no
relationship, while egalitarianism and traditionalism did. Interestingly, egalitarianism was
unrelated to attitudes towards government monitoring of phone and internet
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communication, while traditionalism and authoritarianism predicted support for it. This
contrasts with attitudes towards government regulation of misinformation on social
media, support for which was positively correlated with egalitarianism and negatively
correlated with traditionalism and authoritarianism. It is possible that those on the right
(that is, those lower in egalitarianism and higher in traditionalism) believe that the intent
of censorship is often to quash right-wing dissent – this is particularly likely given what
is known about right-wing attitudes and belief in conspiracy theories (e.g., van der
Linden et al., 2020).
When accounting for demographic variables in the regression analyses, while
egalitarianism and traditionalism were significant predictors of most policy attitudes
(with a handful of exceptions), authoritarianism was predictive only for some. This is
interesting, given that egalitarianism and traditionalism are commonly considered the
main characteristics that distinguish left- from right-wing political attitudes, while
authoritarianism is not, and there is ongoing debate regarding whether authoritarianism is
inherent to the right wing or can exist on ‘both sides’. Authoritarianism significantly
predicted the following: opposing the cancellation of pipelines protested by First
Nations/Indigenous communities (B = -.094, p = .014), believing drug use should be a
criminal offence (B = .163, p < .001), opposing the reallocation of funding from police
departments to social programs (B = -.163, p < .001), wanting Canada to remain under
the British monarchy (B = -.166, p = .001), opposing an increased tax on the wealthiest
Canadians (B = -.139, p = < .001), opposing a Universal Basic Income (B = -.120, p =
.005), supporting a citizenship test for immigrants to Canada (B = -.094, p = .014),
supporting deportation of immigrants who commit crimes (B = .122, p = .009),
supporting public funding of Catholic schools (B = .124, p = .014), supporting increased
military spending (B = .253, p < .001), and supporting allowing private organizations to
donate to political campaigns (B = .236, p < .001).
It is noteworthy that most of these beliefs can be considered conservative or rightwing, and accordingly were all linked with higher traditionalism and lower egalitarianism
in this study. This suggests that at the very least, even if it can present among both left-
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and right-leaning people, authoritarianism is more likely to manifest alongside other
right-wing (less egalitarian and more traditional) attitudes.
It is also interesting that, after controlling for demographic variables,
authoritarianism showed negligible relationships with attitudes towards unrestricted free
speech, mandatory vaccination, government monitoring of internet communications, and
government regulation of social media. If anti-authoritarianism is characterized by a
critical stance towards authority and a dislike of government oversight, it should be
predictive of attitudes like these; someone low in authoritarianism should oppose any
limits on free speech, as well as requirements for medical procedures, and government
oversight and regulation of communication channels like the internet.
Table 61: Means and SDs for policy items, and standardized regression coefficients
(beta coefficients) for ideology on policy items after controlling for demographic
variables.
Support Canadian government investing
more money in infrastructure for First
Nations/Indigenous communities
Support canceling pipelines opposed by
First Nations/Indigenous communities
Support criminalizing drug use

M (SD)
5.76
(1.51)

5.01
(1.86)
2.96
(1.76)
Support criminalizing sex work
2.48
(1.62)
Support re-allocating funding from police
4.93
departments to social programs
(1.79)
Support voting rights for convicted
5.09
criminals
(1.72)
Support publicly-run (rather than privately5.59
run) prisons
(1.37)
Support unrestricted freedom of speech
4.06
(1.80)
Support increasing privatization of Canadian 2.74
healthcare
(1.76)
Support option for medically assisted
5.59
suicide/euthanasia for terminally ill patients (1.69)
Support increased spending on mental health 6.11
care
(1.12)

Egal.
.351***

Trad.
-.323***

Auth.
-.002

.239***

-.418***

-.094*

-.156**

.290***

.163***

-.151**

.421***

.003

.263***

-.349***

-.163***

.092

-.371***

-.085

.255***

-.165*

.062

-.076

.270***

-.032

-.181**

.283***

.076

.146*

-.217**

.011

.305***

-.294***

.075
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Support legal abortion
Support covering prescription medication
under a universal health plan
Support allowing transgender athletes to
compete with the gender category they
identify with
Support including gender identity in
Canadian anti-discrimination laws
Support same-sex parents having same
adoption rights as heterosexual parents
Support ending ties to the British monarchy
Support increasing tax rate on wealthiest
Canadians
Support raising federal minimum wage
Support raising tax rate on corporations
Support establishing Universal Basic
Income
Support classifying Bitcoin as legal currency
Support required citizenship test for
immigrants to Canada
Support deportation of immigrants if they
commit a crime
Support establishing limit on tuition
increases
Support continuing providing public funding
to Catholic schools
Support required military service
Support increasing military spending
Support increasing foreign aid spending
Support establishing a limit on money
politicians can receive from a single donor
Support establishing proportional
representation voting system
Support allowing political party or campaign
donations from private organizations
Support increasing regulations on businesses
to reduce carbon emissions

M (SD)
6.25
(1.46)
6.10
(1.23)
4.48
(2.12)

Egal.
.062

Trad.
-.380***

Auth.
.013

.367***

-.221***

.103*

.190**

-.271***

-.042

5.81
(1.62)
6.33
(1.40)
4.49
(1.64)
5.43
(1.75)
5.22
(1.64)
5.38
(1.58)
4.93
(1.83)
3.57
(1.48)
4.79
(1.55)
3.06
(1.69)
6.15
(1.23)
3.53
(1.89)
1.96
(1.42)
3.13
(1.63)
5.47
(1.41)
4.34
(1.44)
4.91
(1.53)
3.54
(1.63)
5.89
(1.35)

.325***

-.361***

.043

.270***

-.249***

.079

.100

-.231**

-.166**

.776***

.056

-.139***

.335***

-.207**

-.071

.463***

-.222***

-.039

.403***

-.183**

-.120**

-.042

-.046

-.025

-.054

.159*

.264***

.082

.328***

.122**

.386***

-.132*

.080

-.081

.221**

.124*

-.102

.291***

-.065

-.083

.343***

.253***

.275***

-.079

-.074

.258***

-.130*

.098*

.207**

-.166*

-.034

-.127*

.184*

.236***

.391***

-.295***

.055

101

M (SD)
Support banning disposable plastic
5.26
(1.63)
Support banning hydraulic fracking
4.79
(1.44)
Support a tax on meat consumption
3.53
(1.83)
Support subsidizing production of renewable 5.77
energy infrastructure
(1.35)
Support increasing spending on public
5.54
transportation
(1.28)
Support mandatory COVID-19 vaccination
5.06
(1.85)
Support mandatory mask-wearing during
6.38
COVID-19 pandemic
(1.26)
Support allowing Internet Service Providers 1.94
to selectively control speed of access to
(1.37)
websites based (net non-neutrality)
Support allowing Canadian government to
2.46
monitor phone, email, and internet traffic
(1.40)
Support allowing Canadian government to
4.51
regulate social media to prevent spread of
(1.78)
misinformation
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Egal.
.219***

Trad.
-.288***

Auth.
.077

.180*

-.303***

.080

.226***

-.115*

-.107*

.213***

-.381***

.089

.307***

-.196**

-.020

.182**

-.198**

.098

.279***

-.274***

.080

-.084

.350***

-.023

.053

.119

.066

.246***

-.041

-.039

3.2.2.2.4.1 Incremental validity in predicting attitudes towards
Canadian policies
The scale offered an advantage over the combination of all three conventional
ideology measures (left-right orientation, SDO, and RWA combined); that is, the F
change value was statistically significant. This was the case for all but eight of the 43
policy items.
As with the tests of incremental validity for the collective action variables,
incremental validity was also assessed in relation to left-right affiliation alone, as well as
to SDO and RWA. For attitudes towards medical euthanasia or physician-assisted
suicide, attitudes towards legal abortions, and support for providing continued public
funding for Catholic schools, the NPIS did not significantly surpass SDO and RWA in
variance explained, though it was an improvement over left-right affiliation.
Unsurprisingly, these attitudes were strongly predicted by RWA, potentially due to the
fact the RWA scale taps into religious attitudes; some RWA items, for example, refer to

102

religious authorities and “God’s laws” (Altemeyer, 2006). It may be that these items are
polarized more along religious lines than they are along political lines (though of course,
these are often related).
Additionally, the scale did not explain significantly more variance than SDO and
RWA for support for mandatory military service. Support for this position was correlated
highly with SDO-Dominance and RWA (but not SDO-Egalitarianism). Curiously, this
was not the case for the item assessing support for increasing military spending, which
the NPIS predicted substantially better – explaining approximately 15.40% more variance
than left-right affiliation alone and 10.90% more variance than SDO and RWA.
Also curiously, the scale did not significantly improve prediction for attitudes
towards net neutrality compared to the combination of SDO and RWA, but it was a
significant improvement over using left-right affiliation. SDO-Dominance and RWA
were strongly related to net neutrality attitudes – that is, increases in SDO-Dominance
and RWA were linked with support for policies allowing selective, faster access to
certain websites based on how much a company pays, or, said another way, opposition to
a neutral internet.
The scale also did not improve prediction over SDO and RWA for attitudes
towards Canadian government surveillance of telecommunications. In this case, very few
of the variables entered showed a significant relationship with the item at all; only RWA
was significant, and was linked to support for government surveillance, albeit weakly.
The mean for this item was 2.46 (SD = 1.40); respondents seemed generally opposed to
surveillance of this type, and polarization was weak.
Lastly, the scale also did not improve predictive power beyond left-right
affiliation or SDO and RWA for the item assessing attitudes towards classifying Bitcoin
as legal currency. Given the weak correlations with all three ideology factors, it may
simply be that this issue is not politically polarized.
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3.3

Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Scale Validation

(Study 5)
The sample collected for Study 5 was recruited for the purpose of conducting the
experimental analyses described in Chapter 5, and recruitment occurred before the
analyses in Study 4 were complete. As such, the 22-item scale tested in validation study 4
was used here, without modifications (i.e., without excluding any unsatisfactory items
identified in the previous study).

3.3.1

Methods

3.3.1.1

Participants and Data Cleaning

Participants were recruited via the Prolific survey platform and compensated with
£1.10 British pounds (roughly equivalent to $1.90 Canadian dollars). The nature of the
experimental portion of this study required recruiting a sample that had not yet received a
COVID-19 vaccine; at the time of recruitment, vaccine rollouts to priority populations
were commencing across Canada, but they were not yet widely available to all age
groups. Prolific’s extensive screening questions – which included a question asking
whether participants had received a dose of a COVID-19 vaccine – enabled recruitment
of only unvaccinated participants. The sample was thus comprised of Canadian adults
over the age of 18 who had not yet received any doses of a COVID-19 vaccine. In total,
200 participants were recruited who fit these criteria.
Data were screened for incomplete responses, short response times, and
multivariate outliers. However, no participants were found who failed to complete an
essential portion of the questionnaires (i.e., the NPIS or the items pertaining to COVID19 vaccination intentions), and no participants completed the study in an abnormally
short period of time (<2 seconds per item). Nine participants were flagged as multivariate
outliers.
Sample size after data cleaning was N = 191. Of these, 84 (44.00%) were women,
104 (54.50%) were men, and 3 (1.60%) identified as a gender not specified. The age
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range was 18-68 years (M = 29.48, SD = 9.81). The sample predominantly identified as
White (N = 111, 58.10%). Of those who were not White, 10 (5.20%) identified as South
Asian, 33 (17.30%) as Chinese, 18 (9.40%) as Black, seven (3.70%) as Middle Eastern or
West Asian, five (2.60%) as Filipino, eight (4.20%) as Southeast Asian, four (2.10%) as
Korean, two (1.00%) as Aboriginal or First Nations, and four (2.10%) as an ethnic group
not specified. Participants could select multiple ethnicities, and nine (4.70%) identified as
multiracial (i.e., selected at least two options).

3.3.1.2

Procedure

Participants completed the study online via Qualtrics, which took approximately
10 minutes to complete. After reading the Letter of Information and consenting to
participate, participants completed the questionnaires, as well as completed the
experimental component of the study, which is outlined in Chapter 5. As part of the
experimental portion of this study, participants were also presented with one of three
vignettes containing information about the COVID-19 vaccine. These are described in
detail in Chapter 5.

3.3.1.3
3.3.1.3.1

Measures
Vaccination Intentions

Intentions to take a COVID-19 vaccine were assessed with two questions: “How
likely or unlikely are you to choose to receive one of the COVID-19 vaccines in the
future, when you are eligible to do so and doses are available?” and “How reluctant or
willing are you to receive a COVID-19 vaccine in the future, when you are eligible to do
so and doses are available?”. Both were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (“extremely unlikely” or “extremely reluctant”) to 7 (“extremely likely” or
“extremely willing”).
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3.3.1.3.2

Left-right Political Orientation

Left-right political orientation was assessed with a single item measured on a 7point Likert-type scale, with 1 representing “Very liberal/left-wing” and a 7 representing
“Very conservative/right-wing”.

3.3.1.3.3

Contraindications

To control for the possibility that participants were unwilling to receive a vaccine
because of a medical contraindication, I included the following yes-or-no question: “Has
your healthcare provider advised that you should not receive a COVID-19 vaccine
because of an existing medical issue (e.g., allergy to one of the vaccine components)?”.
Two participants (1.00%) indicated that they were advised by their doctors they had
medical contraindications to receiving the vaccine and were excluded from analyses
including vaccination intentions.

3.3.1.4
3.3.1.4.1

Data Analytic Decisions
Factor Analytic Method

CFA was conducted in R with the lavaan package with Maximum Likelihood
estimation. Lavaan defaults to listwise deletion for missing data, except where missing
values are missing completely at random or missing at random, in which case full
information maximum likelihood estimations are provided. Latent factors were
standardized to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, so as not to sacrifice the test of the factor
loading for each factor’s first indicator item.

3.3.1.4.2

Factor Loading Cut-off

Based on Byrne (2010) and Hair et al. (2006), items with loadings < 0.55 were
candidates for revision or deletion.
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3.3.2

Results and Discussion

3.3.2.1

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The first model tested the 22-item scale with three-factor structure and correlated
residual between the two items which referenced attitudes towards taxes. As before,
revisions were made item-by-item based on factor loadings or an examination of the
item’s descriptive statistics. Table 62 depicts descriptive statistics for all 22 items, Table
63 shows model fit indices for all models tested, and Table 64 contains factor loadings
for all items in all models tested.
Table 62: Descriptive statistics for scale items in validation study 5
E Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because they’re
successful.
In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that money is
distributed more equitably.
Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated everyone more
equally.
Having equal access to health care is a human right.
We must make sure people are given equal opportunities, regardless of
their appearance or identity.
We must have laws in place in order to prevent discrimination based
on things like ethnicity and gender identity.
T Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many changes in
how it works.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is something
kids should grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature acts of
rebellion.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas without
any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists and agitators trying to stir things up.
These days, we are going too far in trying to protect the interests of
minority groups.
Protests and other collective actions are necessary to achieve a better
society.
Younger generations should work to change our outdated political
system.
A Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.

Mean (SD)
5.74 (1.43)
5.41 (1.55)
5.94 (1.24)
5.92 (1.15)
6.50 (.95)
6.47 (.84)
6.15 (1.04)
3.23 (1.41)
3.01 (1.52)
2.74 (1.47)
4.04 (1.60)
3.71 (1.70)
2.68 (1.64)
2.46 (1.26)
2.51 (1.24)
4.82 (1.47)
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Mean (SD)
5.08 (1.40)

Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to those who would
do us harm.
I appreciate government surveillance because it protects our country
3.70 (1.65)
from threats.
Laws and rules are the best way to keep society functioning properly.
5.31 (1.23)
Having a strong military is how our government keeps us safe.
3.57 (1.64)
I dislike it when the government restricts our freedoms to supposedly
3.83 (1.70)
keep us safe.
I’m fine with disobeying authorities if they are acting unfairly.
5.04 (1.47)
Note: Con-trait items are italicized. Means presented here are after reverse coding.

Table 63: Model fit indices for CFA 3
χ2
1.
485.902*
2.
400.572*
3.
347.445*
4.
303.581*
5.
272.548*
6.
253.319*
7.
215.689*
8.
187.853*
Note: *p < .001

(df)
205
185
166
148
131
115
100
86

BIC
13323.872
12570.351
11900.088
11319.653
10649.103
10201.692
9799.210
9153.650

RMSEA [95% CI]
.085 [.075, .094]
.078 [.068, .089]
.076 [.064, .087]
.074 [.062, .086]
.075 [.063, .088]
.079 [.066, .093]
.078 [.064, .092]
.079 [.063, .094]

CFI
.836
.869
.886
.897
.901
.897
.907
.910

TLI
.815
.852
.869
.881
.885
.879
.888
.891

SRMR
.091
.080
.077
.074
.074
.076
.074
.066

Table 64: Factor loadings for CFA 3
Factor

Item

1 (E)

6 Wealthy people
shouldn’t have to pay
high taxes just
because they’re
successful.
7 In a fair world, the
wealth gap should be
as small as possible.
8 It is fair to tax
people with large
incomes more highly,
so that money is
distributed more
equitably.
9 Our society would
have a lot less conflict

1
.63

Factor Loadings
Model
2
3
4
5
.63
.63
.63
.63

6
.62

7
.66

8
.66

-.72

-.72

-.72

-.72

-.72

-.71

-.76

-.75

-.79

-.79

-.79

-.79

-.79

-.78

-.82

-.82

-.62

-.62

-.62

-.62

-.62

-.64

-.61

-.61
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Factor

2 (T)

Item
if we treated everyone
more equally.
12 Having equal
access to health care is
a human right.
13 We must make sure
people are given equal
opportunities,
regardless of their
appearance or identity.
14 We must have laws
in place in order to
prevent discrimination
based on things like
ethnicity and gender
identity.
1 Even if society isn’t
perfect, I’d prefer to
avoid too many
changes in how it
works.
2 Rebelling against the
political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is
something kids should
grow out of.
3 Strange new trends
in style or slang are
usually just immature
acts of rebellion.
4 These days, people
are too willing to try
out wild new ideas
without any proof they
will work.
5 I don’t trust activists
and agitators trying to
stir things up.
15 These days, we are
going too far in trying
to protect the interests
of minority groups.
16 Protests and other
collective actions are

Factor Loadings
Model

-.65

-.65

-.65

-.65

-.65

-

-

-

-.65

-.65

-.65

-.65

-

-

-

-

-.73

-.73

-.73

-.73

-.73

-.74

-.68

-.69

.77

.77

.77

.76

.77

.77

.76

.76

.69

.69

.69

.68

.69

.69

.69

.69

.63

.63

.63

.65

.64

.64

.64

.64

.54

.54

.54

.56

-

-

-

-

.72

.72

.73

.73

.72

.72

.73

.73

.65

.65

.65

.66

.65

.65

.66

.65

-.70

-.70

-.69

-.68

-.69

-.69

-.69

-.69
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Factor

Item

necessary to achieve a
better society.
17 Younger
-.53
generations should
work to change our
outdated political
system.
3 (A) 10 Without strong
.59
leaders, society as we
know it would
collapse.
11 Good national
.62
leaders keep us safe by
standing up to those
who would do us
harm.
18 I appreciate
.67
government
surveillance because it
protects our country
from threats.
19 Laws and rules are .68
the best way to keep
society functioning
properly.
20 Having a strong
.71
military is how our
government keeps us
safe.
21 I dislike it when the -.02
government restricts
our freedoms to
supposedly keep us
safe.
22 I’m fine with
-.42
disobeying authorities
if they are acting
unfairly.
Notes: Con-trait items are italicized.

Factor Loadings
Model

-.53

-.53

-

-

-

-

-

.59

.60

.60

.60

.60

.60

.62

.62

.66

.66

.66

.66

.65

.68

.67

.67

.66

.67

.67

.67

.66

.68

.67

.66

.66

.66

.66

.69

.71

.71

.71

.71

.71

.72

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.42

-

-

-

-

-

-

Modification indices for model 7 and subsequent exploration indicated
problematically high cross-loadings for the item ‘Having a strong military is how our
government keeps us safe’ on the traditionalism factor. Removing the item improved
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model fit. Interestingly, while in the previous study item 18 (“I appreciate government
surveillance because it protects our country from threats”) was excluded due to poor
factor loadings, in this study, it demonstrated a high loading on the authoritarianism
factor. The reasons for this are unclear but could potentially reflect differences in sample
characteristics. Study 4 comprised a sample of university students, while this study
recruited a more demographically representative sample of Canadian adults.
Another interesting difference, compared to the previous study, is the relative
strength of the inter-factor correlations, shown below in Table 65. All factor correlations
were smaller in comparison to Study 4; in particular, the size of the correlation between
egalitarianism and authoritarianism shrank by .39. The relationship between
egalitarianism and traditionalism also decreased by .18, and traditionalism and
authoritarianism decreased by .23. A compelling explanation may be found in the
literature on political sophistication. Ideology is more coherent as political sophistication
increases (Choma & Hafer, 2009; Mirisola et al., 2007; Sidanius & Lau, 1989),
potentially resulting in higher correlations between different dimensions. Universityeducated populations – like the sample in Study 4 – may have a higher degree of political
sophistication due to receiving postsecondary education.
Table 65: Inter-factor correlations for CFA 3
1. Egalitarianism
2. Traditionalism
3. Authoritarianism

1.
.67
.13

2.

3.
.53

-

Based on the results of the CFA, seven items were removed, and the three-factor
scale with 15 items – four authoritarianism items, five egalitarianism items, and six
traditionalism items – was used in subsequent tests of scale reliability and validity.

3.3.2.2
3.3.2.2.1

Reliability and Validity Analyses
Internal Consistency

Internal reliability coefficients for Egalitarianism (α = .83), Traditionalism (α =
.85), and Authoritarianism (α = .75) were good.

111

3.3.2.2.2

Criterion Validity

The outcome of interest in this study was behavioural intention to receive a
COVID-19 vaccine. Theoretically, attitudes and intentions regarding the COVID-19
vaccine should be polarized along political lines in much the same way as attitudes
towards the broader pandemic (Cakanlar et al., 2020; Chock and Kim, 2020) and
vaccination in general (Baumgaertner et al., 2018); specifically, political attitudes
characterized as conservative, or less egalitarian and more traditional, should predict
negative attitudes towards the vaccine. The role of authoritarianism was less clear. To
explore this question, a regression analysis was conducted, controlling for gender, age,
and ethnic minority status, and filtering out participants who indicated a medical
contraindication to the vaccine, in order to determine which factors predicted likelihood
of and willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Table 66 and 67 depict the results of
the regression analyses. Bivariate correlations between study variables can be found in
the Appendix.
Table 66: Regression analysis for ideology scale and likelihood of receiving COVID19 vaccine
β

t

p

R
.312

Adjusted
R2
.067

-.005
-.070
.945
Age
Gender
-.084
-1.129
.260
Ethnicity
.008
.101
.920
Egalitarianism
.204
2.267
.025
Traditionalism
-.171
-1.745
.083
Authoritarianism
.048
.612
.541
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)
Table 67: Regression analysis for ideology scale and willingness to receive a COVID19 vaccine

Age
Gender
Ethnicity

β

t

p

-.012
-.059
.015

-.160
-.797
.203

.873
.426
.840

R
.340

Adjusted
R2
.086
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Egalitarianism
.320
3.597
.000
Traditionalism
-.041
-.428
.669
Authoritarianism
-.017
-.213
.831
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White)

3.3.2.2.3

Incremental Validity

Another question of interest was whether the NPIS is more useful than left-right
affiliation in predicting vaccine intentions. A stepwise regression was conducted for each
outcome to investigate this question and assess incremental validity, depicted in Tables
68 and 69.
Table 68: Regression analysis for left-right affiliation, ideology scale, and likelihood
of receiving COVID-19 vaccine

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right

β

t

p

.025
-.107
.054
-.404

.341
-1.488
.734
-5.515

.733
.138
.464
.000

R
.384

Adjust.
R2
.128

F
change

p

.396

.123

.657

.579

.017
.228
.820
Age
Gender
-.122
-1.668
.097
Ethnicity
.042
.556
.579
Left-right
-.372
-3.538
.001
Egalitarianism
.108
1.177
.241
Traditionalism
.029
.263
.793
Authoritarianism
.046
.591
.555
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs
Table 69: Regression analysis for left-right affiliation, ideology scale, and willingness
to receive COVID-19 vaccine

Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Left-right

β

t

p

.025
-.077
.058
-.385

.332
-1.067
.783
-5.219

.740
.287
.435
.000

R
.367

Adjust.
R2
.115

F
change

p

.409

.134

2.322

.077
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Adjust.
R2

F
change

β
t
p
R
.007
.097
.923
Age
Gender
-.094
-1.299
.196
Ethnicity
.048
.645
.520
Left-right
-.341
-3.261
.001
Egalitarianism
.235
2.568
.011
Traditionalism
.144
1.333
.184
Authoritarianism
-.022
-.282
.779
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher L-R
affiliation = more right-wing beliefs
Left-right affiliation was a significant predictor of both the likelihood of receiving
and the willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Egalitarianism was a significant
predictor of willingness to receive the vaccine as well. However, F change values after
including the NPIS were not significant (though for willingness to receive the vaccine,
they were approaching significance at p = .077). Egalitarianism was not a significant
predictor of likelihood of receiving a vaccine after left-right affiliation was included, and
the F change value was not significant.

p
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Chapter 4
Latent Profile Analysis

4

In chapter 4, a latent profile analysis (LPA) was conducted to investigate the
profiles that might emerge from the NPIS, and the nature of these profiles as they related
to the other political variables included in this study. The aim of LPA is to identify
groups of individuals in relation to a set of continuous variables – in this case, the three
factors of the NPIS. LPA assumes that there are unobserved latent profiles in a group of
respondents and identifies these profiles of individuals based on their patterns of scores a
given scale (in this case, the three ideology subscales), such that their profile is thought to
reflect observed covariance between the items. In turn, this allows for estimates of the
prevalence of the respective profiles and comparisons between the profiles on other
variables of interest. LPA is generally used in an exploratory fashion, especially when
little or no previous research on the topic exists (Finch & Bronk, 2011). As such, in this
study, the profiles were not specified a priori but rather were inferred from the results of
the analysis.

4.1
4.1.1

Methods
Participants and Data Cleaning

The LPA was conducted with the sample used in the second scale validation study
as it had a sufficiently large N to identify an appropriate number of latent profiles.
Nylund et al. (2007) suggest a minimum sample size of N = 500 and, after data cleaning,
this sample retained N = 522. This also facilitated comparisons between the profiles on
the other scales administered in validation study 4: SDO, RWA, and attitudes towards
collective action. This sample was recruited via a combination of Western University’s
SONA undergraduate sample pool and the university’s Mass Recruitment system.
Information on data cleaning procedures and sample characteristics is described in the
Methods section of validation study 4.
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4.1.2

Procedure
All participants completed the questionnaires online via Qualtrics. Items and

measures were presented in a randomized order to control for order effects. Timing and
participation compensation are described in the Methods section of validation study 4.

4.1.3

Measures
Details on the questionnaires administered can be found in the Methods section of

study 4. Scales included were the NPIS; SDO7 (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994); RWA
(Altemeyer, 2006); left-right political orientation (single item); a scale assessing attitudes
towards collective action (Teixeira et al., 2020), and a range of single items regarding
Canadian policy issues.

4.1.4

Data Analytic Decisions
The LPA was conducted in R with the mclust package. Mclust estimates model

parameters using maximum likelihood estimation via the expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm.

4.1.4.1

Model selection criteria

Model selection criteria include the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC),
Integrated Completed Likelihood Criterion (ICL), and the Bootstrap Likelihood-Ratio
Test (BLRT). The BIC is a model selection criterion developed by Schwarz (1978); lower
BIC values indicate a better-fitting model. The ICL is like the BIC but imposes a penalty
on model solutions with worse entropy values: the probability of respondents belonging
to one profile, reflecting a clear delineation of groups (Bertoletti et al., 2015). Much like
plotting eigenvalues in exploratory factor analysis, plotting the BIC and ICL on an elbow
plot can be useful to visualize the relative gains in model fit acquired with each additional
profile. This is useful as it is not uncommon for BIC values to improve continually with
the addition of each profile (that is, BIC may overestimate the number of profiles;
Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018).
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The BLRT compares fit between k and k-1 profile models; that is, it tests whether
the addition of another profile improves model fit. Simulation studies by Nylund et al.
(2007) as well as Tein et al. (2013) suggest that the BIC and BLRT are effective in
determining the ideal number of profiles. A significant p-value associated with the BLRT
is taken as support for the addition of a profile.
Also important is the interpretability and relative size of each profile. While here
there was no a priori reason to expect a certain number of profiles or their characteristics,
profiles should nonetheless be interpretable and meaningful, and they should be distinct
from one another. Profiles containing 5% or less of the total sample may be spurious
rather than theoretically meaningful, particularly if they are not easily interpretable; they
may also not be generalizable to future samples (Masyn, 2013).
Following the selection of the appropriate number of profiles, a variable for
profile membership was created to facilitate comparisons between groups including
relative sizes, demographic differences, and mean scores on political variables of interest.

4.2

Results and Discussion

BIC and ICL values were calculated for models with one to nine profiles and
different covariance structures. The mclust package supports modeling data as Gaussian
mixture models differing in covariance structure regarding distribution (spherical,
diagonal, or ellipsoidal patterns), volume (equal or variable), shape (equal or variable)
and orientation (to coordinate axes, equal, or variable). Figure 2 from Scrucca et al.
(2016) depicts an excellent two-dimensional visualization of the geometric structures of
the possible models in mclust. There was no a priori reason to impose any constraints on
the covariance structure of the model, so all models were tested.
Figures 3 and 4 below depict the elbow plots for BIC and ICL, respectively. The
best-fitting model per BIC was an ellipsoidal model with variable volume, variable shape,
and variable orientation (VVV) with three profiles (BIC = -3747.153); close behind were
VVV models with two profiles (BIC = -3768.772) and four profiles (-3778.382).
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Results from ICL were similar, but not identical, to BIC. Per ICL, the best fitting
model was a VVV model with two profiles (ICL = -3863.409), second best was an
ellipsoidal model with variable volume, variable shape, and equal orientation (VVE) with
two profiles (ICL = -38.95.866), and third best was a VVV model with three profiles
(ICL = -3913.332). Thus, taken together, BIC and ICL supported the selection of an
unconstrained (VVV) model with two, three, or potentially four profiles.

Figure 3: BIC values for all possible models with one to nine latent profiles
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Figure 4: ICL values for all possible models with one to nine latent profiles
The BLRT, shown below in Table 70, compared model fit for the VVV models
with one through five profiles. The results of the BLRT suggested that a four-profile
model is ideal – that is, four profiles offered a significant improvement in model fit over
three profiles, but the fit was not significantly improved by the addition of a fifth profile.
Table 70: BLRT values for models with one through five profiles
Number of profiles
1 vs 2
2 vs 3
3 vs 4
4 vs 5

BLRT
232.656
84.196
31.348
21.792

p
.001
.001
.007
.184

Table 71 below compares BIC, ICL, and profile size for VVV models with two,
three, and four profiles. BIC and ICL values were similar in size.
Table 71: Comparison of VVV models with two, three, and four latent profiles.
Two-profile
Three-profile
Four-profile

n
351; 171
237; 167; 118
120; 118; 166; 118

df
19
29
39

BIC
-3768.772
-3747.153
-3778.381

ICL
-3863.409
-3913.332
-3995.913

While the BLRT supported selection of a four-profile model, when considered
together with the BIC and ICL values, criteria were somewhat ambiguous. Two-, three-,
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and four-profile models were plotted to facilitate interpretation and model selection.
Indicators (the NPIS factors) were standardized to facilitate interpretation of profile plots.
Figures 5 through 7 below depict the profiles for the two-, three-, and four-profile
solutions.

Figure 5: Latent model with two profiles
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Figure 6: Latent model with three profiles

Figure 7: Latent model with four profiles
Profiles in all models were interpreted. The two-profile model was readily
understood as a group of left-leaning or ‘liberal’ individuals and a group of right-leaning
or ‘conservative’ individuals. The three-profile model also contained a profile of liberals
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and a group of conservatives, with the addition of a group of ‘centrists’ or ‘moderates’,
who scored above average on egalitarianism but scored near the scale means for
traditionalism and authoritarianism.
The four-profile model was retained for both statistical and theoretical reasons.
First, the BLRT suggested that a four-profile model offered significant improvement over
a three-profile model, and BIC values were very close in size between the two-, three-,
and four-profile models. The relative sizes of the groups were adequate – none contained
less than 5% of the total sample. The four profiles were also theoretically compelling and
meaningful. The four-profile model illustrates two potentially ‘extreme’ groups and two
more moderate groups that are also clearly distinct. These four groups were interpreted as
a ‘progressive leftist’ group characterized by very high egalitarianism, very low
authoritarianism, and very low traditionalism; a ‘moderate liberal’ group characterized by
average authoritarianism, higher than average egalitarianism, and lower than average
traditionalism; a ‘moderate conservative’ group characterized by very high
authoritarianism, lower than average egalitarianism, and higher than average
traditionalism, and a ‘reactionary/extreme conservative’ group characterized by average
authoritarianism, very low egalitarianism, and very high traditionalism. These groups are
referred to as ‘progressives’, ‘liberals’, ‘conservatives’, and ‘reactionaries’ hereafter.
Table 72 below depicts the means, standard deviations, and n of each profile.
Table 72: Descriptive statistics of the four latent profiles
Profile
Progressives
Liberals
Conservatives
Reactionaries

n
118
166
120
118

Egalitarianism
6.84 (.17)
6.19 (.39)
5.09 (.64)
4.14 (1.04)

Mean (SD)
Traditionalism
1.54 (.34)
2.56 (.59)
3.56 (.93)
3.96 (.70)

Authoritarianism
3.74 (1.16)
4.39 (1.05)
5.41 (.60)
4.47 (.73)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test whether differences in these group
means were significant. The overall ANOVA was significant for egalitarianism, F =
438.560, p < .001; traditionalism, F = 315.319, p < .001; and authoritarianism, F =
63.980, p < .001. All post-hoc comparisons were significant as well, with one exception:
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authoritarianism scores for reactionaries and moderate liberals were not significantly
different.
The nature of the authoritarianism scores was interesting. If political ideology is
conventionally viewed as a one-dimensional spectrum, the profiles identified here neatly
illustrated this spectrum, but only for egalitarianism and traditionalism; that is, the
progressives had the highest egalitarianism and lowest traditionalism, followed by the
moderate liberals, then the moderate conservatives, and finally the reactionaries.
However, the authoritarianism factor breaks from this convention. It did not follow the
same pattern as traditionalism, even though these constructs are often considered
‘conservative’ and assessed together (in the RWA scale, for example, despite criticisms;
e.g., Funke, 2005; Mavor et al., 2010). Here, the reactionary group had average
authoritarianism scores – and their scores were not significantly different from the
moderate liberals. The moderate conservatives, on the other hand, were the only highly
authoritarian group.
It is also interesting to consider this finding in conjunction with the fact that the
authoritarianism factor was a strong predictor of attitudes towards collective action in the
scale validation studies. Taken together, this suggests that there could be differences
between conservative groups that have been suggested before in literature on, for
example, the ‘alt-right’. Forscher and Kteily (2020) found that the alt-right tend to be
more suspicious of mainstream media institutions, and they demonstrate high enthusiasm
for collective action (specifically, actions on behalf of White individuals). This new and
more extreme arm of the right wing may be less authoritarian than their classic
conservative counterparts and could be more willing to challenge existing institutions or
engage in radical collective action. With that said, while this suggests interesting avenues
for future research, from this preliminary analysis it is impossible to know whether these
profile members identify as the alt-right, and the sheer size of the profile (around a fifth
of the sample) is difficult to square with the idea that the alt-right is a small fringe
movement. A note of caution is also necessary when comparing group means where the
groups themselves have been produced by LPA. While these results suggest the LPA
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method was successful in creating distinct groups, inferences made about a population
based on the ANOVA results should be interpreted with caution.
The demographics of the profiles were also compared. Table 73 below depicts
descriptive statistics for age, gender, and ethnic minority status for the four profiles. Chisquare values were significant for the categorical variables of gender, χ2 (3) = 48.805, p <
.001, and ethnicity, χ2 (3) = 12.404, p = .006.
Table 73: Observed versus expected cell counts for demographic variables across
the four latent profiles
Age
Mean (SD)
Progressives

Male

Gender (n)
Female

White

Ethnicity (n)
Ethnic
minority

22.70
(6.29)

Observed n
Expected n
Liberals
22.66
(6.67)
Observed n
Expected n
Conservatives 21.59
(5.56)
Observed n
Expected n
Reactionaries
22.12
(8.01)
Observed n
Expected n

13
35.0

95
73.0

76
59.9

42
58.1

39
50.3

116
104.7

82
84.3

84
84.3

49
37.3

66
77.7

56
60.9

64
59.1

58
36.3

54
75.7

51
59.9

67
58.1

Individuals who identified as an ethnic minority (non-White ethnic group in
Canada) were proportionately over-represented in the conservative and reactionary
profiles and underrepresented in the progressive profile. In keeping with previous
literature, women were proportionately overrepresented in the two left-leaning
(progressive and liberal) profiles and underrepresented in the two right-leaning
(conservative and reactionary) profiles. Mean ages of the profiles were similar, likely in
part because this sample was limited to university students.
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Next, the profiles were compared on SDO-D, SDO-E, RWA, attitudes towards
normative collective action, and attitudes towards non-normative collective action.
Profile means and standard deviations are shown below in Table 74.
Table 74: Means and standard deviations for the four latent profiles on SDO, RWA,
and collective action
Profile

Mean (SD)
SDO-D
SDO-E
RWA
NormCA
Non-normCA
Progressives
1.36 (.41)
1.25 (.37)
1.78 (.55)
6.73 (.45)
3.05 (1.24)
Liberals
2.00 (.80)
1.79 (.72)
2.53 (.81)
6.40 (.66)
2.50 (1.11)
Conservatives 2.69 (.92)
2.42 (.97)
3.49 (1.15)
6.01 (.93)
2.09 (.93)
Reactionaries
3.26 (1.01)
3.39 (1.03)
4.05 (1.23)
5.48 (1.13)
2.41 (1.02)
Notes: Gender (0 = man; 1 = woman); ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White); higher
SDO-D and SDO-E = greater social dominance; higher RWA = greater authoritarianism
A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences for all variables: SDO-E, F =
155.651, p < .001; SDO-D, F = 122.592, p < .001; RWA, F = 131.358, p < .001;
normative collective action, F = 51.924, p < .001; and non-normative collective action, F
= 16.710, p < .001. Post-hoc tests indicated that differences between profiles were all
significant at the p < .001 level for SDO-E, SDO-D, and RWA. These differences were in
theoretically expected directions; progressives scored significantly lower on SDO and
RWA than liberals, who in turn scored lower on these than conservatives, who in turn
scored lower on these than reactionaries. At a glance, this contradicts the finding that the
conservative profile was the most authoritarian (while liberals and reactionaries did not
differ), but it should be reiterated that the RWA scale conflates the constructs of
traditionalism and authoritarianism with the use of double-barreled and triple-barreled
items (as well as incorporates constructs like homonegativity and religiosity), making it
impossible to directly compare to the authoritarianism factor in the NPIS (Funke, 2005;
Mavor et al., 2010).
For collective action attitudes, post-hoc tests revealed significant differences
between all profile comparisons for normative collection action at the p < .001 level or, in
the case of liberals versus conservatives and liberals versus progressives, at the p < .01
level (p = .001 and .004, respectively). For attitudes towards non-normative collection
action, conservatives and reactionaries did not significantly differ from one another (p =
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.085), nor did liberals and reactionaries – in fact, they were functionally the same (2.50
and 2.41, respectively; p = 1.00). All other comparisons were significant at either p <
.001 or, in the case of conservatives versus liberals, at p = .006.
Given what was found earlier with regards to authoritarianism and acceptance (or
lack thereof) for non-normative collection action, and the fact that reactionaries and
moderate liberals were similar on authoritarianism, their comparable attitudes towards
non-normative action make sense. This further supports the notion that authoritarianism
is a key driver for intolerance towards system-challenging forms of action. It is worth
noting that for all groups, the average degree of acceptance for non-normative action was
below the scale midpoint – that is, most respondents found these actions unacceptable,
but they differed in how unacceptable they found them. Similarly, most respondents
evidently found normative actions acceptable, but reactionaries less so than
conservatives, conservatives less so than liberals, and liberals less so than progressives.
It is also worth noting the wider variance in attitudes towards non-normative
action than normative action. Standard deviations for all profiles were higher for nonnormative action, indicating more variance in the degree to which these actions were
tolerated. Conversely, progressives and liberals did not exhibit a lot of variance in their
attitudes towards normative actions; they were widely agreed on by respondents in these
profiles to be highly acceptable. This was not the case for the reactionaries, who
exhibited a wide degree of variance in attitudes towards normative actions.
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Chapter 5

5

Experimental Analysis: Political Ideology and Vaccine
Intentions
The goal of this chapter was to employ the scale in the context of an experiment

on the role of political ideology and message framing in influencing behavioural
intentions to take a COVID-19 vaccine. I sought to investigate the independent and
interactive contributions of the NPIS to politically relevant messaging as another aspect
of the scale validation process, as well as to contribute to the body of literature on
persuasive messaging. To these ends, this study applied the NPIS to investigate which
ideological dimensions were relevant in predicting vaccine hesitancy, and the extent to
which vaccine acceptance is influenced by persuasive messaging and its interactive effect
with ideology.

5.1
Political Ideology, Message Framing, and
Vaccination Intentions
Ideological polarization is present in attitudes towards COVID-19 and towards the
measures taken to manage the pandemic, including mask-wearing, lockdowns, and
vaccinations (Cakanlar et al., 2020; Chock and Kim, 2020), as well as to vaccination for
other diseases (Baumgaertner et al., 2018). However, there is growing research that this
polarization can be mitigated with targeted message framing. Specifically, individuals
with beliefs characterized by anti-egalitarianism and resistance to change (i.e.,
‘conservatism’; e.g., Jost et al., 2003a) tend to be persuaded by messages emphasizing
patriotism and adherence to in-group norms, while their more egalitarian, progressive
counterparts (‘liberals’) are more influenced by messages emphasizing fairness and
empathy (Kidwell et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009). For example, targeted message
framing is effective in shifting conservatives’ attitudes on issues such as environmental
conservation (Kidwell et al., 2013; Wolsko et al., 2016), and COVID-19 preventive
measures (e.g., mask-wearing; Cakanlar et al., 2020).
The literature on liberal-conservative ideology – characterized by individual
differences in egalitarianism and resistance to change – suggests 1) a strong link between
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polarization on the issue of COVID-19 vaccines and 2) the potential to shift attitudes by
using messaging appealing to conservatives versus liberals. I made the following
hypotheses: first, the scale factors egalitarianism and traditionalism should predict
intentions to take a COVID-19 vaccine (positively and negatively, respectively). The role
of authoritarianism is less clear from the literature, and no specific hypotheses were
made. Additionally, I expected that egalitarianism and traditionalism would interact with
message framing to predict intentions to take a COVID-19 vaccine. Specifically,
messaging emphasizing fairness and compassionate reasons to take the vaccine should be
particularly effective when egalitarianism is high or traditionalism is low; conversely,
messaging emphasizing in-group norms and patriotic reasons to take the vaccine should
be particularly effective when egalitarianism is low or traditionalism is high.
For comparative purposes, a single-item, self-reported political affiliation item
(left to right) was also included. Theoretically, the fairness/caring prompt should be
particularly effective on those who identify as more left-leaning, and the converse should
be true for the patriotism/in-group norms prompt.
To test these hypotheses, three persuasive messages were written regarding the
COVID-19 vaccine: a fairness/caring frame, a patriotic/in-group norms frame, and a
neutral control emphasizing statistics on the vaccines’ reported efficacies. At the time this
study was conducted (April-May 2021), vaccine roll-out in Canada was nascent, with a
significant portion of the population not yet eligible to receive one of the approved
vaccines, and the messages were phrased accordingly. Below are the three appeals.

5.1.1

Fairness/Caring Appeal

Do your part to keep others safe from COVID-19 – Take the COVID-19 vaccine
Did you know that taking a COVID-19 vaccine can make a difference for others, as well
as yourself? By taking one of the COVID-19 vaccines – such as those made by Moderna,
Pfizer, or AstraZeneca – when it’s available to you, you are helping to protect the health
and safety of everyone in Canada. That’s because the more people choose to get
vaccinated, the less likely it is the novel coronavirus will be able to continue spreading.
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However, some people are not medically able to take the vaccine – so it is up to the rest
of us to do our part. In other words, taking the COVID-19 vaccine is one way you can
help care for the health and safety of others. You can do your part to end this pandemic
for everyone by taking the vaccine when it’s available to you.
Help keep everyone healthy!

5.1.2

Patriotic/In-Group Norms Appeal

Join your fellow Canadians in fighting COVID-19 – Take the COVID-19 vaccine
Did you know that the majority of Canadian citizens intend to take the COVID-19
vaccine? Most people in Canada want to do their part to fight COVID-19 by taking one
of the COVID-19 vaccines – such as those made by Moderna, Pfizer, or AstraZeneca – as
soon as it’s available to them. That’s because getting vaccinated against COVID-19
brings us one step closer to eliminating the novel coronavirus. In other words, Canadian
citizens recognize their duty to combat the pandemic that is threatening the wellbeing of
our country. You can assist in this fight by joining your fellow Canadians in taking the
vaccine when it’s available to you.
Help Canada defeat COVID-19!

5.1.3

Control

COVID-19 vaccines are evidenced-based, safe, and effective – Take the COVID-19
vaccine
Did you know that peer-reviewed scientific studies show the approved COVID-19
vaccines are effective in preventing COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel
coronavirus? According to the Ontario Ministry of Health and based on ongoing
research, the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines are over 90% effective at preventing
symptomatic COVID-19, and the AstraZeneca vaccine is around 70% effective. Current
evidence also suggests that it is extremely rare for individuals to develop serious side
effects from any of these vaccines. Most side effects reported are minor and manageable
– for example, pain at the injection site, headache, or mild fever. Currently, it is
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recommended that healthy Canadians over the age of 16 (Pfizer) or 18 (Moderna and
AstraZeneca) without medical contraindications should be offered a COVID-19 vaccine
when doses are available.

5.2
5.2.1

Methods
Participants and Data Cleaning

Participants were recruited via the Prolific survey platform and compensated with
£1.10 British pounds (roughly equivalent to $1.90 Canadian dollars). The sample was
comprised of Canadian adults over the age of 18 who had not yet received any doses of a
COVID-19 vaccine. In total, 200 participants were recruited who fit these criteria. Data
cleaning procedures as well as sample characteristics are outlined in the Methods section
of Study 5. Sample size after data cleaning was N = 191.

5.2.2

Procedure
Participants completed the study online via Qualtrics, which took approximately

10 minutes to complete. After reading the Letter of Information and consenting to
participate, participants were randomly assigned to read one of the three message frames.
Participants read the following prompt: “Below is a paragraph with some information
about the COVID-19 vaccine. Please take the time to read this paragraph carefully.
Please note that the “next” button will not display for 30 seconds, to give you time to read
the paragraph.” Afterwards, participants read the message frame.
After reading the message frame, participants completed the section of the
questionnaire assessing their intentions to take the COVID-19 vaccine, followed by the
NPIS and demographic questions (including left-right political affiliation).

5.2.3

Measures

5.2.3.1

New Political Ideology Scale

The version of the NPIS identified in Study 5 (15 items) was used.
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5.2.3.2

Vaccination Intentions

Intentions to take a COVID-19 vaccine were assessed with two questions: “How
likely or unlikely are you to choose to receive one of the COVID-19 vaccines in the
future, when you are eligible to do so and doses are available?” and “How reluctant or
willing are you to receive a COVID-19 vaccine in the future, when you are eligible to do
so and doses are available?”. Both were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (“extremely unlikely” or “extremely reluctant”) to 7 (“extremely likely” or
“extremely willing”).

5.2.3.3

Contraindications

To control for the possibility that participants were unwilling to receive a vaccine
because of a medical contraindication, I included the following yes-or-no question: “Has
your healthcare provider advised that you should not receive a COVID-19 vaccine
because of an existing medical issue (e.g., allergy to one of the vaccine components)?”.
Two participants (1.00%) indicated that they were advised by their doctors they had
medical contraindications to receiving the vaccine and were excluded from analyses.

5.2.3.4

Left-right Political Orientation

Left-right political orientation was assessed with a single item measured on a 7point Likert-type scale, with 1 representing “Very liberal/left-wing” and a 7 representing
“Very conservative/right-wing”.

5.2.3.5

Data Analytic Decisions

To assess whether ideology influenced COVID-19 vaccine intentions, as well as
whether the ideology-congruent messaging was effective, the following analyses were
conducted. The political ideology factor scores were calculated and were mean-centered.
Experimental condition was dummy-coded such that two (k-1) dummy variables were
created to represent the three conditions, with the control condition as reference group.
Scatterplots were generated for egalitarianism, traditionalism, and
authoritarianism by treatment group for both dependent variables (likelihood of and
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willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccine) as a visual exploration of interactive effects,
which can be found in Appendix I. The scatterplots suggested the possibility of
interactions in all cases. However, in conducting data cleaning as well as the analyses in
Chapter 3, it was found that the outcome variables – likelihood of and willingness to
receive a COVID vaccine – were highly skewed. Vaccine likelihood had a mean score of
6.39 (on the seven-point Likert scale), standard deviation of 1.35, and skewness value of
-2.70; vaccine willingness had a mean score of 6.05, standard deviation of 1.68, and
skewness of -1.84. In short, most of the sample indicated they strongly intended to take
the COVID vaccine when it became available to them. As such, the decision was made to
convert the 7-point variable to a binary outcome, in which scores from 1 and 4 would be
coded as 0 (‘Unlikely’ and ‘Unwilling’) and scores from 5 to 7 would be coded as 1
(‘Likely’ and ‘Willing’). In total, 19 participants were ‘Unlikely’ versus 172 ‘Likely’ to
receive the vaccine, and 30 participants were ‘Unwilling’ versus 161 ‘Willing’ to receive
the vaccine.
Ideology factor scores were mean centered for ease of interpretation, and
condition variables were dummy-coded to create 2 (k-1) dummy variables with the
control condition as reference group. Interactive terms were created by computing the
product of the mean centered ideology variables with dummy-coded condition variables.
Ideology, condition, and the ideology by condition interaction were regressed
onto the two binary outcome variables: willingness to and likelihood of receiving a
COVID-19 vaccine in the future. Interactive effects were included at step two of the
regression, and main effects interpreted separately, given that the inclusion of interactions
can alter the size of main effects in a model.

5.3

Results and Discussion

A binomial logistic regression was calculated for each model in SPSS to test for
the existence of interaction effects between condition and the ideology variables on
vaccine intentions, after controlling for the effects of age, gender, and ethnic minority
identity. The interaction term (ideology by condition) was entered at Step 2. No
significant interactive effects were found for ideology by condition on either outcome
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variable, though the interaction between egalitarianism and the patriotic condition
approached significance (p = .073; Exp(B) = 3.296).
As expected, and in line with results from the regression analyses in Chapter 3, a
significant main effect was found for egalitarianism on likelihood (p = .012; Exp(B) =
1.817) and willingness (p = .001; Exp(B) = 2.033), suggesting more egalitarian
individuals were twice as likely to report intentions to receive the vaccine. Significant
main effects were also found for traditionalism on likelihood (p = .043; Exp(B) = .628)
and willingness (p = .019; Exp(B) = .633), suggesting more traditional individuals were
about two-thirds as likely to report intentions to receive the vaccine. No significant main
effects were found for authoritarianism.
For comparative purposes and given left-right affiliation was a significant
predictor of vaccine intentions in previous analyses, the experimental analyses were run
using left-right affiliation as the ideological predictor variable instead of the NPIS
factors. As expected, left-right affiliation had a significant main effect, and suggested
individuals who identified as right-wing were about half as likely to express a likelihood
of taking the vaccine (p < .001; Exp(B) = .449), or a willingness to (p < .001; Exp(B) =
.517). However, no interactive effects between left-right affiliation and condition were
found for either outcome. This suggests the lack of interaction effects was not a failing of
the NPIS but might signify other limitations in the design.

5.3.1

Limitations
A total of 172 (90.10%) participants indicated they were at least slightly likely to

receive a COVID-19 vaccine, with 140 (73.30%) indicating they were extremely likely to
do so; similarly, 161 (84.30%) indicated they were at least slightly willing to receive the
vaccine, and 123 (64.40%) were extremely willing. Thus, respondents were, overall,
highly enthusiastic to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. More accurate results could
potentially be obtained if a more proportional number of vaccine-hesitant respondents
had completed the survey. By August 2021 (approximately 4 months after data
collection), only approximately 16% of Canadians 12 years of age and older had not yet
received at least one vaccine dose. Recruiting the vaccine-hesitant population in a
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representative proportion with adequate study power would likely require a larger sample
size than obtained here.
It is also possible that the messages were not sufficiently persuasive. Future
studies using this framework could employ independent raters to assess the adequacy of
the messages, especially insofar as they characterize patriotism and in-group norms or
fairness and caring values. Another alternative could be to re-evaluate what ideological
values might be tapped into with the messaging frames. For example, though prior
researchers have successfully used patriotism framings in persuasive appeals, in this case
it may be that the messaging would be more persuasive to right-leaning individuals if the
framing emphasized the ways in which the pandemic has upset the status quo or stability
of the system – thus appealing to this population’s presumed resistance to change.
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Chapter 6

6

General Discussion and Conclusion
6.1
The New Political Ideology Scale as a Measure of
Core Political Values
The introductory chapter outlined the following definition of political ideology: it

is internally consistent and relatively stable, and it reflects a vision of how society should
function, gives meaning to the political environment, and facilitates political decisionmaking. Operating under this definition, the NPIS is a satisfactory tool for the purpose.
The three factors of egalitarianism, traditionalism, and authoritarianism were
found across the samples tested in the confirmatory factor analyses, and the factors
themselves were internally consistent and theoretically meaningful. Scale scores were
also demonstrably stable across time, based on the test-retest analyses conducted in
chapter 3. Further, the intent of the scale was to tap into core political values – not
support for specific political policies – that reflect general beliefs about how society
should function. That is, the spirit of developing this instrument was to address attitudes
towards questions like ‘How equally should resources be distributed?’ rather than support
for a specific tax policy; or ‘Is it the government’s role to use force to exercise
authority?’ rather than support for involvement in a specific war or ideas about precisely
how much funding police departments should receive (as examples). If political ideology
reflects a vision for how society should function on a broad level, the new scale arguably
assesses these visions.
The scale also reflects and predicts the symbolic ideologies people use. It
correlates highly with self-identification as left-wing or liberal versus right-wing or
conservative. It also predicts political party affiliation. These types of symbolic
descriptors are the terms most people will reach for if asked to describe their political
views (even though, as some researchers point out, many people use them inaccurately,
e.g., Ellis & Stimson, 2007; Kalmoe, 2020). Perhaps more important than the scale’s
correlation with symbolic descriptors is its demonstrated link to intentions and
behaviours. The scale was a strong predictor of voting behaviour – egalitarian individuals
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were more likely to vote for a left-leaning party, and anti-authoritarian individuals were
more likely to vote for a fringe party (the Green Party). The scale also predicted
vaccination intentions, which, while not specifically a political outcome, are nonetheless
politically polarized. In short, the NPIS captures individuals’ broad political orientations,
and it predicts their political decision-making.
Contentions about the end or the abuse of ideology usually center on arguments
that the public does not understand ideological terminology like right-wing; that their
belief systems are too disorganized to predict political behaviour, at least if they are
politically unsophisticated; and that their belief systems are unstable (Kalmoe, 2020). To
address the first issue, it is true that only a modest percentage of individuals accurately
interpret terms like conservative (Ellis & Stimson, 2007) and they often rely on different
criteria to define terms like left and right (Feldman & Johnston, 2013), but this is
precisely why it is necessary to use measures that do not rely on symbolic terms. Instead,
researchers should employ measures that attempt to assess core political values, such as
the scale developed here.
Second, the contention that individuals’ policy views are often disorganized is the
reason it is inadvisable to construe ideology as an itemized collection of these same
policy views. The complex and ever-changing nature of political policy does not lend
itself to being used as an attitudinal measure. The development of the NPIS as a measure
of core values implies that policy views are something arising from ideology – a
downstream phenomenon – rather than equating to it or representing it. Researchers may
disagree on the number and character of these values, but it is clear the general
population has ideological inclinations. If they did not, it is doubtful the body of research
on left-right or liberal-conservative orientation would be so productive (Carney et al.,
2008; Jost et al., 2009); nor the literature on SDO (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994) and
RWA (Altemeyer, 2006); nor would there have been evidence for the three-factor
structure of egalitarianism, authoritarianism, and traditionalism, which proved useful here
for predicting voting behaviour, support for collective action, and vaccination intentions
(among other variables).
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Lastly, ideology as measured by the new scale was stable. In chapter 3, test-retest
reliability values (at two weeks) were between .87 and .90. Policy views may indeed be
unstable, as Converse (1964), Ellis & Stimson (2012), and Kalmoe (2020) have pointed
out, but core political values do not seem to be, at least in the short term. They may also
be relatively stable in the long term. Block & Block (2006) noted that the traits that typify
political orientation – at least along left and right lines – are apparent by preschool age.
The instability noted by other scholars may reflect a difference in their operational
definitions of ideology (symbolic ideology, core values, or policy views), and
consequently a measurement problem.

6.2
The Three Factors of the New Political Ideology
Scale
The factors identified in the development of the NPIS were egalitarianism,
traditionalism, and authoritarianism. Initially, the hypothesized factors also included
dogmatism or radicalism (versus moderatism), as well as two subfactors of
authoritarianism – one capturing authoritarian obedience, and another authoritarian
punitiveness, similar to the structure found in modern versions of the RWA scale (e.g.,
Duckitt et al., 2009; Mavor et al., 2010). The data did not support splitting the
authoritarianism factor, nor did the hypothesized dogmatism factor manifest.
The final egalitarianism factor closely resembled the originally hypothesized
construct and reflects attitudes about how resources should be distributed in society and
how fairly others are treated. Two items written during the scale development process
intended to capture attitudes about ‘equal access’ – towards healthcare and
‘opportunities’ more broadly – were ultimately removed from the egalitarianism factor
due to their very high means and low variance. In other words, nearly all respondents
agreed with these items, making them less useful for discriminating between people with
high and low egalitarianism. Excluding these two items, the final egalitarianism factor
had five items.
The traditionalism factor, like the egalitarianism factor, closely resembles the
hypothesized construct, which was described as a general opposition to change, a dislike
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of perceived ‘radical’ approaches, and value of traditional norms. It was the largest
factor, with six items in the final version of the scale. The traditionalism factor had high
inter-factor correlations with both egalitarianism and authoritarianism, which may
indicate that other aspects of ‘conservatism’ – besides traditionalism or ‘resistance to
change’ – are included in participants’ interpretations of the items. This limitation and
some proposed modifications are further discussed in the future directions section.
It was hypothesized that there could have been an authoritarianism obedience or
submission factor (versus freedom or liberty) and an authoritarianism aggression or
punitiveness factor (versus pacifism). This hypothesis was largely based on the finding
that the RWA scale contains both, in addition to conventionalism (e.g., Duckitt et al.,
2009; Funke, 2005; Mavor et al., 2010). However, only one unified authoritarianism
factor was identified – it was not statistically justified to separate the items written for
these two constructs. One authoritarianism item– “I appreciate government surveillance
because it protects our country from threats” – had varying factor loading strength across
samples. The reasons for this are unclear, but future studies may reveal whether this item
should remain in the scale. The final authoritarianism factor has five (or potentially four)
items that appear to capture an attitude of deference to a ‘strong national leader’, belief in
the rule of law and acceptance of the use of force by authorities, and a belief that strong
authorities keep society safe and stable. Unlike egalitarianism and traditionalism, the
authoritarianism factor had no reverse-coded items.

6.2.1

The Three-Factor Model Compared to One- and Two-Factor
Models
The theoretical problems with using a single-item self-report of symbolic

ideology (i.e., placing oneself on a scale from liberal-to-conservative) are welldocumented. However, some scholars nonetheless argue that this dimension – if not a
single item – are an adequate reflection of most people’s political views.
Yet, many other researchers disagree with a unidimensional approach for both
theoretical and psychometric reasons. Some of the earliest research on ideology in
political psychology argued for multiple dimensions – for example, Ferguson’s (1944)
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humanitarianism, nationalism, and religionism; Eysenck’s (1954) toughmindednesstendermindedness and radicalism-conservatism, and Rokeach’s (1973) national
strength/order and international harmony/equality, to name a few. While these early
scales have long since fallen out of favour, many still argue for the existence of multiple
factors. In fact, Feldman (2013) has argued there are “virtually no cases[s]” where a
unidimensional left-right model is the best fit to the data (p. 6). Many researchers have
found that at least two dimensions are needed, often ‘social’ attitudes or traditionalism
and ‘economic’ attitudes or egalitarianism – roughly analogous for their focuses on
sociocultural norms and the distribution of economic resources, respectively (e.g.,
Achterberg & Houtman, 2009; Ashton et al., 2005; Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 2013;
Feldman & Johnston, 2013; Fleishman, 1988; Heath, 1986a; Heath, et al., 1994; Knight,
1999; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Luttbeg & Gant, 1985; Sarıbay et al., 2017; Treier &
Hillygus, 2009).
Across the studies conducted here, there was no instance identified where a oneor two-factor model would have fit the data better than a model with three factors. In the
EFAs conducted during scale development, the best-fitting solutions had four or more
factors; when the scale was condensed and meaningless factors and items removed, three
factors were selected. When a two-factor model was compared with the three-factor
model in validation study 4 of chapter 3, the two-factor model showed worse fit across all
indices (and given the worse fit of the two-factor model, it is exceedingly unlikely a onefactor model would have been adequate).
One point that should be acknowledged, however, are the relatively high interfactor correlations – specifically between traditionalism and egalitarianism and between
traditionalism and authoritarianism. It is likely that the traditionalism factor requires
further modifications, a point which is elaborated in the future directions section.
However, while high inter-factor correlations can indicate redundancy between the
constructs, this is not necessarily true here. The average correlation between
traditionalism and egalitarianism was |.74|, between traditionalism and authoritarianism
was |.73|, and between egalitarianism and authoritarianism was |.48|. While the shared
variance between traditionalism and the other factors is substantial, some would consider
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it acceptable. Brown (2015) argues factor intercorrelations above .80-.85 should be
questioned, and Meehl (1993) suggests these correlations should be lower than the factor
reliabilities. However, modifications to the traditionalism factor are justified, and could
potentially improve both the model fit and the utility of the scale.
The highest inter-factor correlations were also seen among samples of university
students. This high correlation could represent the increased coherence and strength of
ideology that is seen with higher levels of political sophistication (e.g., Choma & Hafer,
2009; Mirisola et al., 2007; Sidanius & Lau, 1989), given university students are more
educated than the average person. Such a phenomenon does not indicate redundancy
between the factors, but simply reflects a difference in the relationship between these
factors across populations. As Gerring (1997) writes, neglecting to address how ideology
manifests in politically ‘unsophisticated’ individuals equally as much as ‘sophisticated’
individuals “deprive[s] us of a way to talk about the political beliefs” of this population
(p. 26). Those individuals engage with politics, just as university students do (or even
more so).
Another finding that should be addressed is the result of the LPA. Alford et al.
(2005) have argued that there exist two political phenotypes (importantly, not two
dimensions or factors): a ‘contextualist’ group who are optimistic, antiauthoritarian, and
empathetic, and an ‘absolutist’ group who are rigid, traditional, antiegalitarian, and
punitive. The four profiles that emerged in the LPA appear to, roughly, represent a
spectrum spanning one of these phenotypes to the other – two more contextualist, and
two more absolutist – and proponents of a single ideological factor might contend this
resembles a spectrum of liberals to conservatives. However, this would not be a wholly
accurate interpretation of the LPA. For authoritarianism, the profiles did not show a
smooth gradient from one extreme to the other. The ‘moderate conservative’ profile was
substantially more authoritarian than the ‘moderate liberal’ profile and the ‘reactionary
conservative’ profile. This suggests that, rather than being two variants of the same
phenotype, moderate conservatives have a different character than far-right reactionaries,
driven by their differing attitudes towards authority.
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Some scholars use SDO and RWA as a sort of two-factor model of political
attitudes (e.g., Duckitt’s dual-process model, 2001). In some ways, using the NPIS is like
using SDO and RWA to measure ideology, and the literature on SDO and RWA helped
guide hypothesis formation and item development for the new scale. SDO is a measure of
attitudes towards group-based hierarchy, and RWA is a measure of right-wing
authoritarianism; together, they contain elements of anti-egalitarianism, traditionalism,
and authoritarianism. However, as discussed in the introduction, both SDO and RWA are
multifactorial themselves. SDO contains subfactors of SDO-Dominance and SDOEgalitarianism (Ho et al., 2015), and only the latter resembles the egalitarianism factor in
the NPIS – SDO-Dominance more closely resembles punitiveness, especially items such
as “Some groups of people must be kept in their place.”
RWA, as discussed earlier, has been criticized for the double- and triple-barreled
items that confound its three factors of conventionalism (traditionalism), authoritarian
punitiveness, and authoritarian obedience. Recently, researchers have either explored the
fit of a three-factor model or even endeavored to rewrite items to disentangle these
factors, in either case finding better fit for the three-factor structure (Duckitt & Bizumic,
2013; Duckitt et al., 2009; Funke, 2005; Mavor et al., 2010). While this revised RWA
may prove useful for researchers interested in the phenomenon of right-wing
authoritarianism, for researchers seeking to measure overall political ideology, the NPIS
is more appropriate. The authoritarianism factor identified here also does not conflate
authoritarianism with other constructs; for example, RWA contains items referencing
homonegativity, religiosity, and sexism (e.g., “God’s laws about abortion, pornography
and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them
must be strongly punished,” and the reverse-coded “Homosexuals and feminists should
be praised for being brave enough to defy ‘traditional family values’”). Even the revised
RWA scale is ‘contaminated’ by other constructs – as White et al. (2020) point out, two
of the four items intended to measure conventionalism reference a specific religious or
social issue, leaving only two unconfounded items – insufficient for measurement
purposes.
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6.3

Future Directions

The fit indices of the final iteration of the three-factor scale tested here
approached acceptability, but still left room for improvement. The first and most pressing
direction for future research is to develop and test an improved version of the scale, likely
with a handful of additional items to bolster the smallest factor (authoritarianism), and to
better differentiate traditionalism as a resistance to change factor. The latter revision may
potentially reduce traditionalism’s high inter-factor correlations with egalitarianism and
authoritarianism, which was a recurring problem throughout scale development. These
intercorrelations may indicate that some items were conflating multiple aspects of
conservatism – like punitiveness, or attitudes towards outgroups – with resistance to
change.
In the time since the scale was developed and these studies were conducted, a new
measure of interest has been published by White et al. (2020) called the ‘Resistance to
Change-Beliefs’ scale. In their view, resistance to change is characterized by the desire
for societal stability and avoidance of radical progress. Importantly, White et al. (2020)
distinguish between dislike of change – a trait-like predisposition – and the belief that
change is undesirable. This is an important distinction since one might personally dislike
change but nonetheless view societal progress as beneficial. White et al. also point out
that those who are resistant to change may accept some changes but prefer them to be
“slow and organic” (p. 21). White et al.’s (2020) scale includes items like “Slow, gradual
change helps prevent catastrophes and mistakes,” “Traditions reflect wisdom and
knowledge,” and “The established way of doing things should be protected and
preserved.” This research provides a starting point for ideas about how to modify the
traditionalism factor of the NPIS so that it better capture resistance to change and is not
conflated with other right-wing attitudes.
After improving the traditionalism factor, a second task is to investigate the scale
outside the Canadian context, such as in the United States, as well as to test the
measurement invariance of the scale across gender, ethnic group, age, and nationality.
The program of research was delimited to the Canadian context, limiting the conclusions
that can be drawn about its generalizability to other nations. To determine the robustness
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of the findings, the geographic scope must be expanded. While the scale should ideally
demonstrate measurement invariance across gender and age, there is a possibility that
given this delimitation, the NPIS reflects core political values specific to a Canadian
context; however, given that the research draws on theoretical background largely from a
North American and Western European context, the three-factor structure may generalize
to the United States or other Western nations. If the structure itself is stable, the patterns
of intercorrelations between the factors may also differ from country to country; this has
been shown with the three factors of RWA (Duckitt et al., 2009). In the former case, a
modified NPIS could be developed to suit the needs of other cultural and national groups.
Another task is to use the scale to increase understanding of political stances that
are not polarized solely along left-right lines. There are several potential research
avenues. First, it would be useful to further explore the nature of far-right extremism, and
how these fringe movements, like the alt-right, differ from more moderate conservatives.
The latent profile analysis hints at one difference – lower authoritarianism – suggesting
that far-right extremists may be more likely to oppose existing systems in the interest of
advancing their goals. While it may be challenging, recruiting a sample of individuals
who identify as far-right or alt-right, in addition to moderate conservatives, could help
unpack these differences. For example, how do they describe their political identities
(i.e., would this population use the term ‘alt-right’)? Are they more likely to engage in
collective action than moderate conservatives? More urgently, are they predisposed to
engaging in aggression or political violence?
Other complex political views include attitudes towards foreign policy, which
researchers have noted are difficult to define along left-and-right lines (e.g., Hurwitz &
Peffley, 1987). Researching foreign policy attitudes in relation to the factors of
egalitarianism, traditionalism, and authoritarianism may provide insights. It is possible
that egalitarians are less likely to support interventionist policies due to a desire to
maintain peace. It is also possible that authoritarianism plays a role, since inherent to this
construct is obedience and submission to a powerful leader, whose job is to guard the
nation. That is, authoritarians would be likely to support interventionist policies, while
anti-authoritarians may prefer isolationist policies. There may also be a role of political
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sophistication, and specifically knowledge of foreign policy – a topic that is removed
from most people’s lives. For example, those with greater knowledge of their nation’s
military programs may show a stronger relationship between their political ideologies and
their stances on foreign policy – anti-authoritarians who are politically knowledgeable
may be even more strongly opposed to military interventions, and authoritarians who are
knowledgeable may have even greater levels of support for them. And finally, there could
be a non-linear relationship between relevant factors and foreign policy attitudes. A latent
profile analysis and comparison may reveal, for example, that those in the extreme
groups are most likely to oppose interventionist policies, while those in the moderate
groups are more likely to support them.
Populism is a set of beliefs that centers the ‘common people’ and emphasizes a
divide between the populace and corrupt ‘elites’ (Obradović et al., 2020). It is closely
related to isolationist foreign policy stances as it prioritizes the needs and sovereignty of
the nation’s citizens; it can be seen as the opposite of ‘globalism’, or the pursuit of an
economically and politically interconnected world. Populist movements can manifest on
both the left and right (Obradović et al., 2020), and are thus additional examples of
movements not polarized along left and right lines which could be investigated with the
NPIS. Given the ‘vertical opposition’ aspect of populism – that is, it emphasizes a
conflict with political institutions and elites rather than other groups in the common
population (Obradović et al., 2020) – it is likely that authoritarianism is a key predictor of
support for populist movements. There may also be differences between right-leaning and
left-leaning populist movements, even if they have a shared anti-authoritarian quality. For
example, left-leaning populist movements are often described as socialist, while rightleaning populist movements are characterized as ethnonationalist (Obradović et al.,
2020). Supporters of left-leaning populist movements are likely to be more egalitarian
than those of right-leaning movements.
The NPIS presents new opportunities for research in political psychology. Too
often, it is assumed that political behaviours can be understood through the lens of just
one dimension of ideology. Here, it was shown that a model comprising three distinct
core political values is superior to one- and two-dimensional models in terms of model
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fit, as well as more useful than conventional measures of ideology in predicting a variety
of political views, intentions, and behaviours. The NPIS should be further refined so that
researchers with an interest in measuring ideology can make use of this instrument.
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Appendices
Appendix A: EFA 1 seven factor solution factor loadings.
1

2
3
4
5

6

7
8

9
10

11

12

13
14
15
16

Item text
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer
to avoid too many changes in how it
works.
I try my best to follow the traditions
passed down by my culture or society.
Changes in the social order are often
shown later to be for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being
old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political
‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang
are usually just immature acts of
rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the
right ideas about how to live.
These days, people are too willing to
try out wild new ideas without any
proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists and agitators
trying to stir things up.
Sometimes to solve big social
problems, we have to try brand new
approaches.
I admire people who are trying to
make a difference by being active in
political movements.
In order to build a good society, we
need to let go of past customs that are
holding us back.
I am quick to adopt new ideas and
ways of thinking.
Society can survive just fine without
old-fashioned customs to guide it.
Too many people accept the world as
it is instead of trying to make it better.
Sometimes what society needs are
people who are brave enough to push
new ideas, even if they seem
troublesome to some.

1

2

3

.43

.63

.64

.54

.52

.43
.64

4

5

6

7
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17 In a fair world, it is natural that some
people will end up with more
resources and some with less.
18 People should get used to competition,
because it’s an inevitable part of life.
19 Inequality motivates people to work
hard for success.
20 Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay
high taxes just because they’re
successful.
21 It is fine that some people can pay for
privileges others can’t afford.
22 Social inequality is inevitable, because
some groups of people have good
qualities that others do not.
23 It would cause fewer problems if
different groups of people lived
separately and didn’t have to interact.
24 Life would be boring if we ensured
everyone had the same standard of
living.
25 In a fair world, the wealth gap should
be as small as possible.
26 Society is at its best when people
cooperate with those around them.
27 Resources should be distributed
according to people’s needs.
28 A responsible society takes good care
of its weakest members.
29 Different cultural groups have more in
common than they have differences.
30 It is fair to tax people with large
incomes more highly, so that money is
distributed more equitably.
31 The role of the government is to
ensure the wellbeing of all of its
citizens.
32 Our society would have a lot less
conflict if we treated everyone more
equally.
33 No jobs should be looked down upon,
because they all provide useful
contributions to society.
34 Freedom must sometimes be
sacrificed in the name of security.

.60

.56
.47
.80

.53
.51

.53

-.48

-.86
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35 Without strong leaders, society as we
know it would collapse.
36 Government surveillance is only
concerning if you have something to
hide.
37 The role of the government is to
maintain law and order.
38 Parents should be strict in disciplining
their children, to teach them
obedience.
39 Our country’s leaders need to be
tougher on citizens who hold
dangerous views.
40 Criminals should be harshly punished
for the wellbeing of society.
41 Good national leaders keep us safe by
standing up to enemies who would do
us harm.
42 Our government must be prepared to
use its full military might to protect
us.
43 There are some crimes that are so
terrible, the criminal deserves the
death penalty.
44 It is often necessary for the police to
use force to catch potential criminals.
45 All authority should be questioned
rather than blindly followed.
46 One of the worst things I could
imagine would be to live under a
dictatorship.
47 It is not the place of the government to
restrict freedom of speech.
48 What two consenting adults do in their
own bedroom is not anyone else’s
business.
49 In school, kids should be taught to
think critically about all of the
information they receive.
50 Without personal freedom, society as
we know it would collapse.
51 Children should be able to play and
express themselves without too many
strict rules.

.40

.46

.47

.41

.42
.41
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52 I believe in letting others do as they
.40
please, and they should do the same
for me.
53 Rarely, if ever, has declaring war on
another country been justified.
54 Prisons should be places of
rehabilitation, not of harsh
punishment.
55 Violence can be justified when
pursuing a noble goal.
56 I have no faith in our current social
system.
57 When I compromise with the other
side in a political debate, I feel like
I’ve sacrificed some of my integrity.
58 When people are trying to further a
great cause, the ends justify the
means.
59 I know that my political views are
morally right.
60 Sometimes words aren’t enough to
.43
create social change – there needs to
be disruption.
61 Sometimes, creating great changes in
society requires ruthlessness or
brutality.
62 I wouldn’t want to associate at all with
someone whom I politically disagreed
with.
63 It’s best if political changes happen in
small increments.
64 If people from opposing sides of the
political spectrum took the time to
listen, they’d see that they agree on a
lot of things.
65 If you are hostile in a debate, you have
already lost.
66 People shouldn’t try to force their
beliefs on others, regardless of how
strongly they hold them.
67 There are no moral or immoral
political views, only differences of
opinion.
68 Extremists of any political beliefs are
threats to democratic society.

.42

.48

.44
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69 No single group in particular can be
trusted to say what information should
be censored.
70 Educators should be allowed to
express their political views to
students, even if some of those
attitudes are unconventional or
disagreeable.
Note: Only factor loadings ≥0.40 are shown.
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Appendix B: EFA 1 six-factor solution factor loadings.
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

Item text
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too
many changes in how it works.
I try my best to follow the traditions passed down
by my culture or society.
Changes in the social order are often shown later
to be for the worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or
‘establishment’ is something kids should grow out
of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually
just immature acts of rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas
about how to live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild
new ideas without any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists and agitators trying to stir
things up.
Sometimes to solve big social problems, we have
to try brand new approaches.
I admire people who are trying to make a
difference by being active in political movements.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go
of past customs that are holding us back.
I am quick to adopt new ideas and ways of
thinking.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned
customs to guide it.
Too many people accept the world as it is instead
of trying to make it better.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are
brave enough to push new ideas, even if they seem
troublesome to some.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will
end up with more resources and some with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s
an inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for
success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes
just because they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges
others can’t afford.

1

2
.43

3

4

5

.43
.48
.47
.41

.41
.51
.45
.48
.58
.48

.48
.57

.58
.56
.44
.80
.51

6
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22 Social inequality is inevitable, because some
groups of people have good qualities that others do
not.
23 It would cause fewer problems if different groups
of people lived separately and didn’t have to
interact.
24 Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had
the same standard of living.
25 In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small
as possible.
26 Society is at its best when people cooperate with
those around them.
27 Resources should be distributed according to
people’s needs.
28 A responsible society takes good care of its
weakest members.
29 Different cultural groups have more in common
than they have differences.
30 It is fair to tax people with large incomes more
highly, so that money is distributed more
equitably.
31 The role of the government is to ensure the
wellbeing of all of its citizens.
32 Our society would have a lot less conflict if we
treated everyone more equally.
33 No jobs should be looked down upon, because
they all provide useful contributions to society.
34 Freedom must sometimes be sacrificed in the name
of security.
35 Without strong leaders, society as we know it
would collapse.
36 Government surveillance is only concerning if you
have something to hide.
37 The role of the government is to maintain law and
order.
38 Parents should be strict in disciplining their
children, to teach them obedience.
39 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on
citizens who hold dangerous views.
40 Criminals should be harshly punished for the
wellbeing of society.
41 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up
to enemies who would do us harm.
42 Our government must be prepared to use its full
military might to protect us.

.45

.50
-.48
.46
.44
.54
.40
-.86

.46
.43
.45

.48

.49
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43 There are some crimes that are so terrible, the
criminal deserves the death penalty.
44 It is often necessary for the police to use force to
catch potential criminals.
45 All authority should be questioned rather than
blindly followed.
46 One of the worst things I could imagine would be
to live under a dictatorship.
47 It is not the place of the government to restrict
freedom of speech.
48 What two consenting adults do in their own
bedroom is not anyone else’s business.
49 In school, kids should be taught to think critically
about all of the information they receive.
50 Without personal freedom, society as we know it
would collapse.
51 Children should be able to play and express
themselves without too many strict rules.
52 I believe in letting others do as they please, and
they should do the same for me.
53 Rarely, if ever, has declaring war on another
country been justified.
54 Prisons should be places of rehabilitation, not of
harsh punishment.
55 Violence can be justified when pursuing a noble
goal.
56 I have no faith in our current social system.
57 When I compromise with the other side in a
political debate, I feel like I’ve sacrificed some of
my integrity.
58 When people are trying to further a great cause,
the ends justify the means.
59 I know that my political views are morally right.
60 Sometimes words aren’t enough to create social
change – there needs to be disruption.
61 Sometimes, creating great changes in society
requires ruthlessness or brutality.
62 I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone
whom I politically disagreed with.
63 It’s best if political changes happen in small
increments.
64 If people from opposing sides of the political
spectrum took the time to listen, they’d see that
they agree on a lot of things.
65 If you are hostile in a debate, you have already
lost.

.41
.51
.44

.42

.44
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66 People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on
others, regardless of how strongly they hold them.
67 There are no moral or immoral political views,
only differences of opinion.
68 Extremists of any political beliefs are threats to
democratic society.
69 No single group in particular can be trusted to say
what information should be censored.
70 Educators should be allowed to express their
political views to students, even if some of those
attitudes are unconventional or disagreeable.
Note: Only factor loadings ≥0.40 are shown.

.52
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Appendix C: EFA 1 four-factor solution factor loadings.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Item text
Even if society isn’t perfect, I’d prefer to avoid too many
changes in how it works.
I try my best to follow the traditions passed down by my
culture or society.
Changes in the social order are often shown later to be for the
worse.
There is nothing wrong with being old-fashioned.
Rebelling against the political ‘system’ or ‘establishment’ is
something kids should grow out of.
Strange new trends in style or slang are usually just immature
acts of rebellion.
My grandparents’ generation had the right ideas about how to
live.
These days, people are too willing to try out wild new ideas
without any proof they will work.
I don’t trust activists and agitators trying to stir things up.
Sometimes to solve big social problems, we have to try brand
new approaches.
I admire people who are trying to make a difference by being
active in political movements.
In order to build a good society, we need to let go of past
customs that are holding us back.
I am quick to adopt new ideas and ways of thinking.
Society can survive just fine without old-fashioned customs to
guide it.
Too many people accept the world as it is instead of trying to
make it better.
Sometimes what society needs are people who are brave
enough to push new ideas, even if they seem troublesome to
some.
In a fair world, it is natural that some people will end up with
more resources and some with less.
People should get used to competition, because it’s an
inevitable part of life.
Inequality motivates people to work hard for success.
Wealthy people shouldn’t have to pay high taxes just because
they’re successful.
It is fine that some people can pay for privileges others can’t
afford.
Social inequality is inevitable, because some groups of people
have good qualities that others do not.
It would cause fewer problems if different groups of people
lived separately and didn’t have to interact.

1

2

3
.43

4

.59
.43
.40
.46
.41
.59
.46
.49
.60
.45
.43

.45

.62
.40

.53
.47
.56
.66
.42
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24 Life would be boring if we ensured everyone had the same
standard of living.
25 In a fair world, the wealth gap should be as small as possible.
26 Society is at its best when people cooperate with those around
them.
27 Resources should be distributed according to people’s needs.
28 A responsible society takes good care of its weakest members.
29 Different cultural groups have more in common than they have
differences.
30 It is fair to tax people with large incomes more highly, so that
money is distributed more equitably.
31 The role of the government is to ensure the wellbeing of all of
its citizens.
32 Our society would have a lot less conflict if we treated
everyone more equally.
33 No jobs should be looked down upon, because they all provide
useful contributions to society.
34 Freedom must sometimes be sacrificed in the name of security.
35 Without strong leaders, society as we know it would collapse.
36 Government surveillance is only concerning if you have
something to hide.
37 The role of the government is to maintain law and order.
38 Parents should be strict in disciplining their children, to teach
them obedience.
39 Our country’s leaders need to be tougher on citizens who hold
dangerous views.
40 Criminals should be harshly punished for the wellbeing of
society.
41 Good national leaders keep us safe by standing up to enemies
who would do us harm.
42 Our government must be prepared to use its full military might
to protect us.
43 There are some crimes that are so terrible, the criminal
deserves the death penalty.
44 It is often necessary for the police to use force to catch
potential criminals.
45 All authority should be questioned rather than blindly followed.
46 One of the worst things I could imagine would be to live under
a dictatorship.
47 It is not the place of the government to restrict freedom of
speech.
48 What two consenting adults do in their own bedroom is not
anyone else’s business.
49 In school, kids should be taught to think critically about all of
the information they receive.

.60
-.71
.49

.47

-.58
-.40

-.58
.45
-.41

.42

.46

.47
.62
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50 Without personal freedom, society as we know it would
.46
collapse.
51 Children should be able to play and express themselves without
too many strict rules.
52 I believe in letting others do as they please, and they should do
the same for me.
53 Rarely, if ever, has declaring war on another country been
justified.
54 Prisons should be places of rehabilitation, not of harsh
punishment.
55 Violence can be justified when pursuing a noble goal.
56 I have no faith in our current social system.
57 When I compromise with the other side in a political debate, I
feel like I’ve sacrificed some of my integrity.
58 When people are trying to further a great cause, the ends justify
the means.
59 I know that my political views are morally right.
60 Sometimes words aren’t enough to create social change – there
needs to be disruption.
61 Sometimes, creating great changes in society requires
ruthlessness or brutality.
62 I wouldn’t want to associate at all with someone whom I
politically disagreed with.
63 It’s best if political changes happen in small increments.
64 If people from opposing sides of the political spectrum took the
time to listen, they’d see that they agree on a lot of things.
65 If you are hostile in a debate, you have already lost.
66 People shouldn’t try to force their beliefs on others, regardless
.51
of how strongly they hold them.
67 There are no moral or immoral political views, only differences
of opinion.
68 Extremists of any political beliefs are threats to democratic
society.
69 No single group in particular can be trusted to say what
.50
information should be censored.
70 Educators should be allowed to express their political views to
students, even if some of those attitudes are unconventional or
disagreeable.
Note: Only factor loadings ≥0.40 are shown.
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Appendix D: Bivariate correlations for all variables for scale validation study 3, time 1.
1 Age
2 Gender
3 Ethnicity
4 Egal.
5 Trad.
6 Auth.
7 SDO-D
8 SDO-E
9 RWA
10 C19Threat
11 C19Burden
12 C19Restrict
13 C19Punish

1.
.05
-.28***
-.11*
.12*
.00
-.03**
.12
.00
.00
-.04
-.07
-.07

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

-.08
.18**
-.26***
-.14**
-.15**
-.24***
-.20***
.16**
.24***
.03
-.07

-.05
.11*
.22***
.06
.03
.17**
.09*
-.07
.15
.22***

-.61***
-.35***
-.58***
-.70***
-.50***
.28***
.22***
.34***
.11*

.68***
.63***
.66***
.76***
-.10*
-.18***
-.13*
.14**

.50***
.39***
.68***
.05
-.09
.11*
.33***

.76***
.66***
-.13**
-.13**
-.12**
.13**

.54***
-.24***
-.21***
-.24***
-.02

-.04
-.18***
-.10
.13

.38***
.46***
.36***

.04
.043

-

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001
Note: gender (0 = male; 1 = female); ethnicity (0 = white; 1 = ethnic minority)

13.

-
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Appendix E: Bivariate correlations for all variables for scale validation study 3, time 2.
1 Age
2 Gen.
3 Ethn.
4 Egal.
5 Trad.
6 Auth.
7 Cons.
8 Open
9 L-R
10 Pat.
11 Nat.
12 Effi.
13Vote
14 Act

1.
.075
.31***
-.09
.15**
.10
.14**
.11*
.03
.19***
-.02
.09
.23***
-.16**

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

-.09
.22***
-.32***
-.16**
.16**
.15**
-.23***
-.05
-.20***
.03
.07
-.11*

-.08
.12*
.22***
-.17**
-.25***
.18**
.07
.18***
-.18***
-.21***
-.07

-.65***
-.41***
-.05
.30***
-.64***
-.15**
-.26***
.15**
.10
.20***

.66***
-.01
-.42***
.65**
.39***
.57***
-.17**
-.12*
-.27***

.06
-.36***
.50***
.60***
.66***
-.08
-.11*
-.23***

.14**
.00
.26***
.06
.21***
.10
.05

-.35***
-.09
-.21***
.41***
.16**
.26***

.24***
.35***
-.23***
-.27***
-.20***

.61***
.19***
.05
-.09

.04
-.09
-.11*

.24***
.24***

.11*

-

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001
Note: gender (0 = male; 1 = female); ethnicity (0 = white; 1 = ethnic minority)
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Appendix F: Bivariate correlations for all non-policy item variables in validation study 4.
1 Age
2 Gender
3 Ethnicity
4 Egal.
5 Trad.
6 Auth.
7 L-R
8 SDO-D
9 SDO-E
10 RWA
11 N CA
12 N-N CA

1.
-.02
-.18***
.13**
-.03
-.11*
-.12**
-.16***
-.03
-.18***
.08
.08

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

-.09*
.32***
-.35***
-.15**
-.12**
-.22***
-.40***
-.18***
.10*
.01

-.12**
.17***
.14**
.10*
.20***
.15**
.27***
-.23***
-.08

-.72***
-.33***
-.67***
-.63***
-.70***
-.65***
.42***
.21***

.54***
.69***
.68***
.66***
.77***
-.51***
-.32***

.45***
.39***
.28***
.47***
-.21***
-.44***

.57***
.56***
.66***
-.34***
-.38***

.69***
.67***
-.51***
-.16***

.63***
-.43***
-.05

-.56***
-.25***

.11*

-

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001
Note: gender (0 = male; 1 = female); ethnicity (0 = white; 1 = ethnic minority)
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Appendix G: Zero-order bivariate correlations between policy items and ideology scale
Support Canadian government investing more
money in infrastructure for First
Nations/Indigenous communities
Support canceling pipelines opposed by First
Nations/Indigenous communities
Support criminalizing drug use
Support criminalizing sex work
Support re-allocating funding from police
departments to social programs
Support voting rights for convicted criminals
Support publicly run (rather than privately-run)
prisons
Support unrestricted freedom of speech
Support increasing privatization of Canadian
healthcare
Support medically assisted suicide for terminally
ill patients
Support increased spending on mental health care
Support legal abortion
Support covering prescription medication under a
universal health plan
Support allowing transgender athletes to compete
with the gender category they identify with
Support including gender identity in Canadian
anti-discrimination laws
Support same-sex parents having same adoption
rights as heterosexual parents
Support ending ties to the British monarchy
Support increasing tax rate on wealthiest
Canadians
Support raising federal minimum wage
Support raising tax rate on corporations
Support establishing Universal Basic Income
Support classifying Bitcoin as legal currency
Support required citizenship test for immigrants to
Canada
Support deportation of immigrants if they commit
a crime
Support establishing limit on tuition increases
Support continuing providing public funding to
Catholic schools
Support required military service
Support increasing military spending

Egal.
.588***

Trad.
-.580***

Auth.
-.298***

.613***

-.683***

-.418***

-.412***
-.453***
.619***

.482***
.517***
-.678***

.367***
.289
-.464***

.377***
.322***

-.460***
-.268***

-.325***
-.106*

-.284***
-.418***

.314***
.449***

.148**
.297***

.302***

-.313***

-.156***

.530***
.413***
.544***

-.515***
-.489***
-.482***

-.210***
-.254***
-.161***

.485***

-.524***

-.304***

.621***

-.619***

-.284***

.478***

-.474***

-.176***

.297***
.752***

-.376***
-.539***

-.309***
-.351***

.562***
.646***
.606***
-.051
-.282***

-.536***
-.584***
-.560***
.007
.374***

-.322***
-.324***
-.370***
.005
.379***

-.395***

.491***

.334***

.485***
-.284***

-.401***
.336***

-.126**
.285***

-.330***
-.447***

.389***
.576***

.152**
.482***
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Support increasing foreign aid spending
Support establishing a limit on money politicians
can receive from a single donor
Support establishing proportional representation
voting system
Support allowing political campaign donations
from private organizations
Support increasing regulations on businesses to
reduce carbon emissions
Support banning disposable plastic
Support banning hydraulic fracking
Support a tax on meat consumption
Support subsidizing production of renewable
energy infrastructure
Support increasing spending on public
transportation
Support mandatory COVID-19 vaccination
Support mandatory mask-wearing during COVID19 pandemic
Support allowing Internet Service Providers to
selectively control speed of access to websites
based (net non-neutrality)
Support allowing Canadian government to
monitor phone, email, and internet traffic
Support allowing Canadian government to
regulate social media to prevent spread of
misinformation
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Egal.
.382***
.376***

Trad.
-.353***
-.332***

Auth.
-.225***
-.254***

.341***

-.329***

-.189***

-.309***

.354***

.364***

.615***

-.575***

-.257***

.436***
.454***
.349***
.434***

-.430***
-.504***
-.342***
-.462***

-.165***
-.329***
-.236***
-.183***

.414***

-.381***

-.208***

.317***
.497***

-.300***
-.469***

-.076
-.172**

-.306***

.376***

.201***

-.050

.108*

.110*

.322***

-.269***

-.143***
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Appendix H: Bivariate correlations between all study variables in validation study 5.
1 Age
2 Gender
3 Ethnicity
4 Egal.
5 Trad.
6 Auth.
7 L-R
8 Vax likely
9 Vax
willing

1.
.035
-.32***
-.10
.17*
.05
.18*
-.07
-.06

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

-.06
.27***
-.23**
.02
-.28***
.01
.04

-.03
.10
.18*
.10
.02
.02

-.58***
-.12*
-.62***
.29***
.33***

.41***
.71***
-.25**
-.22**

.27***
-.03
-.08

-.37***
-.35***

.83***

-

*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Note: gender (0 = male; 1 = female); ethnicity (0 = white; 1 = ethnic minority)
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Appendix I: Scatterplots for effects of ideology factors and message condition on
likelihood and willingness to receive COVID vaccines

Effects of egalitarianism and message condition on likelihood of receiving COVID19 vaccine
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Effects of egalitarianism and message condition on willingness to receive COVID-19
vaccine

Effects of traditionalism and message condition on likelihood of receiving COVID19 vaccine
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Effects of traditionalism and message condition on willingness to receive COVID-19
vaccine

Effects of authoritarianism and message condition on likelihood of receiving
COVID-19 vaccine
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Effects of authoritarianism and message condition on willingness to receive COVID19 vaccine
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Appendix J: Ethics Approval letters from Western University’s Office of Human
Research Ethics for all samples
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